DAVID SIMS, Appellant, and CITY OF PORTLAND, a municipal corporation,
Intervenor-Appellant, v. BESAW'S CAFE, and BESAW'S CAFE, an Oregon corporation,
Defendants, and RICHARD G. BEASLEY, individually and dba BESAW'S CAFE, and all
predecessors and successors in interest, Respondent.
CA A99868
COURT OF APPEALS OF OREGON
2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 125
October 9, 1998, Argued and Submitted; September 8, 1999, Resubmitted En Banc
January 26, 2000, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY:
[*1] Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County. 9611-08970. Monte Bricker, Judge
pro tempore.
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded to reinstate plaintiff's second claim for relief and to
declare that PCC
§ 23.01.080E is valid as against the objections raised by defendant and that
plaintiff can pursue a claim under PCC
§ 23.01.080E against defendant in circuit court; otherwise affirmed.
COUNSEL: Madelyn Wessel, Chief Deputy City Attorney, argued the cause and filed the
brief for intervenor-appellant City of Portland.
Craig A. Crispin filed the briefs for appellant David Sims. With him on the
briefs were Shelley D. Russell and Crispin
& Associates.
Charles W. Carnese argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent Richard
G. Beasley, individually and dba as Besaw's Cafe.
Lynn R. Nakamoto and Markowitz, Herbold, Glade
& Mehlhaf, P.C., Portland, filed a brief amicus curiae for the American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation of Oregon, Inc.
JUDGES: Before Deits, Chief Judge, and Edmonds, De Muniz, Landau, Haselton, Armstrong,
Linder, Wollheim, Kistler, and Brewer, Judges. Linder, J., concurring. Deits,
C. J., and Haselton and Kistler, JJ., join in this concurrence. Edmonds, J.,
dissenting.
[*2]
OPINIONBY: ARMSTRONG
OPINION: ARMSTRONG, J.
The City of Portland adopted an
ordinance that prohibits Portland employers from discriminating against employees and
prospective employees on a number of bases, including on the basis of
sexual orientation. The
ordinance implements the prohibition by providing people who are harmed by that conduct
with a
cause of action to redress the harm. The trial court held that Portland lacked authority to
give people a
cause of action that they could litigate in state court. We disagree with that conclusion and
reverse, in part, the court's judgment.
Plaintiff filed an action for
employment discrimination against defendant n1 in circuit court that alleged claims under the Portland
ordinance, under a
state statute, and under state tort law. Because plaintiff sought and defendant opposed a
declaration that plaintiff could pursue a claim in state court under the
Portland
ordinance, the court allowed the
City of Portland to intervene in the action to assert a claim for declaratory
relief on the validity of its
ordinance. n2 The court ultimately concluded that the city could not create a
cause of action that plaintiff could litigate in state court. Based on that
[*3] conclusion, the court dismissed the claims by plaintiff and the city under the
Portland
ordinance, and plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal of his state statutory claim. n3 We
conclude that the court erred in dismissing two of plaintiff's four claims and
in dismissing the city's claim for declaratory relief.
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n1 Plaintiff sued two defendants: Richard Beasley dba Besaw's Cafe and Besaw's
Cafe, Inc. Only the former is a party to the appeal, so we refer to him as
defendant.
n2
See ORS 28.110 (gives
municipalities the right to become parties and be heard in declaratory judgment proceedings
in which the validity of their
charters,
ordinances, or franchises is at issue).
n3 Plaintiff based his first claim on a
state statute, ORS 659.030, and his second claim on the Portland
ordinance. He based his third claim on the proposition that the court should treat a
violation of the Portland
ordinance and the
state statute as a
"statutory tort." Finally, he sought in his fourth claim a declaration that he could bring his
first three claims. The trial court apparently viewed its decision on
Portland's authority to create a
cause of action, and plaintiff's decision to withdraw his claim under the
state statute, as controlling whether plaintiff could state a claim for a statutory tort and,
in turn, whether he was entitled to a declaration that he could bring any of
his claims. Hence, it dismissed plaintiff's statutory tort claim and his claim
for declaratory relief when it dismissed plaintiff's other two claims. Even if
the court were correct about Portland's authority to create a
cause of
action, the court nevertheless erred in dismissing plaintiff's and the city's claims
for declaratory relief. That is because the proper disposition of the
declaratory relief claims was not to dismiss them but to declare the parties'
rights.
See, e.g.,
Burks v. Lane County, 72 Ore. App. 257, 260, 695 P.2d 1373 (1985);
Harrison v. Port of Cascade Locks, 27 Ore. App. 377, 379 n 1, 556 P.2d 160 (1976),
rev den
277 Ore. 1 (1977).
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[*4]
Portland's
charter gives the Portland City Council broad legislative authority. Defendant does
not dispute that that authority includes the authority to prohibit
employment discrimination by Portland employers. Indeed, defendant concedes that the city acted within
its authority in enacting its
anti-discrimination
ordinance, except for its decision to include
in the
ordinance the provision that gives people
"a
cause of action in any court of competent jurisdiction" for harm that they suffer as a result of
ordinance violations. Defendant raises a series of arguments against the validity of
that provision. We address them in turn. n4
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n4 The concurrence goes beyond the arguments raised by defendant to explore the
general authority of Oregon cities to
enact legislation. Contrary to the concern expressed by the concurrence, our
decision does not imply that cities are free to modify private law in whatever
manner they choose, so long as their
charters give them that authority. The authority that cities can exercise is limited by
the applicable state and federal law that bears on that authority. On that
issue, we note that, before the people amended the Oregon Constitution to give
themselves the power to
enact
municipal
charters for their cities, the legislature performed that task.
See generally
La Grande/Astoria v. PERB, 281 Ore. 137, 140-45, 576 P.2d 1204,
adhered to on reh'g
284 Ore. 173, 586 P.2d 765 (1978). In doing that, the legislature could adopt a
charter for a city that gave the city government legislative power that was limited
only by the limits imposed by the state and federal constitutions. Nothing
suggests that the shift from the legislature to local citizens as the body
responsible for enacting city
charters served to limit the legislative power that a
charter could give a city government to exercise. In addition to any other
constitutional limits, there are limits imposed by state preemption on the
exercise of legislative power by cities, which we discuss in relation to
defendant's challenge to Portland's
anti-discrimination
ordinance and under which the policy choices made by the state
legislature or voters prevail over local policy choices on substantive matters.
See, e.g.,
La Grande/Astoria, 281 Ore. at 156. If the relevant
charter gives the city the power to
enact the legislation at issue, the question of the city's authority to
enact the legislation will then turn on the limits imposed by state and federal law
on that authority. See
La Grande/Astoria, 281 Ore. at 142. Both we and the concurrence agree that there is no limit of which we are aware
in either source that denies to Portland the authority to adopt legislation to
regulate the conduct of Portland employers toward their employees and to give
people harmed by that conduct a claim for that harm.
The dissent contends that our decision gives cities the authority to override
"the will of the legislature or the people" regarding the effect to be given
municipal law in state court.
2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 125, *58, ___ Ore. App. at ___ (dissenting slip opinion at 8). There is no basis for that assertion. As we
explained above, it is well established that state substantive law preempts
municipal law if the
state law is intended to have that effect.
See, e.g.,
LaGrande/Astoria, 281 Ore. at 156. Consequently, the legislature and the people, through the initiative, have the
power to deny to cities the authority to modify private law or to affect the
law that is used by state courts to
adjudicate private disputes.
See, e.g.,
de Parrie v. State of Oregon, 133 Ore. App. 613, 618-19, 893 P.2d 541,
rev den
321 Ore. 560, 901 P.2d 858 (1995) (state statute can preempt
municipal authority to
enact substantive law on a subject even though the
state statute does not, itself, establish substantive policy on the subject). Nothing that
we have said raises any question about the
preemptive effect of state statutory or constitutional law or is inconsistent
with our recent treatment of that issue in
State v. Logsdon, 2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 38, ___ Ore. App. ___, ___ P.2d ___ (Jan. 12, 2000).
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[*5]
Defendant first contends that the provision constitutes an impermissible
delegation of the city's
"police power," n5 because it authorizes private people, as opposed to city officials, to
bring proceedings to enforce the
ordinance. Defendant confuses law making with law enforcement. The authority that the
Portland
charter gives the city council to
enact laws pursuant to the
"police power" cannot be delegated by the council to others to exercise. n6 The same
prohibition applies to the delegation of legislative power by the state
legislature. n7 However, the prohibition against the delegation of law-making
power has no application to legislative decisions about who can enforce the
policies that the legislative body has chosen to
establish. Defendant cites no authority and offers no analysis, and we are
unaware of any, that supports the proposition that Portland impermissibly
delegated its
"police power" by giving people who are harmed by violations of its
anti-discrimination
ordinance a
cause of action to redress the harm.
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n5 Among other things, the Portland
charter gives the city council the power to
"exercise within the City of Portland all the powers commonly known as the
police power." Consequently, it is appropriate to use that term to describe one facet of the
city's law-making authority. We note, however, that the term can be misleading
as a general description of governmental law-making authority.
See, e.g.,
Dennehy v. Dept. of Rev., 305 Ore. 595, 604 n 3, 756 P.2d 13 (1988).
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[*6]
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n6
See, e.g.,
Brinkley v. Motor Vehicles Division, 47 Ore. App. 25, 27, 613 P.2d 1071 (1980).
n7
See, e.g.,
Hillman v. North. Wasco Co. PUD, 213 Ore. 264, 276-81, 323 P.2d 664 (1958),
overruled on other grounds by
Maulding v. Clackamas County, 278 Ore. 359, 365, 563 P.2d 731 (1977).
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Defendant next contends that Portland lacks authority to give people a
cause of action that can be litigated in state court because the creation of such a
cause of action would add to the jurisdiction of the state courts, and only the state
legislature can do that. Defendant is correct that local governments lack
authority to change state court jurisdiction. He is mistaken, however, in
believing that Portland's creation of a
cause of action that can be litigated in state court does that.
There have been
[*7] instances in which Oregon cities have
exceeded their authority by enacting
ordinances that purported to give state courts authority to perform functions that they
had not been authorized by
state law to perform. In
La Grande v. Municipal Court et al., 120 Ore. 109, 251 P. 308 (1926), for example, the La Grande
charter gave people convicted of
municipal offenses the right to appeal their convictions from
municipal court to the local state circuit court. The Supreme Court had previously held
that the provision in original Article VII, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution that gives circuit courts appellate jurisdiction over lower
tribunals is not self-executing, which meant that additional law had to be
adopted to give circuit courts authority to hear
municipal appeals.
See
La Grande, 120 Ore. at 116 (quoting
Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Ore. 118, 74 P. 710 (1903)). All that
La Grande held was that the additional law had to be state rather than
municipal law. In other words, the court held that the city could not assign a function to
the local state circuit court--serving as the appellate court for the La Grande
municipal court--that
[*8] the state had not authorized the state court to perform.
Lines v. City of Milwaukie, 15 Ore. App. 280, 515 P.2d 938 (1973),
rev den (Or 1974), applied the same principle. It involved a city
charter that gave the circuit court appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of a
city civil service commission. We held that the city lacked authority to add to
the jurisdiction of the state courts and that the grant by the city to the
circuit court of appellate jurisdiction over the city's civil service
commission decisions had done that.
See also
Wong Sing v. Independence, 47 Ore. 231, 234, 83 P. 387 (1905) (applied same principle).
Here, in contrast, the Portland
ordinance does not purport to confer any jurisdiction on state courts or to assign any
function to them. It provides only that people harmed by violations of it
"shall have a
cause of action in any court of competent jurisdiction." Whether the state circuit court
is a court that has jurisdiction to
adjudicate such a claim is an issue that we must address, but that is a different issue
from the one presented in
La Grande and Lines on whether cities can directly assign to state
[*9] courts functions that they have not been authorized by
state law to perform. n8
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n8 In defendant's view, the creation of a
cause of action that can be litigated in state court adds to the jurisdiction of the state
court. If that were true, it would mean that state courts would change their
own
jurisdiction whenever they recognized a new
cause of action or eliminated an existing one. Such a change in the law normally is not
considered to change a court's jurisdiction, unless the affected court's
jurisdiction is limited in some way, such that recognition of a new
cause of action would expand its jurisdiction beyond that authorized by the granting authority.
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As to the jurisdictional issue, we conclude that the state circuit court has
jurisdiction to
adjudicate a claim under the Portland
ordinance. Except to the extent that it has been modified by statute, original Article
VII, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution is the source of circuit court
jurisdiction.
See Or Const, Art VII,
§ 2 (amended). It provides:
[*10]
"All judicial power, authority, and jurisdiction not vested by this
Constitution, or by laws consistent therewith, exclusively in some other Court
shall belong to the Circuit Courts, and they shall have appellate
jurisdiction, and supervisory control over the County Courts, and all other
inferior Courts, Officers, and tribunals."
No statute of which we are aware has changed that grant of jurisdiction in a
way that is relevant to this case.
The judicial power identified in that provision includes the power to
adjudicate civil, or private-law, disputes without regard to the source of the law. As
long as a circuit court has personal jurisdiction over the parties, the parties
can litigate claims based on the law of this and other states, of the United
States, and of foreign countries. n9 There are court-created principles that
bear on the manner and extent to which an Oregon circuit court will
adjudicate a private dispute based on foreign law, but the court has jurisdiction to do
it.
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n9 Actions involving disputes with which the state has no connection other than
jurisdiction over the parties are referred to as transitory actions. The state
judicial power extends to the adjudication of transitory
actions.
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[*11]
Aldrich v. Anchor Coal Co., 24 Ore. 32, 32 P. 756 (1893), illustrates the principle.
Aldrich involved a claim by a contractor against a
stockholder of a California corporation for a debt allegedly owed by the corporation to
the contractor. The contractor based its claim on a California statute that
made
stockholders of California corporations individually liable for their proportionate share
of corporate liabilities. It was not a claim that was cognizable under Oregon
law, and the trial court dismissed it on that basis. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the court had authority to
adjudicate the claim:
"The [California] statute indeed creates a new right and liability not existing
at
common law, but [it] does not prescribe a peculiar remedy for its enforcement; it only
declares that it may be enforced by action,
leaving the creditor to select such
common-law remedies as may be in use in the jurisdiction where the suit is brought to
enforce such liability. * * * Where a liability * * * is created by statute,
without making the procedure for its enforcement, as it were, a part of the
liability, we cannot see why it should not be enforced in any
[*12] court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties."
Aldrich, 24 Ore. at 38. n10
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n10 The effort by the dissent to distinguish
Aldrich from this case reveals a fundamental flaw in the dissent's analysis.
See ___ Ore. App. at ___ (dissenting slip opinion at 10-12). The liability that
the
Aldrich statute imposed on
stockholders to pay corporate obligations was not a liability that the
common law would recognize, so there was no
common-law remedy available to the plaintiff for that liability. However, the statute
that imposed the liability did not specify a remedy for it, so the court could
supply a remedy from
among the normal
common-law remedies that were available to it for such a liability by, for example,
awarding damages.
We can assume, for these purposes, that the
common law imposes no liability for the discriminatory conduct that the Portland
ordinance proscribes. Because the
common law imposes no liability for that conduct, it necessarily provides no remedy for
it. The Portland
ordinance imposes liability for the conduct. However, as in
Aldrich, it leaves it to the courts to supply remedies for that liability from among
the appropriate
remedies that are available to them, again, for example, by awarding damages.
In the dissent's view, the Portland
ordinance is invalid because it gives people
a remedy for conduct for which the
common law would not impose liability even though the
ordinance does not specify
what remedies flow from the liability. If that were a correct understanding of the
relevant principles, then
Aldrich, itself, was wrongly decided, because it, too,
gave people
a remedy in circumstances in which the
common law would not give them one. At bottom, the dissent is founded on a fundamental
failure to distinguish between legislation that imposes liability in
circumstances in which the
common law would not and legislation that provides
"peculiar" remedies for the liabilities that it imposes. The legislation at issue in
Aldrich and this case is legislation of the former type. It did not, and does not, run
afoul of any principle of which we are aware.
See also
Aldrich, 24 Ore. at 38 (peculiar remedy that prevents adjudication of
cause of action is one that forum is
"incapable of administering").
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[*13]
Oregon
municipal law also is a source of law that an Oregon circuit court can apply in adjudicating
a private dispute. In other words, it is within the judicial power of the
circuit court to
adjudicate a private dispute that arises under Oregon
municipal law.
Consequently, the circuit court is a
"court of competent jurisdiction" to
adjudicate a claim under the Portland
ordinance.
The dissent does not dispute that the circuit court has jurisdiction to
adjudicate a claim under the Portland
ordinance. In its view, however, Portland exceeded its authority by creating a
cause of action that could be litigated in circuit court, because the creation of the
cause of action imposes an obligation on the court to
adjudicate claims that it would not otherwise be required to
adjudicate. The dissent is correct that Oregon
municipalities infringe on state sovereignty, and thereby act beyond their authority, by
requiring or authorizing state officials to perform functions that they have
not been authorized by
state law to perform. The dissent is wrong, however, in its belief that Portland's
creation of the
cause of action at issue in this case runs afoul of that principle.
The dissent principally
[*14] relies on two Oregon cases as support for its position. One of them is
La Grande
v.
Municipal Court, which we have discussed above. The other is
City of Eugene v. Roberts, 305 Ore. 641, 756 P.2d 630 (1988). That case involved an effort by the City of Eugene to place an advisory
question on a state election ballot. The court concluded that the proposed
question was not one that
state statutes authorized the relevant state and county election officials to place on the
ballot. The city argued, however, that its status as a
home rule city gave it the authority to require county officials to place the question
on the ballot. The court rejected that argument, reasoning that the city's
home rule power did not give it the power
"to conscript the services of county and state officials in the conduct of city
business."
Id. at 650. In other words, the city could not require the election officials to do
something that
state law did not authorize them to do.
The court considered
Wilson v. City of Medford, 107 Ore. 624, 215 P. 184 (1923), to provide direct support for its
City of Eugene decision:
"There, an
ordinance of the City of
[*15] Medford purported to require the county recorder to record certain items on
the county lien docket. This court said:
"' * * * Stated in broad terms and without attempting to attain technical
exactness, the city can as part of its prescribed procedure require the
recording in the office of the county recorder of any paper which it would, by
force of
state law, be the
duty of that officer to record if presented by any individual; but cities cannot,
in the exercise of the initiative and under the guise of
municipal legislation[,] expand the
duties of state or county officers beyond the limits fixed by
state laws * * * .'
"
Id. at 643. (Citations omitted.) We find this analysis to be equally applicable here."
City of Eugene, 305 Ore. at 650 (citing additional cases, including
La Grande v.
Municipal Court).
In each of the cited cases, cities sought to require or authorize state
officials to perform functions that they had not been authorized by
state law to perform. Here, in contrast, the challenged Portland
ordinance does
not add to the circuit court's authority to
adjudicate claims. One of the basic functions of the circuit
[*16] court is to resolve disputes over harm caused to people as a result of failure
by others to conform their behavior to the requirements of law. Therefore,
independently of the Portland
ordinance, the circuit court has authority to
adjudicate a claim by an employee of a Portland employer for harm caused by
discriminatory treatment by the employer on the basis of
sexual orientation. Leaving aside for these purposes the effect of ORS 659.030, n11 that claim
might fail because
employment discrimination on that basis is not unlawful. Nevertheless, the claim is one that the circuit
court has authority to hear. The effect of the Portland
ordinance is to change the law that bears on such a claim, making it one on which the
employee
can prevail, but it does not add to the function or
duties of the circuit court for the court to
adjudicate the claim.
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n11 ORS 659.030 prohibits certain employment practices, the violation of which
can give rise to a claim that can be litigated in state court.
See, e.g.,
Tanner v. OHSU, 157 Ore. App. 502, 971 P.2d 435 (1998). The claim by plaintiff that the court dismissed by stipulation was a claim
based on ORS 659.030. See pages 1-2 and note 3
supra.
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[*17]
That contrasts with the situation presented in
La Grande,
Lines, City of Eugene, and
Wilson. In each of those cases, cities had to change
state law in order to permit the
state officials to do what the cities wanted them to do. The cases held that
the cities simply did not have the power to do that.
La Grande,
Lines,
City of Eugene, and
Wilson essentially establish a principle that is the other side of that established
in
State ex rel. Haley v. City of Troutdale, 281 Ore. 203, 210-11, 576 P.2d 1238 (1978), on the relationship between state and
municipal law.
Haley held that the policy choices made by the state legislature on civil matters
are not presumed to preempt those made by cities. In contrast, the cited cases
establish that the policy choices made by the state legislature regarding the
authority of state officials
do preempt the ability of cities to make different choices about the officials'
authority. In
City of Eugene, state election officials did not have authority to conduct votes on advisory
measures.
State law had to be
changed to give them that authority.
Municipal law could not do that.
[*18] In
La Grande and
Lines, circuit courts did not have authority to hear appeals from
municipal courts or commissions.
State law had to be changed to give them that authority, and, again,
municipal law could not do that. Here, in contrast, circuit courts
do have authority to
adjudicate claims under Portland's
ordinance. No
state law has to be changed or enacted to give them that authority. n12
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n12 Of course, the issue framed in this case can be examined outside the
context of court authority to
adjudicate claims. Assume, for example, that the state employed building inspectors and
charged them with inspecting new buildings to confirm that they were built
according to the applicable building codes. Assume further that a city adopted
a building code that required double-wall construction, while the state
building code required only single-wall construction.
Haley
held that a city building-code requirement of that kind was not preempted by
the state building code as a matter of then-existing
state law.
Haley, 281 Ore. at 205-11. If the state building inspector required conformance with the city's
double-wall standard, she would be enforcing the city's substantive law, but
she would be performing the job that she had been assigned by the state to
perform. In contrast, if the city adopted an
ordinance that required state building inspectors to conduct inspections that they were
not required by
state law to perform, for example, inspecting commercial buildings when they were
employed by the state to inspect only residential buildings, the
ordinance could not be enforced.
See, e.g.,
Wilson, 107 Ore. at 648-50 (city could require state official to do job specified by
state law but nothing more). All that the Portland
anti-discrimination
ordinance does is change the substantive law that
state courts use to perform the adjudicative role that they have been assigned
by
state law to perform. It does not run afoul of any limit of which we are aware that is
imposed on the enactment of
municipal law.
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[*19]
The dissent also claims support for its position from McQuillin's treatise on
municipal law.
See
2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 125, *14-20, ___ Ore. App. at ___ (dissenting slip opinion at 14-16) (citing Eugene
McQuillin, 6
The Law of
Municipal Corporations
§ 22.01 (3d ed 1998)). The dissent quotes the following statement by McQuillin,
which the dissent identifies as stating the first of two rules that bear on the
authority of cities to affect private law:
"'The well-established
general rule is that a
municipal corporation cannot create by
ordinance a right of action between third persons
or
enlarge the
common law or statutory
duty or liability of citizens
among themselves.'"
2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 125, *67, ___ Ore. App. at ___ (emphasis added). n13 The dissent treats the
statement as if it dealt only with the authority of cities
to create
causes of action and not their authority
to affect existing ones. But the statement addresses
both issues and asserts that the
"well-established
general rule" is that cities lack authority to do either of those things. Oregon Supreme
Court cases establish, however, that, contrary to McQuillin's view, Oregon
cities
can
"enlarge the
common
[*20] law * * *
duty or liability of citizens among themselves."
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n13 Not surprisingly, most of the cases that McQuillin cites as support for
that rule do not, in fact, support it. For example, McQuillin cites
Yellow Freight Systems v. Mayor's Com'n, 791 S.W.2d 382 (Mo 1990), as support for its contention that cities lack authority to create
a private
cause of action. McQuillin, at 338 n 1. However, the court based its holding in
Yellow Freight Systems on a Missouri constitutional provision that governed the authority of Missouri
municipal courts. It held that the provision prevented the city from using a commission,
that is, an executive rather than a judicial forum, to award relief to people
who were affected by violations of the city's civil rights
ordinance.
Yellow Freight Systems, 791 S.W.2d at 384-85. The court pointedly did not address whether the city could create a private
cause of action that could be enforced in state court. See
Yellow Frieght Systems, 791 S.W.2d at 385-86.
The bulk of the other cases cited by McQuillin suffer from similar flaws.
See, e.g.,
Delaney v. Superior Fast Freight, 14 Cal. App. 4th 590, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33 (1993) (state preemption made it unnecessary to decide if city could create
cause of action for
employment discrimination). The authority of cities to
enact
ordinances is derived from the grant of that authority in each state. Those grants differ
dramatically.
See Gary T. Schwartz,
The Logic of
Home Rule and the Private Law Exception,
20 UCLA L Rev 671, 681-97 (1973). Consequently, as Professor Schwartz noted in his comprehensive analysis of the
authority of
home rule cities to
enact
ordinances that affect private law, McQuillin and the cases that it cites are of no use
in determining whether a city in a particular state has the authority to create
a
cause of action or to otherwise affect private law. See Schwartz,
20 UCLA L Rev at 696-710 & nn 160, 163.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*21]
In
Marsh v. McLaughlin et ux, 210 Ore. 84, 309 P.2d 188 (1957), the court held that a property owner could not be liable at
common law for injuries sustained as a result of the owner's failure to maintain the
sidewalk on the owner's property. The court then looked to the Salem city
charter to determine whether it imposed liability on property owners for that conduct
and concluded that it did not. That the court looked to the
charter is telling, because the court treated the issue as one in which the city
could impose liability on the property owner, which liability would be enforced in a
civil action in state circuit court notwithstanding that the injured party
could not prevail in such an action at
common law. The court had applied the same principle four years earlier in
Olson v. Chuck et al., 199 Ore. 90, 259 P.2d 128 (1953), in which it
held that an injured pedestrian could recover against a property owner for
injuries sustained as a result of the owner's failure to maintain a
sidewalk, based on a Portland code provision that imposed that liability on the owner.
Hence,
Marsh and
Olson establish that Oregon cities can
enlarge the
[*22]
common-law
duties and liabilities of private parties. n14
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n14
See also
Lange v. Minton, 303 Ore. 484, 738 P.2d 576 (1987);
Harris v. Sanders, 142 Ore. App. 126, 919 P.2d 512,
rev den
324 Ore. 322, 927 P.2d 598 (1996); note 16
infra. In the dissent's view,
Marsh and
Olson stand for the proposition that cities have authority to
enact
ordinances that establish negligence
per se and that thereby affect the standard of care that is applied by courts
within an existing
common-law
cause of action. In a normal negligence action, a jury or court, as fact finder, determines
whether the defendant's conduct was negligent. In other words, it determines
where on the continuum of conduct the point is reached that constitutes
negligent conduct. A statute or
ordinance that is treated by a court as establishing negligence
per se operates to fix as a legal matter the point on the same continuum where
negligent conduct is reached, thereby removing that factual issue from the fact
finder. Such a statute or
ordinance would not change
common-law
duties or liabilities; it would simply remove a factual issue from the fact finder
about whether or not the particular conduct met the recognized
duty to act reasonably.
Marsh and
Olson involve
ordinances that have a very different effect. Under the
common law, a
landowner could
not be liable for failing to maintain
a
sidewalk to guard against the hazards presented in those cases. As a matter of law,
there was
no
duty to maintain the
sidewalk to remove the hazards and
no liability could attach for failing to perform that
duty. Consequently, there was no continuum of conduct for a fact finder to consider
to determine whether or not the particular conduct fulfilled the recognized
duty to act.
Marsh and
Olson established the principle that
municipal
ordinances
could impose a
duty on
landowners to maintain
sidewalks and that breach of that
duty
could result in liability in a state court action to those harmed by the breach.
That is precisely what McQuillin says
municipal
ordinances cannot do.
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[*23]
The dissent does not attempt to explain why Oregon's rejection of one half of
McQuillin's
general rule should cause us to treat the other half of it as nevertheless valid in Oregon.
In fact, both halves of the rule are based on a
widely held assumption that cities lack authority to affect private law. That
assumption does not withstand examination, as Professor Schwartz demonstrated
in his comprehensive 1973 article on the authority of
home rule cities to affect private law. n15 Most critically, however, the Supreme
Court's implicit rejection of that assumption through its decisions in
Marsh and
Olson means that McQuillin's statement loses all force as support for the dissent's
distinction between the authority of cities to create new
causes of action and their authority to alter liability under existing ones.
See ___ Ore. App. at ___ (dissenting slip opinion at 12-20). n16
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n15
See Gary T. Schwartz,
The Logic of
Home Rule and the Private Law Exception,
20 UCLA L Rev 671, 672-777 (1973).
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[*24]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n16 The dissent treats McQuillin's rule as if it were based on the
principle that cities lack authority to impose obligations on state agencies
and officials, rather than on the principle that cities lack authority to
affect private law. As explained above, McQuillin's rule is based on the latter
principle, not the former.
See Schwartz,
20 UCLA L Rev at 696-710 & nn 160, 163. There is no doubt that Oregon cities lack authority to impose obligations on
the state, but that does not mean, as the dissent would have it, that the
Oregon cases that have applied that principle support the application of the
McQuillin rule in Oregon. For example, the dissent claims that the McQuillin
rule against creating
causes of action or affecting
common-law liability
"finds expression in
La Grande v.
Municipal Court."
2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 125, *70, ___ Ore. App. at ___ (dissenting slip opinion at 16). However,
La Grande had nothing to do with creating or affecting private
remedies that could be litigated in state court. It dealt with the authority of
a city to add to the jurisdiction of the local state circuit court by making it
the appellate court for the city's
municipal court. Giving people a
cause of action that they can litigate in court does not add to the jurisdiction or authority
of the state courts or impose obligations on them that they do not already have.
Furthermore, the distinction that the dissent draws between
municipal authority to affect existing
causes of action and its authority to create new ones makes no sense. In the dissent's view, a
city can
enact an
ordinance that affects a negligence claim but not one that creates a claim for
employment discrimination. However, negligence is simply the label that we attach to the circumstances
in which you can be liable for harm caused by your inadvertent conduct.
Wrongful discharge, battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and similar terms are simply the labels that
we attach to the circumstances in which you can be liable for your intentional
conduct. If the
common law establishes that you are
not liable for harm caused by your inattention to the condition of your
sidewalk, but a
municipal
ordinance makes you liable for that harm, the
ordinance has imposed liability for conduct that the courts would not recognize as
tortious and, hence, actionable.
See
Marsh, 210 Ore. at 88-91;
Olson, 199 Ore. at 105-13;
Harris v. Sanders, 142 Ore. App. 126, 919 P.2d 512,
rev den
324 Ore. 322, 927 P.2d 598 (1996). Similarly, if the
common law would not impose liability for the harm caused by your decision to discharge
an employee on the basis of
sexual orientation, but a
municipal
ordinance makes you liable for that harm, that
ordinance, too, imposes liability for conduct that the courts would not recognize as
tortious or actionable. The two
ordinances are functionally indistinguishable for these purposes, yet the dissent
concludes that a city has authority to
enact one but not the other.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*25]
Defendant's final contention is that Portland's creation of a private
cause of action conflicts with
state statutes that give the Multnomah County Circuit Court jurisdiction over, and the
Portland city attorney authority to bring, proceedings to
prosecute violations of Portland's
ordinances. n17 Defendant reasons that those statutes represent the sole source of
authority for Portland to enforce its
ordinances in state court. Consequently, Portland exceeded that authority by creating a
private
cause of action that litigants could pursue in state court for violations of the
anti-discrimination
ordinance. Two federal
judges have used similar reasoning to dismiss claims brought in federal court
under the Portland
ordinance. n18 Defendant misconceives the role of the relevant statutes.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n17 The statute that gives the Multnomah County Circuit Court jurisdiction over
such proceedings is ORS 3.136(1). It provides:
"The circuit court for a county within the boundaries of which there is situated
the largest part of a city having a population of more than 300,000 shall have
all judicial jurisdiction, authority, powers, functions and
duties of the
municipal court of each such city and the judges thereof with respect to all violations
of the
charter and
ordinances of each such city."
At the time that this case began, that statute gave the Multnomah County
District Court rather than the circuit court that jurisdiction. The abolition
of the district court on January 15, 1998, caused the jurisdiction to shift
from the district court to the circuit court. See notes preceding ORS 1.001.
The statute that
addresses the authority of city attorneys to
prosecute
municipal violations is ORS 221.315(1), which provides, as relevant:
"Prosecution of violations of the
charter or
ordinances of a city in circuit court or justice court shall be by the city attorney in
the name of such city. An agreement may be made between any city and, on behalf
of the state, the presiding judge for the judicial district in which all or
part of such city is located, that such violations be prosecuted for such city
in the circuit court by the district attorney in the name of the State of
Oregon."
To the extent that ORS 3.136 is understood to make the Multnomah County Circuit
Court the
municipal court for Portland for the prosecution of Portland
municipal violations, ORS 221.315(1) may not have any bearing on such prosecutions,
because the latter statute applies only to the prosecution of
municipal offenses in
circuit court. We need not resolve that issue to decide this
case.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*26]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n18
See Brown v. Starbucks Corp., No. 96-269-MA (D Or July 1, 1996);
Sexsmith v. Marriott International, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1040, 1041 (D Or 1995);
Seidel v. Albertson's, Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2438, No. 94-1275-
FR, 1995 WL 82268 (D Or Feb. 22, 1995).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The courts of one sovereign generally do not execute the penal laws of another.
n19 That means that governmental officials who
prosecute offenses must do so in the courts of the sovereign that they serve. We do not
need to decide the extent to which that principle applies to the state and
municipal governments in Oregon. It is sufficient to recognize that it could operate to
deny Oregon
municipalities the ability to use the state circuit court as the forum for
municipal officials to
prosecute
municipal
offenses.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n19
See generally
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666-69, 13 S. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123 (1892);
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§ 89 (1971); Robert A. Leflar et al.,
American Conflicts Law
§§ 46, 111 (4th ed 1986).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*27]
We believe that the legislature recognized that principle when it enacted the
statutes that permit Portland to use the Multnomah County Circuit Court to
prosecute
municipal violations. n20 Whether those statutes expanded circuit court jurisdiction to
encompass those proceedings or simply served to confirm its jurisdiction over
them, the legislature's decision to
enact those statutes does not imply a decision
to subtract from the court's existing jurisdiction over private-law disputes, which, as we
have explained above, includes jurisdiction over disputes that are based on
municipal law. Hence, Portland's
decision to create a private
cause of action for violations of its
anti-discrimination
ordinance does not conflict with the statutes that permit Portland to use the circuit
court to
prosecute
municipal violations, that is, to use it for public law enforcement. n21
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n20 ORS 3.132, ORS 221.315(1), and ORS 221.337, in turn, permit other Oregon
cities to use the circuit court for the same purpose.
n21 The foregoing discussion refutes the dissent's contention, ___ Ore. App. at
___ n 4 (dissenting slip opinion at 7 n 4), that our decision renders
superfluous the statutes that give circuit courts jurisdiction over proceedings
to
prosecute
municipal violations.
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[*28]
In summary, Portland did not exceed its authority by prohibiting discrimination
by Portland employers on the basis of
sexual orientation and by giving people who are harmed by the
prohibited conduct a claim for relief for that harm in any court that has
jurisdiction to hear such a claim. State circuit courts are courts that have
jurisdiction to hear such a claim. The trial court erred in concluding that
they do not.
Plaintiff's third claim for relief sought to recover damages for defendant's
alleged violation of Portland's
anti-discrimination
ordinance on the ground that the violation constituted a
"statutory tort." The city also sought a declaration that its
ordinance could provide the basis for such a claim. On appeal, plaintiff and the city
also argue that the claim could be understood to allege a claim for wrongful
discharge. We understand plaintiff and the city to assert the claim as an
alternative claim that could be pursued if it were determined that the city
lacked authority to create a
cause of action for violation of the
ordinance. Because we have concluded that the city had authority to create a
cause of action that could be litigated in
state court, we do not reach plaintiff's
[*29] and the city's alternative claim.
Reversed and remanded to reinstate plaintiff's second claim for relief and to
declare that PCC
§ 23.01.080E is valid as against the objections raised by defendant and that
plaintiff can pursue a claim under PCC
§ 23.01.080E against defendant in circuit court; otherwise affirmed.
CONCURBY: LINDER
CONCUR: LINDER, J., concurring.
I write separately because, although I agree with the
lead opinion's ultimate validation of the city's
ordinance, its analysis sweeps too broadly in concluding generally that
"cities can
enlarge the
common-law
duties and liabilities of private parties."
2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 125, *19, ___ Ore. App. at ___ (slip op at 15). As I understand the
lead opinion, a city's authority to alter private rights and responsibilities is unlimited
except insofar as the legislature affirmatively has enacted preemptive
state laws. In my view, the issue need not and should not be decided in terms so general
or so abstract. The precise question before us is whether
this
ordinance is within the city's power to
enact. Pursuant to a more narrow--or at least more specific--analysis, I would
conclude that it is.
The starting point is to examine the challenged
ordinance and the city's
[*30] interest in it. To be sure,
no one disputes that the general
nondiscrimination policy embodied in the
ordinance is one that the city may pursue. Indeed, defendants carefully
"reiterate" in their brief that they do not assert that the city acted outside its
authority in enacting a
nondiscrimination policy; their objection is to the creation of a private
cause of action to further that policy. But the issue cannot be analyzed in a contextual
vacuum. The
ordinance's provisions and the purposes underlying them are the predicate for a meaningful
examination of the city's authority.
The particular provisions challenged in this case were enacted in 1991 as part
of an comprehensive set of
ordinances directed to combating discrimination in employment, housing, and public
accommodation. By design, the provisions parallel and complement the
nondiscrimination provisions of ORS chapter 659. For example, prohibited employment acts are
those made unlawful under ORS 659.030 and 659.425; prohibited acts
in selling, renting, or leasing real property are those made unlawful under ORS
659.033 and 659.430; and prohibited acts in places of public accommodation
include those made unlawful under ORS 659.037
[*31] and 659.425.
See Portland City Code (PCC) 23.01.050 to 23.01.070. The city's code explicitly
provides for enforcement of the
nondiscrimination provisions through the complaint procedures established in ORS chapter 659 and
administered by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries. n22
See
PCC 23.01.080. Of particular significance here, the
ordinance further provides:
"Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory act under the
provisions of this code shall have a
cause of action in any court of competent jurisdiction for damages and such other remedies as
may be appropriate." PCC 23.01.080(E).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n22 The city has not purported to force this role on the Commissioner or the
agency. Rather,
apparently through some form of intergovernmental agreement (see ORS 190.010), the Commissioner and the city have agreed to this cooperative
mechanism of enforcement.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The essential difference between the city's
ordinances and
state law lies in the fact that the
ordinances' prohibitions
[*32] extend expressly to discrimination on grounds that include
sexual orientation and source of income. n23
See generally Title 23, chapter 1 of the PCC. The Portland City Council included those
categories of discrimination after months of research, background work by city
staff and community leaders, and extensive public hearings examining
discrimination on those grounds in employment, housing, and public
accommodations. The public hearings culminated in the council's finding that
such discrimination exists and is detrimental to the city's general welfare and
the full participation of its citizens in city life. The council's finding,
which it codified, is worth quoting in full:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n23 The city's
code also establishes uniform protection for all prohibited grounds of
discrimination. Under ORS chapter 659, some categories of discrimination (e.g., age and familial status) are protected for some purposes and not others.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
"The City Council finds that discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation
[*33] and source of income exists in the City of Portland and that
state law does not clearly prohibit such discrimination. It is the intent of the
Council, in the exercise of its powers for the protection of the public health,
safety, and general welfare and for the maintenance of peace and good
government, that every individual shall have an equal opportunity to
participate fully in the life of the City and that discriminatory barriers to
equal participation in employment, housing, and public accommodation be removed."
PCC 23.01.020.
See also
PCC 23.01.010 (recognizing that all prohibited discrimination threatens the
"health, safety and general welfare of the citizens of Portland and menaces the
institutions and foundation of our community").
The city's
nondiscrimination provisions are far from novel, at least in their fundamental terms. They
reflect a now-familiar and commonplace policy of equal access and
nondiscrimination in areas basic to the most minimal quality of life in our communities:
employment, housing, and public accommodation. In that regard, it is not
surprising that defendants do not dispute the legitimacy of the city's
regulatory goal or the city's general
[*34] authority to legislate to that end. The days of doubting that so-called
"civil rights laws" reflect compelling public interests are long past. Nor is there doubt that
those policies are of equal or greater concern to
municipalities than they may be to states or to the nation as a whole.
See,
e.g.,
District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 73 S. Ct. 1007, 97 L. Ed. 1480 (1953) (upholding District of Columbia
ordinance prohibiting restaurants from discriminating based on race as valid exercise of
police power and within district's authority as a
municipality exercising
home rule). As the Kansas Supreme Court pointedly observed:
"We would be hard pressed to say at this point in time and history that
legislation designed to eliminate the poison of discrimination from our midst
is not a proper exercise of the
police power. Recent experience has gone far to demonstrate, particularly in urban
communities, that discrimination against minorities has a direct and
detrimental impact on the orderly processes of government, the peace and
tranquility of a community, and the health, safety and general well-being of
its residents.
"Problems arising
[*35] from racial and other forms of discrimination are especially common in
population centers; the cancer of injustice toward members of minority groups
is peculiarly virulent on the local scene; discrimination is essentially a
people problem, and must eventually be dealt with and solved by people in the
localities where they live."
Hutchinson Hum. Rel. Com'n v. Midland Cr. Man., Inc., 213 Kan. 308, 312, 517 P.2d 158, 162 (1973).
See also
City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 265 Ga. 161, 454 S.E.2d 517 (1995) (upholding
ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation as a proper exercise of
municipality's
police power). n24
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n24 Indeed,
municipalities tend to be the proving grounds--in terms of both need and public
acceptance--for
nondiscrimination policies that later are adopted at state and national levels. Public
accommodations
ordinances requiring equal access for racial minorities, for example, were enacted at
local and state levels before federal legislation came into existence.
Compare
John R.Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 97 L. Ed. 1480, 73 S. Ct. 1007 (1872 and 1873
ordinances)
with
The Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 USC § 2000a et seq. The same is true of fair housing laws.
Compare
Chicago Real Estate Board v. City of Chicago, 36 Ill. 2d 530, 224 N.E.2d 793 (1967)
with the Fair Housing Act of 1968,
42 USC § 3601 et seq. (1970).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*36]
The dispute, correctly, is not whether
nondiscrimination policies are important to the general welfare--they plainly are. Nor is the
dispute whether such policy objectives are of compelling interest and
importance at
municipal levels--they plainly are that too. The
only objection is to the remedy devised--that of a private
cause of action for damages. The issue, then, is not whether
municipalities have general authority to adjust rights and responsibilities as between
private citizens. The precise issue is whether a city may do so to further
substantive policies that a
municipality is otherwise fully
entitled to advance.
So framed, then, the question must be: what is the source of a limitation on
the city's authority in that regard?
Municipalities do not have plenary legislative authority, and they therefore
"cannot
enact
charters or legislation of any kind merely because it is not expressly forbidden."
La Grande v. Municipal Court et al., 120 Ore. 109, 114, 251 P. 308 (1926). Rather, they are limited to enacting laws directed to their local interests
and exercising
"those powers incident and germane to the
municipal government."
State ex rel. v. Port of Tillamook, 62 Ore. 332, 341, 124 P. 637 (1912).
[*37] Thus, it is well-settled that
municipalities cannot exercise authority extramurally--that is, by extending their
governmental reach beyond their jurisdictional boundaries.
See
id. at 342 (port could not annex territory outside port district without consent of
residents of land to be annexed). Nor may they exercise control
over other government officials or agencies. As we recently observed:
"Although the perimeters of city and county
home rule authority may defy easy delineation, certain qualifications of that authority
may be stated with some confidence. In particular, it is well established that,
whatever else local government authority may entail, it does not include
governing the conduct of state and federal officials."
State v. Logsdon, 2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 38, *6, ___ Ore. App. ___, ___, ___ P.2d ___ (January 12, 2000) (citations
omitted).
On the other hand,
municipalities are not deprived of authority to legislate in a particular area merely because
their interest is not exclusively or uniquely local. As the Supreme Court
explained in
La Grande/Astoria v. PERB, 281 Ore. 137, 148-49, 576 P.2d 1204,
on reh'g
284 Ore. 173, 176, 586 P.2d 765 (1978),
[*38]
municipalities and the state legislature in many instances pursue substantive objectives on
the same subject matter that are well within the respective authority of both
levels of government. Their legislative interests may--and frequently
will--overlap. In that circumstance, the inquiry is whether both policies may
coexist, or whether one must give way, and, if so, which one.
Id.
If
municipalities lack authority to create private
causes of action for damages or other remedies, it must be because such
causes of action either do not reflect a
municipal interest or conflict with a desirable policy of statewide uniformity. Local
legislation attempting to adopt, for example, unique policies of property,
contract, or domestic relations law might invite problems at the state level by
purporting to determine rights for persons who do not reside locally or who do
not remain there. Courts in
other jurisdictions have resisted the notion that
municipalities should be able to have separate substantive law in such areas for essentially
that reason.
See,
e.g.,
City of Bloomington v. Chuckney, 165 Ind. App. 177, 331 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1975) ("a city should not be able
[*39] to
enact its own separate law of contracts or domestic relations since these areas are
unsuited to less than statewide legislation");
see also
McKinney, 265 Ga. at 164, 454 S.E.2d at 520 (similar observation made in context of state constitutional provision
expressly forbidding
municipalities from enacting special laws relating to rights or status of private persons).
But the issue here is not whether
municipalities can adjust private rights and liabilities generally or with regard to private
contracts, property rights, or other substantive areas that may reach beyond
local boundaries. The narrow question is whether
municipal
legislative authority extends to creating a private
cause of action as a remedy for discrimination prohibited by
ordinance. On that precise issue, courts in other jurisdictions appear divided. A few
have endorsed McQuillin's view n25 and have invalidated a damages remedy
authorized by local
ordinance.
See, e.g.,
Yellow Freight Systems v. Mayor's Com'n, 791 S.W.2d 382 (Mo 1990);
Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877 (Mo 1962) (dictum). Other authorities point in the opposite direction.
See, e.
[*40]
g.,
Trans World Airlines v. City of Philadelphia, 44 Pa. Commw. 341, 403 A.2d 1057 (1979) (sustaining compensatory damage award related to employer's discrimination
against pregnancy-related disability in violation of local
ordinance);
Hutchinson Hum. Rel. Com'n, 213 Kan. at 316-17, 517 P.2d at 165 (invalidating damage award only because not provided for by
ordinance; no suggestion that damage award could not have been authorized by
ordinance). At least one jurisdiction has concluded that, in the absence of a preemptive
state provision, creation of a private action for damages is well within
municipal authority to further
nondiscrimination policies.
See,
e.g.,
Bracker v. Cohen, 204 A.D.2d 115, 612 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1994) (upholding compensatory and punitive damage award).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n25 I refer here to the
"general rule" offered in Eugene McQuillin, 6
The Law of
Municipal Corporations
§ 22.01, 388 (3d ed 1998) quoted in the
lead opinion. ___ Ore. App. at ___ (slip op at 13).
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Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*41]
We can resort, however, to Oregon precedent for more guidance. As the majority
observes, prior Oregon cases have approved of damage actions when those actions
were provided for only by local
ordinance and not by
common law or any other legal source. If I find fault with the
lead opinion on that score, it is that it too quickly glosses over that line of cases in
favor of a broader principle that the cases do not support (i.e., that
municipalities have general authority to
enlarge private rights and obligations).
Both
Marsh v. McLaughlin et ux, 210 Ore. 84, 309 P.2d 188 (1957), and
Olson v. Chuck et al., 199 Ore. 90, 259 P.2d 128 (1953), involved local
ordinances that required
landowners to repair
sidewalks abutting their property. In both cases, pedestrians were injured by hazards in
sidewalks and sued the abutting
landowners for damages. In both cases, the defendants demurred to the complaints. In
Olson, the court concluded that plaintiff had a
cause of action. In
Marsh, the court reached the opposite conclusion.
The court in
Marsh
distinguished
Olson and observed that, because a
landowner had no
common-law
duty to repair
[*42] the area in front of his property, the court had to
"look to some legislative enactment of the state
or city as the basis for liability."
210 Ore. at 89, 91-92 (emphasis added). There was no
state law creating liability. In
Olson, private liability had been created expressly by the City of Salem's
ordinance, so the pedestrian in
Olson had a
cause of action against the
landowner. In contrast, in
Marsh, the City of Portland had imposed a
duty of maintenance on the
landowner but had not provided for a
cause of action
for an injured pedestrian. Consequently, the pedestrian's private action in
Marsh
failed.
McLaughlin, 210 Ore. at 91-92.
Marsh
and
Olson
were not negligence or negligence
per se actions in which the court, in adjudicating a
common-law action, looked to
municipal legislation to define the scope of the private citizen's
common law
duty of care. They rested squarely and only on the premise that the injured
pedestrians had a
cause of action against the abutting
landowners only if that
cause of action was created by express
municipal declaration. The cases are of limited precedential force in this context
because neither
[*43] involved a direct challenge to a
municipality's authority to include such a provision in its
sidewalk
ordinance. But they nevertheless are of value, for three reasons. First, they
demonstrate that, in Oregon,
ordinances creating private
causes of action are not novel or unprecedented.
Second, although neither
Marsh
nor
Olson directly examined
municipal authority to create the
causes of action at issue in those cases, both cases at least implicitly accept that there is
such authority. Third, given their divergent outcomes,
Marsh
and
Olson tacitly acknowledge that statewide uniformity of private rights and
liabilities is not, at least in all contexts, an overriding goal or principle.
Although the
lead opinion does not discuss it, there is at least one prior Oregon case in which a city's
creation of otherwise nonexistent private liability was directly challenged as
beyond its
municipal authority. The challenge failed. In
Covey Drive Yourself & Garage v. Portland, 157 Ore. 117, 70 P.2d 566 (1937), the city passed an
ordinance regulating car rentals. The
ordinance required the businesses to be licensed by the city; to post a surety bond or
liability insurance policy
[*44] of $
1,000; and to agree that the bond or insurance would indemnify persons injured
by the negligence of anyone renting cars from the licensed rental agent.
Covey Drive Yourself & Garage, 157 Ore. at 120-21. Further and significantly, the
ordinance provided that anyone injured, or the heirs of anyone killed, by a driver's
negligence would be authorized to bring an action against the licensee, the
surety, or the insurer for damages. n26 The plaintiff, a rental and repair
business, brought an action seeking to invalidate the
ordinance on the grounds that vehicle regulation was preempted by
state law and that the
ordinance's provisions were otherwise beyond the city's regulatory power.
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n26 Specifically, the
ordinance permitted the injured person (or heirs of the deceased) to bring the action
"on his own relation in the name of the city."
Covey Drive Yourself & Garage, 157 Ore. at 121. The fact that the action was nominally in the city's name, but with the
injured person as the party benefitted by the action, played no part in the
court's analysis of
municipal authority.
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[*45]
The court held that the city's
ordinance was not preempted by
state law because it was a complementary enactment that sought to achieve the same goals
by
"different methods."
Id. at 125. With regard to the plaintiff's challenge to the liability provisions, the
court observed that the purpose of creating liability was
"to coerce [the renter] into renting his cars only to those who will drive with
care."
Id. at 128. The court considered it
"a matter of common knowledge that a consciousness of financial responsibility
for negligence tends to promote care, and, conversely, that a consciousness of
financial irresponsibility tends to promote indifference."
Id. at 130 (quoting with approval
Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Company v. Cincinnati, 123 Ohio St. 284, 175 N.E. 196, 199 (1931),
aff'd
284 U.S. 335, 52 S. Ct. 144, 76 L. Ed. 323 (1932)). After detailing the city's general welfare interests in regulating to avoid
irresponsible drivers, the court upheld the
ordinance's liability provisions as a reasonable exercise of the city's
police power, one that the city could impose on licensees even though at
common
[*46] law they had no liability for the negligence of their bailees (i.e., renters).
Covey Drive Yourself & Garage, 157 Ore. at 140-41.
The analysis that the court followed in
Covey Drive Yourself
& Garage is the analysis that should be followed here: the first step is to assess the
legitimacy of the
municipality's regulatory goal; if it is legitimate, then the next question is whether the
means chosen to serve the interest reasonably does so; finally, the local
legislation must not conflict with preemptive state policy. In this case, the
city's
nondiscrimination
ordinance readily satisfies each of those inquiries. The substantive
policy of eliminating discrimination in housing, employment, and public
accommodations reflects concededly valid--and, indeed, compelling--municipal concerns. In providing a private right of action to redress damages caused by
prohibited discrimination, the
ordinance undeniably furthers its objectives and does so effectively. As the court
observed in
Covey Drive Yourself
& Garage, financial liability is one of the most effective tools to achieve compliance
with social obligations.
The city's
ordinance can be invalid, then, only if the creation of a private right of action
conflicts
[*47] with state regulatory policy in the same substantive area. Plainly, it does
not, and defendants do not argue otherwise. As was true in
Covey Drive Yourself
& Garage, and as is often true of
municipal and state legislation, the substantive goals of the
nondiscrimination policies embodied in ORS chapter 659 and in the city's
ordinances are the same. The fact that the city's
ordinances
extend broader protection than
state law is not objectionable, given the protective purpose of the policy.
See
State ex rel Haley v. City of Troutdale, 281 Ore. 203, 576 P.2d 1238 (1978). n27
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n27 Indeed, with respect to discrimination based on
sexual orientation, ORS 659.165 prohibits
ordinances that
"single out" those individuals
for discriminatory treatment, or that provide preferential treatment for that
group.
See
deParrie v. City of Portland, 138 Ore. App. 105, 906 P.2d 844 (1995),
rev den
323 Ore. 114, 913 P.2d 1384 (1996) (examining meaning of statute). Implicit in that prohibition is a recognition
that local governments in Oregon properly may
enact
nondiscrimination policies of their own.
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[*48]
In sum, I depart from the
lead
opinion's holding that cities have general or abstract authority to
enlarge the
common-law
duties and liabilities of private persons. But I agree that, in creating a private
cause of action as part of its
nondiscrimination policy, the City of Portland has acted within its
municipal authority in this instance. In all other respects, I agree with the
lead opinion's essential analysis of the other issues that this case presents.
Deits, C. J., and Haselton and Kistler, JJ., join in this concurrence.
DISSENTBY: EDMONDS
DISSENT: EDMONDS, J., dissenting.
This case presents the issue of whether a
municipality lawfully can require by
ordinance that a state court provide a forum for a civil law suit for compensatory
damages brought by a private citizen based on the violation of a city
ordinance. The
lead opinion answers that question in the affirmative. I disagree because the
lead opinion's conclusion violates the concept of the state's sovereignty over its political
subdivisions and improperly
enlarges a city's authority.
A general introduction to the issue and the arguments surrounding it is helpful
to an understanding of the specific arguments that bear on the core
[*49] of the issue. The city has adopted Portland City Code (PCC) 23.01.050B, which
prohibits discrimination in employment based on
sexual orientation, and PCC 23.01.070B, which prohibits discrimination in places of public
accommodation based on an individual's
sexual orientation. In its
brief on appeal, the city describes the sources of its authority to promulgate
those
ordinances and argues:
"Portland's first legislative
charter became effective January 23, 1851, upon passage of the Council of the
Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Oregon, Special Laws of Oregon
1850-51,
§§ 1-28, pp 16-22. In 1903, the Legislative Assembly passed a special act that
granted a
charter to the City of Portland, Special Laws of Oregon 1903, Chapter I. Chapter II,
Article IV, section 73(1), of the City's 1903
Charter granted the Portland City Council the power: 'To exercise within the limits of the City of Portland all the powers commonly
known as the
police power, to the same extent as the State of Oregon has or could exercise said power
within said limits.' * * * Section 73(2) of that same chapter further grants the City the power:
'To make and enforce within the
city all necessary water,
[*50] local, police, and sanitary laws and regulations.'
"Although various changes were made to Portland's
charter by the legislature or the people over the years, none affected this expansive
grant of power to the City. The City's current
charter continues to grant it the power to exercise
all of the powers of the state, as well as the power to 'secure the protection of
persons and property and to provide for the health, cleanliness, ornament,
peace, safety and good order of the City.'
Charter, Sections 2-105(a)1 and 2."
(Emphasis added in the city's brief.)
Article XI, section 2, of the Oregon Constitution, provides that
"the legal voters of every city and town are hereby granted power to
enact and amend their
municipal
charter,
subject to the Constitution[.]" (Emphasis added.) I do not question the city's authority to
enact PCC 23.01.050B and PCC 23.01.070B under the
police power granted to it by Article
XI, section 2 of the Oregon Constitution, and its
charter. However, the city asserts that its
charter empowers it to direct state courts to provide a forum for the violations of
its
ordinances and that PCC 23.01.080E, the
ordinance at issue in this case, is a lawful
[*51] exercise of that authority.
PCC 23.01.080 provides, in part:
"E. Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory act under
the provisions of this code shall have a
cause of action in any court of competent jurisdiction for damages and such other remedies as
may be appropriate. Election of remedies and other procedural issues relating
to the interplay between administrative proceedings and private rights of
action shall be handled as provided for in ORS 659.095 and
659.121. The court may grant such relief as it deems appropriate, including, but not
limited to, such relief as is provided in ORS
659.121."
PCC 23.01.080E differs from PCC 23.01.050B and
PCC 23.01.070B. The latter impose obligations on Portland citizens. Arising out
of those obligations are rights held by others, including employees, under the
ordinances. The former provides a remedy for the violation of those rights. By its
enactment of PCC 23.01.080E, the city seeks to establish within courts of
competent jurisdiction a
cause of action for the vindication of those rights by its offended citizens. In this case,
the
"court of competent jurisdiction" is the circuit court, according to plaintiff
[*52] and the city.
To the extent that the city seeks to direct by
ordinance that the circuit court of the State of Oregon is a court of competent
jurisdiction for the adjudication between private parties of a violation of the
city's
ordinances, its exercise of the
police power granted to it by the constitution and its
charter is
ultra vires. n28 Only the people of the State of Oregon, by the initiative process or
through their elected representatives, the legislature, can
exercise that authority under the constitution. The constitution represents a
grant of authority to state government by the people of the State of Oregon
whereby they consent to be governed with respect to the subjects enumerated
therein.
Municipal corporations such as cities can exercise no more authority than what is
granted to them by the constitution. As political subdivisions created under
the constitution, their authority is inferior to that exercised by the
legislature, unless the constitution expressly provides to the contrary. As the
city must acknowledge, its
police power under its
charter is expressly limited to its territorial limits. Consequently, the authority to
provide remedies through court proceedings
[*53] is similarly limited.
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n28
Ultra vires
means
"an act performed without any authority to act on [the] subject" and an
"[u]ltra vires
act of [a]
municipality is one which is beyond [the] powers conferred upon it by law."
Black's Law Dictionary, 1522 (6th ed 1990).
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In the
absence of any authority from its
charter, the city is dependent on the legislature for authority to
enact
ordinances like PCC 23.01.080E. ORS 221.315, ORS 221.337, ORS 3.132 and ORS 3.134 permit
cities to utilize state courts and are examples of the legislature's exercise
of the authority that was granted to it by the constitution. ORS 221.315
permits a city attorney in the name of the city to
prosecute violations of the city's
charter or
ordinances. ORS 3.132 (formerly ORS 46.040) provides that circuit and
municipal courts have concurrent jurisdiction of all violations of
municipal
charters or
ordinances. ORS 3.134 (formerly ORS 46.047) provides that, when an offense defined by
municipal
ordinance is
[*54] tried in a circuit court, it is subject to the statutes and rules that govern
the trial of similar offenses under
state statute. When read together, those statutes permit a city to
prosecute violations in a state court. However, those
statutes do not authorize a private citizen to bring a civil claim for damages
in circuit court based on the violation of the city's
anti-discrimination
ordinances. In sum, the city is unable to point to any express provision of the Oregon
Constitution or of the Oregon Revised Statutes that authorizes it to direct the
circuit court to provide private parties a forum for the violation of its
anti-discrimination
ordinances.
The
lead opinion takes a different tack from that argued by plaintiff and the city to avoid the
dilemma of the city's
ultra vires enactment. It relies on Article VII (original), section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution. Section 9 provides, in part:
"All judicial power, authority, and jurisdiction not vested by this
Constitution, or by laws consistent therewith, exclusively in some other Court
shall belong to the Circuit Courts * * * ."
To the extent that the
lead opinion argues that
section 9 supports the city's and
[*55] plaintiff's reasoning, there is not one word in section 9 about any grant of
authority to
municipalities. A
municipality's power to provide a forum for the enforcement of the laws that it creates can
be no greater than the power granted to it by the source of its authority, or
in this case, the constitution. n29 It is clear that the authority of the city
to direct that the circuit court provide a remedy n30 for the violation of its
ordinances cannot be found in any express grant of authority in the constitution to the
city and that such authority does not exist.
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n29 For example, at issue in
State v. Logsdon, 2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 38, *1, ___ Ore. App. ___, ___, ___ P.2d ___ (January 12, 2000), was whether a
provision in a county
charter,
"which forbids police to search private property without prior written consent
or
a search warrant," was invalid. In holding that the provision was invalid, we reasoned:
"In particular, it is well established that, whatever else local government
authority may entail, it does not include governing the conduct of state and
federal officials.
See, e.g.,
Multnomah County v. $ 5,650 in
U.S. Currency, 309 Ore. 285, 289, 786 P.2d 729 (1990) ('The fact that a county acts under a
home rule
charter does not mean that it can call upon the state courts to enforce
ordinances or otherwise to exercise their jurisdiction in any case that the county
wishes.');
La Grande v. Municipal Court et al., 120 Ore. 109, 114-15, 251 P. 308 (1926) (cities cannot alter jurisdiction or function of state courts);
Kiernan v. Portland, 57 Ore. 454, 463, 111 P. 379 (1910),
error dismissed
223 U.S. 151, 32 S. Ct. 231, 56 L. Ed. 386 (1912) (home rule entities may not regulate other governmental units);
Lines v. City of Milwaukie, 15 Ore. App. 280, 286, 515 P.2d 938 (1973),
rev den (1974) (home rule city does not have authority to alter the jurisdiction of state courts)."
Logsdon, 2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 38, *6-7, ___Ore. App. at ___.
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[*56]
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n30 A
"remedy" is defined, in part, as
"the means by which * * * the violation of a right is * * * redressed[.]"
Black's
at 1294. A remedy includes an action for damages in a particular forum.
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Nonetheless, the
lead opinion reasons that, because circuit courts of the State of Oregon are courts of
general jurisdiction and the city has assigned by its
ordinance a function to the circuit court that is within the court's jurisdiction, it
follows that the city is authorized to direct the state circuit courts to
provide private parties a forum for the violations of the city's
ordinances. The
lead opinion perceives the circuit court conceptually as a global reservoir for all claims
brought by the citizens of Oregon, regardless of the source of law for those
claims. n31 Thus, it concludes that, regardless of the city's authority, the
court's authority is not enlarged by the city's
ordinance directing that the court provide a forum for the violation of the city's
anti-discrimination
ordinances. In general,
[*57] the
lead opinion's reasoning has several fatal flaws.
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n31 If the
lead opinion is correct, statutes like ORS 221.315, ORS 221.337, ORS 3.132 and ORS 3.134
that permit cities to utilize state courts to
enforce their criminal and quasi-criminal
ordinances are meaningless; the general jurisdiction of the circuit court would permit
municipalities to enforce
ordinances in circuit court as well as permit claims between private citizens. Although
the
lead opinion's reasoning is premised on a distinction between such claims and private claims,
it never identifies the origin of the distinction in terms of grants of
authority.
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First, the
lead opinion's reasoning is
non-sequitur.
The constitutional grant of authority to a
municipality to make law and impose
duties on its citizens is fundamentally different from and does not overlap with the
constitutional grant of authority to state circuit courts to
adjudicate civil claims. Under the constitution, the lawmaking function and the judicial
function are vested in different
[*58] branches of government. Moreover, the constitutional grant of lawmaking
authority to the city is not only discrete from the grant of judicial authority
to state courts but is vested
in a political subdivision that is subordinate to the authority granted to the
legislature. Under the
lead opinion's views, any political subdivision of the state could contribute, through its
ordinances, to state jurisprudence and, regardless of the will of the legislature or the
people, compel enforcement of its legislation by appropriating state courts,
the judicial arm of the state, to its own use. The
lead opinion's reasoning, when taken at face value, violates principles of state sovereignty
over its political subdivisions.
Second, the
lead opinion's reasoning improperly conflates what are discrete concepts that circumscribe
the authority of
municipalities and of the circuit courts. Just as a
municipality has only the constitutional
police power to impose obligations on its own citizens and to declare rights only on behalf
of those injured by the violations of its
ordinances, so too is its authority circumscribed regarding the forums that it can provide
to
adjudicate the remedies it has enacted.
[*59] What governs the
subject matter jurisdiction of courts differs from what legal rules provide the extent of
a city's authority. The circuit courts operate under a constitutional grant of
authority that is discrete from the constitutional grant of authority to
municipalities. As courts of general jurisdiction under section 9, circuit courts are
empowered to exercise jurisdiction over matters of discrimination. However, it
does not also follow from that grant of general jurisdiction that they are
required to recognize any legal rule governing discrimination, regardless of
its source. The
lead opinion's reasoning requires circuit courts to recognize the legislative enactments of
municipalities as binding upon them merely because circuit courts are courts of general
jurisdiction. That reasoning is erroneous because, even though a court has
subject matter jurisdiction, a court exercises its authority erroneously if it gives effect to a rule of
law that is
ultra vires, that is, a rule of law that exceeds the authority of the promulgating body.
When a court applies an
ultra vires
rule, it improperly
enlarges the authority of the promulgating body.
In light of the foregoing general
[*60] discussion, I turn to the specific claims made by plaintiff and the
lead opinion's reasoning regarding those claims.
Plaintiff's first claim in his amended complaint alleges a violation of ORS
659.030. He stipulated to its dismissal in the trial court. After this case was
briefed on appeal, we decided
Tanner v. OHSU, 157 Ore. App. 502, 971 P.2d 435 (1998). Whether or not plaintiff's first claim states facts sufficient to state a
cause of action under
Tanner is not properly before us in light of plaintiff's stipulation. Plaintiff's
second claim is labeled as a
"violation of PCC
§ 23.01.070
et seq." The viability of the claim in circuit court rests on the proposition that the
city has the authority to direct the court to provide a forum for the violation
of its
ordinances. Also, plaintiff alleges
a third claim that he has labeled as a statutory tort claim. He alleges, in
part:
"Pursuant to ORS 659.030 and PCC
§ 23.01.070, defendants stood in a special relationship to plaintiff and owed
plaintiff the
duty to not discriminate against plaintiff based on his
sexual orientation and to provide him with a discrimination-free workplace."
I understand
[*61] plaintiff's and the city's present position to be that ORS 659.030 does not
factor into the calculus for determining whether the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment on the third claim. Because the complaint appears to
allege a
common-law claim as well as a claim based on the city's
ordinance, it is appropriate to analyze it under both theories.
According to the
lead opinion, the judicial power identified in section 9 includes the power to
adjudicate private-law disputes without regard to the source of law governing the
dispute, and
"
Aldrich v. Anchor Coal Co., 24 Ore. 32, 32 P. 756 (1893), illustrates the principle." __Ore. App. at __ (slip op at 7). In fact,
Aldrich stands for a proposition contrary to that stated by the
lead opinion. The plaintiffs brought an action in Oregon against a California corporation
and one of its
stockholders, Loomis, to recover monies on a contract after they had performed work and
labor for the corporation. The complaint sought to hold Loomis liable under a
California statute that made Loomis personally liable for a portion of the
claim. The question posed by the court was
"whether an action at law can be maintained in this
[*62] state to enforce a
stockholder's liability created by the laws of California."
Aldrich, 24 Ore. at 37.
The court concluded that Loomis's liability under the statute was enforceable
in the
action brought in Oregon. It explained:
"The statute indeed creates a new right and liability not existing at
common law, but
does not prescribe a peculiar remedy for its enforcement; it only declares that it may be enforced by action, leaving the creditor to
select
such
common-law remedies as may be in use in the jurisdiction where the suit is brought to enforce such
liability. When a statute not only creates a new right and liability against a
stockholder, but prescribes a peculiar remedy for its enforcement, such remedy is sometimes
held to be exclusive, and often cannot be enforced
in another state by the employment of the remedies, and according to the course of procedure,
provided by its laws. In such case, it would seem the creditor can enforce the
stockholder's liability only in the state where the corporation exists; not, however,
because the liability is not recognized as
valid and binding, but because the forum where it is sought to be enforced
[*63] is incapable of administering the peculiar remedy provided for its
enforcement. Where a liability, however, is created by statute, without making
the procedure for its enforcement, as it were, a part of the liability, we
cannot see why it should not be enforced in any court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter
and parties.
There is no difference between a statutory and
common-law right or liability in this regard. The nature of the
remedy or the
jurisdiction of the court
to enforce it does not in any manner depend on the question whether it is the
one or the other. * * * And, in general, a creditor of a corporation whose
shareholders are by a statute made personally liable in the nature of a
contract for its debts may maintain a suit or action to enforce this liability
in any court capable of administering the proper relief, whenever he can obtain
jurisdiction over the parties, if it is not opposed to the legislation or
public policy of the state in which it is sought to be enforced."
Aldrich, 24 Ore. at 38-39 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
Several observations are evident from the court's holding in
Aldrich
that cut against its
[*64] use as support for the
lead opinion's position.
Aldrich
does not involve an attempt by a subordinate political subdivision of the State
of Oregon to direct a state court to provide a forum and a remedy. No policy
concern regarding interference with Oregon's sovereignty inhibited the
recognition of California's statute by the
Aldrich court. Rather,
Aldrich presents the issue of whether a California statute will be recognized in
Oregon when a
common-law remedy is employed. Additionally, the
Aldrich
court clearly distinguishes between the concepts of
subject matter jurisdiction and the enlargement of a foreign jurisdiction's authority, a distinction that
the
lead opinion blurs
in its analysis of the issue in this case. As the
Aldrich court observed, it would have properly declined to provide a remedy for the
enforcement of the California statute had the California statute provided for a
specific remedy. To have enforced the California statute in Oregon under that
circumstance would have resulted in the improper enlargement of the California
legislature's authority because it would mean that the California legislature
could lawfully direct Oregon courts to
[*65] provide a forum for its remedy. To permit the City of Portland to direct the
circuit court to provide a forum and to supply a remedy for the violation of
its
ordinances absent a grant of authority from the legislature or the constitution results
in a similar usurpation of authority.
The
lead opinion recognizes that:
"The dissent is correct that Oregon
municipalities infringe on state sovereignty, and thereby act beyond their authority, by
requiring or authorizing state officials to perform functions that they have
not been authorized by
state law to perform."
2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 125, *13, __ Ore. App. at __. However, it asserts that
"the dissent is wrong, however, in its belief that Portland's creation of the
cause of action at issue in this case runs afoul of that principle."
2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 125, *13, ___ Ore. App. at ___. According to the
lead opinion,
"the challenged Portland
ordinance does
not add to the circuit court's authority to
adjudicate claims. One of the basic functions of the circuit court is to resolve disputes
over harm caused to people as a result of failure by others to conform their
behavior to the requirements of law. Therefore, independently of the Portland
ordinance,
[*66] the circuit court has authority to
adjudicate a claim by an employee of a Portland employer for harm caused by
discriminatory treatment by the employer on the basis of
sexual orientation."
2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 125, *15-16, ___ Ore.
App. at ___(emphasis in original).
When the
lead opinion claims that PCC 23.01.080E
"does
not add to the circuit court's authority," it fails to perceive the effect of its reasoning. The question is not whether
the circuit court's authority has been enlarged by the City's
ordinance. Clearly, the circuit court has
subject matter jurisdiction over claims based on workplace discrimination. However,
subject matter jurisdiction is not equivalent to the authority to appropriate another political entity's
courts and require those courts to provide a forum and a remedy. When a
municipality legislates by promulgating an
ordinance that exceeds its authority, courts, even courts of general jurisdiction, will
not recognize the effect of the
ordinance because to do so would
enlarge the authority of the
municipality beyond what has been granted to it. Even through a court may have
subject matter jurisdiction, it errs if it gives efficacy to an
ultra vires
ordinance.
[*67]
The above proposition is founded on a rule that is generally accepted
throughout jurisdictions in the United States:
"The well-established
general rule is that a
municipal corporation cannot create by
ordinance a right of action between third persons or
enlarge the
common law or statutory
duty or liability
of citizens among themselves. Under the rule, an
ordinance cannot directly create a civil liability of one citizen to another or relieve
one citizen from a liability by imposing it on another."
Eugene McQuillin, 6
The Law of
Municipal Corporations
§ 22.01, 388 (3d ed 1998) (emphasis added; footnote omitted). The
lead opinion's reasoning and its conclusion in this case are in contradiction to McQuillin's
pronouncement. When a
municipality undertakes to provide a remedy for the violations of its
ordinances by directing a state court to entertain actions for the violations, it acts in
an
ultra vires
manner
outside its grant of authority because it has sought to
enlarge its grant of authority. Here, by its
ordinance, the city has created a new, civil
cause of action between private citizens that
enlarges liability in a state court. That liability is
[*68] not founded on a
state statute or the
common law. Nonetheless, the
lead opinion says
"Oregon cities
can
'enlarge the
common law * * *
duty or liability of citizens among themselves'."
2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 125, *19, __ Ore. App. at __ (slip op at 14) (emphasis in original). That assertion
cannot be correct in the context of this case because the city did not merely
impose a liability,
duty or standard of care on its citizens but sought to provide a new
common-law remedy that is enforceable by private parties in an extraterritorial forum,
the state circuit court. The
common law is not a
product of the legislative will of a
municipality.
Common-law remedies are created by courts when confronted with conduct causing injuries
that the court believes should be compensable. In creating a
common-law remedy, the court exercises the sovereign prerogative of choosing between the
view that the court for lack of precedent is impotent and the view that the
court has authority to declare a remedy to grant redress for injury resulting
from conduct which universal opinion would condemn.
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Ore. 210, 215, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). The circuit court's authority to
enlarge
common-law remedies to citizens
[*69] is implicit if not express from the authority granted to it by section 9.
There is no such corresponding grant to
municipalities.
McQuillin also states another
general rule that is applicable to the analysis in this case:
"However, the mere fact that an
ordinance cannot directly create a civil
cause of action does not mean that
state law cannot attach tortious liability to a breach of an
ordinance proximately causing injury to another, and in many jurisdictions, if not all,
such a breach of an
ordinance under certain circumstances constitutes or evidences a civil and actionable
wrong."
McQuillin, 6
The Law of
Municipal Corporations
§ 22.01 at 388. That rule recognizes situations in which no enlargement of the
municipality's authority occurs. A
municipality's
police power permits it to govern the conduct of its citizens and to impose standards of
care or conduct that are consistent with its grant of authority. When it
imposes a standard of care or
duty on its citizens, there is no
conflict
with state sovereignty because the
municipality is regulating within its own boundaries and within its grant of authority.
When a
cause of action is predicated on the violation
[*70] of the standard imposed by the
municipality and is founded on a theory of civil recovery for a wrong
recognized by the state court, the state court is a proper forum for the claim.
Such a situation is devoid of any
ultra vires
exercise of authority by the
municipality, in contrast to the situation where the
municipality directs the state court to provide a forum for what is otherwise a
noncognizable claim within its jurisprudence.
Examples of the application of both of McQuillin's rules can be found in Oregon
case law. The first rule finds expression in
La Grande v. Municipal Court et al., 120 Ore. 109, 251 P. 308 (1926). In that case, A. W. Wall was
"convicted in the recorder's court of a violation of an
ordinance of the City of La Grande[.]"
Id. at 110. He gave notice of appeal to the Circuit Court of Union County. The
municipal judge, acting under the city's initiative
charter, which provided for
a right of appeal to the circuit court,
"allowed the appeal, approved the proffered undertaking and ordered a stay of
execution on the judgment appealed from." The city then sought a writ of review challenging Wall's right to appeal.
On appeal,
[*71] the Oregon Supreme Court explained:
"From the earliest times to the present, it has been the law of this state that
grants of power to
municipal corporations are to be strictly construed[.]"
Id. at 112. The court reasoned:
"If a city can assume extramural powers which the legislative branch of the
government by general law might grant but has not conferred, the
municipality need not wait for the sanction of a general law to appropriate to its own use
and behest the whole judicial system of the state. * * * [That] doctrine * * *
would lead naturally to the usurpation of the state power by every locality
that chose to do so."
Id. at 115. Concluding that Wall could not appeal to the circuit court, the court said:
"The state has a
right to establish its own tribunals and has done so. Until it gives authority
to a
municipality to add to or detract from the
duties of state courts there must be some primary authority issuing from the state in
the form of general legislation. There is no such legislation with respect to
appeals from the
municipal court of La Grande."
Id. at 116. Because the
[*72] city
charter provision giving the right to its citizens to appeal to circuit court from the
municipal court was
ultra vires,
Wall's remedy, an appeal to state court, was not cognizable in that court. The
analogy to this case is apparent because the city's
ordinance is also
ultra vires;
i.e.,
the remedy it affords, a private claim for compensatory damages in state
circuit court, is outside its grant of authority.
The holding in
City of Eugene v. Roberts, 305 Ore. 641, 756 P.2d 630 (1988), is also instructive. In that case, the city sought
"to compel Lane County
election officials to place on the state primary election ballot an 'advisory
question'" that the city wished to submit to its voters.
Id. at 643. The Secretary of State had directed the officials not to place the question on
the ballot. In an appeal to the Supreme Court, one of the issues was whether
the city could rely on its own
charter and
ordinances as authority to require the officials to place the question on the ballot in
the absence of a
state law requiring or authorizing a vote on an advisory question. Relying, in part, on
the analysis in
La Grande, the court
[*73] rejected the city's argument. The court said:
"The City here seeks to compel action by state and county officials.
Home rule does not extend so far. The source of any
duty to comply with the City's request must be in
state law."
City of Eugene, 305 Ore. at 650. Under
La Grande
and
City of Eugene, the source of authority to provide a forum
for plaintiff's remedy must also be in
state law.
In response to these cases, the
lead opinion says,
"The effect of the Portland
ordinance is to change the law that bears on such a claim, making it one on which the
employee
can
prevail, but it does not add to the function or
duties of the circuit court for it to
adjudicate the claim.
"That contrasts with the situation presented in
La Grande, * * *
[and]
City of Eugene * * * .
In each of those cases, cities had to change
state law in order to permit the state officials to do what the cities wanted them to
do. The cases held that the cities simply did not have the power to do that."
__Ore. App. at __(slip op at 12) (emphasis in original). The
lead opinion acknowledges that the holdings in
La Grande
and
City of Eugene
[*74]
are illustrative of attempts by
municipalities to change
state law but claims that that is not the effect of PCC 23.01.080E. The
lead opinion is wrong because the
ordinance gives injured
litigants a remedy in circuit court that otherwise they would not have under
state law. Accordingly, the circuit court would have erred if it had not dismissed
plaintiff's second claim. To have done otherwise would have permitted plaintiff
to enforce an
ultra vires
ordinance as if it were a
state statute.
The
lead opinion also relies on the holdings in
Marsh v. McLaughlin et ux, 210 Ore. 84, 309 P.2d 188 (1957), and
Olson v. Chuck et al., 199 Ore. 90, 259 P.2d 128 (1953). What the
lead opinion fails to recognize is that these cases are examples of the application of the
second rule that McQuillin describes in his treatise: n32
"The mere fact that an
ordinance cannot directly create a civil
cause of action does not mean that
state law cannot attach tortious liability to a breach of an
ordinance." McQuillin, 6
The Law of
Municipal Corporations
§ 22.01 at 388. There are a number of Oregon cases in which state courts have
recognized civil liability arising
[*75] out of the violation of an
ordinance. For example,
Lange v. Minton, 303 Ore. 484, 738 P.2d 576 (1987), involved a negligence
per se claim where plaintiff relied on a standard of care established by a city
ordinance. Similarly,
Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Ore. 401, 407, 591 P.2d 719 (1979), involved a
common-law negligence claim where the court concluded that the city's
"agent had an employment responsibility to process license applications pursuant
to the requirements of the
ordinance." Additionally, in
Harris v. Sanders, 142 Ore. App. 126, 919 P.2d 512,
rev den
324 Ore. 322, 927 P.2d 598 (1996), the plaintiff appealed from a directed verdict for defendants on her claim
that they were negligent
per se because they violated an
ordinance by failing to remove leaves from
sidewalks abutting their property that caused her injury. We reversed and indicated that
the issue was
"whether the liability imposed by [the
ordinance could] include a
duty for abutting
landowners to maintain
sidewalks free from leaves."
Harris, 142 Ore. App. at 130. Specifically, we held that it was error for the trial court to conclude as a
matter
[*76] of law that an accumulation of leaves was not within the contemplation of the
ordinance. Those cases express the rule that, when a
municipality acts within the scope of its authority by establishing a
duty or standard of care pursuant to its
police power, the violation of the
ordinance can be a ground for a remedy that is recognized by the circuit court's
jurisprudence. None of the above cases involve an
ordinance that is
ultra
vires or an
ordinance that attempts to impose its will by changing
state law.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n32 Both
Marsh
and
Olson concerned whether the violation of a
municipal
ordinance could give rise to a remedy in a state court under the
common law. In
Olson,
the
ordinances at issue imposed a
duty on
landowners to maintain their
sidewalks and imposed liability for damages arising from the offender's fault or
negligence. Because the plaintiff's claim was founded in
common-law negligence as affected by the
duty and liability imposed by the
ordinance, a proper remedy existed in circuit court. In contrast, the city's
charter in
Marsh imposed a
duty on
landowners to repair their
sidewalks but imposed no liability for damages for a violation. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's decision to sustain general demurrers to the
common-law negligence and nuisance actions brought by the plaintiff. This case presents a
third variation of those facts. Although the
duties imposed by the city's
ordinances are within its
charter authority, the remedy it seeks to provide, a private-law action in circuit
court, is not authorized. Thus, this case differs from
Marsh
and
Olson because it is not founded in
common-law negligence.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*77]
According to the concurrence, the city without a grant of authority can provide
lawfully a private right of action in a state court when its regulatory goal is
a legitimate one. It relies on
Covey Drive Yourself & Garage v. Portland, 157 Ore. 117, 70 P.2d 566 (1937), as a case in which the city's creation of private liability was challenged as
beyond the city's authority and upheld. In
Covey, the
ordinance
provided, in part:
"'The cash deposit, the surety bond, or the insurance policy, shall each be
conditioned that the licensee, his surety or insurer, will pay any adjudicated
claim within the limit of the liability of $ 1,000 ten days after the date of
the final adjudication of any claim. The cash deposit, the surety bond or the
liability insurance shall be further conditioned that the licensee and the
surety or insurer will be liable for injury to or the death of any person and
for damages to the property of any person caused by the carelessness, negligent
or unlawful act of the driver of the vehicle rented or hired out. The liability
of said cash deposit, said surety bond or liability insurance shall not exceed
the sum of $ 1,000 arising out of any one accident: * * *
[*78] Any person sustaining personal injuries or property damage caused by the
carelessness, negligent or unlawful act of the driver of any motor vehicle
rented or hired out under the terms of this article; or
in case of death resulting from personal injuries, the personal representative
of the deceased, is hereby authorized to institute an action against the
licensee, the surety, or against the liability insurance company on his own
relation in the name of the city and to
prosecute the same to final judgment. * * * '"
157 Ore. at 120-21 (omissions in original). In determining that the standard imposed by the
ordinance was a valid exercise of the city's
police power, the court reasoned:
"The enactment of an
ordinance or of a statute -- unless they be merely codifications of existing regulations
-- necessarily alters the existing law. * * * Ordinarily, the violation of such
a regulation constitutes negligence [per se] when applicable in civil actions. * * * In other words, the enactment of the
ordinance affects the
common law by prescribing a different standard of conduct."
Id. at 139. As to the remedy for the enforcement of the
[*79] standard imposed by the
ordinance, the court stated that the
ordinance was
a form of voluntarily-incurred contractual liability.
"It may be avoided by avoiding the driverless car business; but, as a condition
of entering the business, the bond must be filed. The liability attends upon
the bailment even though the negligent injury is inflicted in some distant
state. It is enforced in the remote place, not because Portland's authority
extends there, but because the other state will enforce the contractual
liability in its courts."
Id. at 140. Thus,
Covey stands for the unremarkable proposition that a
municipality may create liability between its citizens that may be enforced in a state
court in accordance with an already available remedy.
Covey is unlike this case because, here, the city is attempting to provide a tort
remedy in a forum outside its territorial limits: in a court that does not
already recognize such a remedy.
In light of the
general rules pronounced in McQuillin's treatise and the holdings in
La Grande
and
City of Eugene,
the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's second
claim. The
[*80] city has no authority to require state courts to provide a forum for the
violations of its
ordinances, and the circuit court would exercise its authority erroneously if it were to
recognize the remedy that the city prescribes. It does not follow from the fact
that circuit courts exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over
employment discrimination cases in general that its doors are open to the use of
ultra vires
remedies created by
municipalities. To the extent that plaintiff's third claim rests on PCC 23.01.080E, it is
similarly flawed. I turn then to the
common law aspect of the third claim.
To allege a
common-law claim for wrongful discharge of an at-will employee, there must be a discharge
and that discharge must be
"wrongful."
McGanty v. Staudenraus, 321 Ore. 532, 551, 901 P.2d 841 (1995). Discharges have been recognized as
"wrongful" in two categories of cases. The first category involves the discharge of a
plaintiff for fulfilling a societal obligation such as serving on a jury.
Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 298 Ore. 76, 86, 689 P.2d 1292 (1984) (quoting
Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l., 297 Ore. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984));
[*81]
see also
Nees, 272 Ore. 210, 536 P.2d 512. Plaintiff's third claim that he was discharged because of his
sexual orientation does not involve a discharge for fulfilling a societal obligation.
The second category in which a discharge has been found to be wrongful involves
an employer who discharges an employee for
pursuing a right that is of
important public interest as indicated by constitutional provisions, statutory
provisions and case law and that is related to his role as an employee.
Holien, 298 Ore. at 86.
Holien
is an example of a case that falls into the second category. The court in
Holien explained:
"In this case, the plaintiff, Holien, sued defendant Sears in her second claim
alleging that she was terminated for fulfilling her right to be gainfully
employed without being subject to sexual advances and sexual harassment. We
have stated that sexual harassment on the job is a forbidden discriminatory act
under state and federal law and an employee has a legal right which is of
important public interest not to be discharged for resisting sexual harassment
on the job. Following the rationale of the second category of
[*82]
Delaney, it is not the supervisor's demand, or discriminatory sexual harassment, for
which plaintiff seeks
common law tort damages; it is for a tortious
discharge following her rightful resistance to those demands or harassment.
Such a discharge of an employee by an employer would be an actionable
common law tort under the second category of
Delaney unless the provisions of ORS Chapter 659 demonstrate the legislature's intent
* * * to abrogate or supersede any
common law remedy for damages."
298 Ore. at 90-91. In this case, unlike in
Holien, plaintiff's claim that he was terminated because of his
sexual orientation does not involve a discharge for pursuing his right to file a complaint for
discrimination with BOLI. In that regard, he is like the plaintiff in
Patton v. J. C. Penney Co., 301 Ore. 117, 719 P.2d 854 (1986), who alleged that he was fired because he refused to terminate a social
relationship with a coemployee. The plaintiff in
Patton argued that his
"'fundamental, inalienable human rights were compromised * * * and made the
subject of an
illicit barter in that he was forced to forego these rights or to purchase them
[*83] with his job.'"
Id at 121. The court rejected his argument, reasoning:
"It may seem harsh that an employer can fire an employee because of dislike of
the employee's personal lifestyle, but because the plaintiff cannot show that
the actions fit under an exception to the
general rule, plaintiff is subject to the traditional doctrine of 'fire at will.'"
301 Ore. at 122. The same reasoning applies here. Plaintiff's claim falls outside the
recognized exceptions to the rule that termination of employment ordinarily
does not create a
common law tortious
cause of action. n33
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n33 The court in
Delaney also described a third category of cases
"where an adequate existing remedy protects the interests of society so that an
additional remedy of wrongful discharge will not be accorded."
297 Ore. at 16. That category is inapplicable here.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Finally, plaintiff, the City and the
amicus
curiae argue that, because the
ordinance defines a right, Article I, section
[*84] 10, of the Oregon Constitution, compels a remedy. Article I, section 10,
provides:
"No court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered, openly and without
purchase, completely and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by due
course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation."
The preface to the argument is lacking. Article I, section 10 protects
statutory and
common-law rights. This case involves an
ultra vires
municipal
ordinance. As I have previously pointed out, PCC 23.01.080E does not have the force of a
state statute enacted by the legislature. Therefore, section 10 is inapplicable.
At the beginning of this opinion, I identified the issue as being whether a
municipality's authority is improperly enlarged if it is held that the
municipality can lawfully direct
by
ordinance that a state court provide a forum for a civil action brought by a private
citizen based on the violation of
municipal
ordinances. The
lead opinion has found authority for the City's enactment in section 9, a constitutional
provision that has nothing to do with the authority of a
municipality. In its reasoning process, the
lead opinion
[*85] has ignored the dictates of generally accepted legal propositions about state
sovereignty and the resulting limitations on
municipal authority. Its reasoning that PCC 23.01.080E is permissible because it does not
enlarge the authority of the courts is mistaken. In fact, the
ordinance changes
state law regarding cognizable theories of
employment discrimination and improperly
enlarges the authority of
municipalities as legislative bodies. Because no
state statute, the constitution or the city's
charter authorizes the city to promulgate such legislation, the city's
ordinance is
ultra vires, and it would be error for the circuit court to
exercise its authority by furnishing efficacy to the
ordinance. Consequently, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to
defendants.
I dissent.