PEREZ ET UX. v. CAMPBELL, SUPERINTENDENT, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, ARIZONA
HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, ET AL.
No. 5175
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
402 U.S. 637;
91 S. Ct. 1704;
1971 U.S. LEXIS 127;
29 L. Ed. 2d 233
January 19, 1971, Argued
June 1, 1971, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
[***1]
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
DISPOSITION:
421 F.2d 619, reversed and remanded.
SYLLABUS: The provision that
"discharge in bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment [as a result of an
automobile accident] shall not relieve the
judgment debtor from any of the requirements of this article," contained in Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-1163 (B), part of the
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, which the Arizona courts have construed as having
as
"its principal purpose the protection of the public using the
highways from
financial hardship which may result from the use of automobiles by
financially
irresponsible persons," directly conflicts with
§ 17 of the
Bankruptcy Act, which states that a
discharge in bankruptcy fully discharges all but certain specified judgments, and is thus
unconstitutional as violative of the Supremacy Clause.
Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153, and
Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, have no authoritative effect to the extent they are inconsistent
[***2] with the controlling principle that
state legislation that frustrates the full effectiveness of
federal
law is invalidated by the Supremacy Clause. Pp. 644-656.
COUNSEL: Anthony B. Ching argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Robert H. Schlosser argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief
was Gary K. Nelson, Attorney General of Arizona.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by David A. Binder, Raine Eisler, and Paul L.
McKaskle for the Western Center on Law and Poverty et al., and by William D.
Browning for the National Organization for Women.
JUDGES: White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Black, Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring
in the result as to petitioner Emma Perez and dissenting as to petitioner
Adolfo Perez, in which Burger, C. J., and Harlan and Stewart, JJ., joined,
post, p. 657.
OPINIONBY: WHITE
OPINION:
[*638]
[**1705] MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises an important issue concerning the construction of the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution -- whether Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1163 (B) (1956), which is part of Arizona's
[***3]
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, is invalid under that clause as being in conflict
with the mandate of
§ 17 of the
Bankruptcy Act,
11 U. S. C. § 35, providing that receipt of a
discharge in bankruptcy fully discharges all but certain specified judgments. The courts below,
concluding that this case was controlled by
Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962), and
Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941), two earlier opinions of this Court dealing with alleged conflicts between the
Bankruptcy Act and state
financial responsibility laws, ruled against the claim of conflict and
upheld the Arizona statute.
On July 8, 1965, petitioner Adolfo Perez,
driving a car registered in his name, was involved in an
automobile accident in Tucson, Arizona. The Perez automobile was not covered by liability
insurance at the time of the collision. The
driver of the second car was the minor daughter of Leonard Pinkerton, and in
September 1966 the Pinkertons sued Mr. and Mrs. Perez in state court
[**1706] for personal injuries and property damage sustained in the accident. On
October 31, 1967, the petitioners
[***4] confessed judgment in this suit, and a judgment order was entered against them
on November 8, 1967, for $ 2,425.98 plus court costs.
Mr. and Mrs. Perez each filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy in Federal
District Court on November 6, 1967. Each of them duly scheduled the judgment
debt
[*639] to the
Pinkertons. The District Court entered orders on July 8, 1968, discharging
both Mr. and Mrs. Perez from all debts and claims provable against their
estates, including the Pinkerton judgment.
11 U. S. C. § 35;
Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467 (1925).
During the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, the provisions of the
Arizona
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act came into play. Although only one provision of the
Arizona Act is relevant to the issue presented by this case, it is appropriate to describe
the statutory scheme in some detail. The Arizona statute is based on the
Uniform
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act promulgated by the National Conference on Street and
Highway Safety. n1 Articles 1 and 2 of the Act deal, respectively, with definitional matters
and administration.
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n1 See Reviser's Note, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§
28-1101.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[***5]
The substantive provisions begin in Art. 3, which requires the posting of
financial security by those involved in accidents. Section 28-1141 of that
article requires
suspension of
licenses for unlawful failure to report accidents, and
§ 28-1142 (Supp. 1970-1971) provides that within 60 days of the receipt of an
accident report the
Superintendent of the
Motor Vehicle Division of the
Highway Department shall suspend the
driver's
license of the operator and the
registration of the owner of a car involved in an accident
"unless such operator or owner or both shall deposit
security in a sum which is sufficient in the judgment of the
superintendent to satisfy any judgment or judgments for damages resulting from the accident
as may be recovered against the operator or owner." Under the same section,
notice of such
suspension and the amount of security required must be sent to the owner and operator not
less than 10 days prior to the effective date of the
suspension. This section does not apply if the owner or the operator carried liability
[*640] insurance or some other covering bond at the time of the accident, or if such
individual had previously qualified as a self-insurer
[***6] under
§ 28-1222. Other exceptions to the requirement that security be posted are
stated in
§ 28-1143. n2 If none of these exceptions applies, the
suspension continues until: (1) the person whose privileges were
suspended deposits the security required under
§ 28-1142 (Supp. 1970-1971); (2) one year elapses from the date of the accident
and the person whose privileges were
suspended files proof with the
Superintendent that no one has initiated an action for damages arising from the
[**1707] accident; (3) evidence is filed with the
superintendent that a release from liability, an adjudication of nonliability, a confession
of judgment, or some other written settlement agreement has been entered. n3 As
far as the
record in the instant case shows,
[*641] the provisions of Art. 3 were not invoked against petitioners, and the
constitutional validity of these provisions is, of course, not before us for
decision.
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n2 Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1143 (A), the owner or operator of a car involved in an accident need not
post security as required by
§ 28-1142 (Supp. 1970-1971): (1) if the accident caused injury or damage to no
person or property other than the owner's car or the operator's person; (2) if
the car was parked when involved in the accident, unless it was parked
illegally or did not carry a legally sufficient complement of lights; (3) if
the car was being driven or was parked by another without the owner's express
or implied permission; (4) if prior to date for
suspension the person whose
license or
registration would be
suspended
files with the
superintendent a release, a final adjudication of nonliability, a confession of judgment, or
some other written settlement agreement providing for payment, in
installments, of an agreed amount of damages with respect to claims arising from the
accident; or (5) if the
driver at the time of the accident was
driving a vehicle owned, operated, or leased by his employer with the employer's
permission; in that case the security and
suspension provisions apply only to the owner-employer's
registration of vehicles not covered by insurance or other bond.
[***7]
n3 This section further provides that the
superintendent may employ
suspension a second time as a means of enforcing payment should there be a default on
installment obligations arising under a confession of judgment or a written settlement
agreement. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1144 (3).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Article 4 of the
Arizona Act, which
includes the only provision at issue here, deals with
suspension of
licenses and
registrations for nonpayment of judgments. Interestingly, it is only when the
judgment debtor in an
automobile accident lawsuit -- usually an owner-operator like Mr. Perez -- fails to respond to a
judgment entered against him that he must overcome two hurdles in order to
regain his
driving privileges. Section 28-1161, the first section of Art. 4, requires the state
court clerk or judge, when a judgment n4 has remained unsatisfied
for 60 days after entry, to forward a certified copy of the judgment to the
superintendent. n5 This was done in the present case, and on March 13, 1968, Mr. and Mrs.
Perez were served with
notice that their
drivers'
licenses and
registration were
suspended
[***8] pursuant to
§ 28-1162 (A). n6 Under other provisions of Art. 4, such
suspension is to
[*642] continue until the judgment is
paid, n7 and
§ 28-1163 (B) specifically provides that
"[a]
discharge in bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment shall not relieve the
judgment debtor from any of the requirements of this article." In addition to requiring satisfaction of the judgment debt,
§ 28-1163 (A) provides that the
license and
registration
"shall remain
suspended and shall not be renewed, nor shall any
license or
registration be thereafter issued in the name of the person . . . until the person gives
proof of financial responsibility" for a future period. n8 Again, the validity
[**1708] of this limited requirement that some
drivers post evidence of
financial responsibility for the future in order to regain
driving privileges is not questioned here. Nor is the broader issue of whether a
[*643] State may require proof of
financial responsibility as a precondition for granting
driving privileges to anyone before us for decision. What is at issue here is the
power of a
State to include as part of this comprehensive enactment designed to secure
compensation
[***9] for
automobile accident victims a section providing that a
discharge in bankruptcy of the
automobile accident tort judgment shall have no effect on the judgment debtor's obligation to
repay the judgment creditor, at least insofar as such repayment may be enforced
by the withholding of
driving privileges by the State. It was that question, among others, which
petitioners raised after
suspension of their
licenses and
registration by filing a complaint in Federal District Court seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief and requesting a three-judge court. They asserted several
constitutional violations, and also alleged that
§ 28-1163 (B) was
in direct conflict with the
Bankruptcy Act and was thus violative of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. n9 In
support of their complaint, Mr. and Mrs. Perez filed affidavits stating that
the
suspension of their
licenses and
registration
worked both physical and
financial hardship upon them and their children. The District Judge granted the petitioners
leave to proceed
in forma pauperis, but thereafter granted the respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
[***10] citing
Kesler and
Reitz. n10 The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on
[*644] the same two decisions.
421 F.2d 619 (CA9 1970). We granted certiorari.
400 U.S. 818 (1970).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n4 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1102 (Supp. 1970-1971) defines
"judgment," for purposes of the
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, as
"any judgment which has become final . . . , upon a cause of action arising out
of the ownership, maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle, for damages . . . or upon a cause of action on an agreement of settlement for
such damages."
n5 Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1161 (B), a similar
notice must also be forwarded to officials in the home State of a nonresident
judgment debtor.
n6
"A. The
superintendent upon receipt of a certified copy of a judgment, shall forthwith suspend the
license and
registration and nonresident operating privilege of a person against whom the judgment was
rendered, except as otherwise provided in this section and
§ 28-1165."
n7 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1163 (A). Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1164 (Supp. 1970-1971) defines when a judgment is
"paid." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1165 sets forth a procedure for paying judgments in
installments. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1162 (B) provides that if a creditor consents in writing and the debtor furnishes
proof of financial responsibility, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1167, the debtor's
license and
registration may be restored in the
superintendent's discretion. After six months, however, the creditor's consent is revocable
provided the judgment debt remains unpaid.
[***11]
n8 Sections 28-1167 through 28-1178 set forth the requirements for various
forms of proof. Under
§ 28-1178, the
judgment debtor is apparently able to regain his
license and
registration to operate a
motor vehicle without
proof of financial responsibility after three years from the date such proof was first required of him, if
during that period the
superintendent has not received any
notice -- and
notice can come from other States -- of a conviction or forfeiture of bail which
would require or permit the
suspension or revocation of the
driver's
license and if the
individual is not involved in litigation arising from an accident covered by
the security he posted. If the
driver required to post financial security does so, and is involved as an owner or
operator in another accident resulting in personal injury or property damage
within one year prior to the date he requests permission to cancel his
security, the
superintendent may not permit cancellation.
n9 U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
n10 Mr. and Mrs. Perez also alleged in their complaint that certain provisions
of the
Arizona Act imposed involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and
denied Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection. They also
claimed that portions of the
Arizona Act operated as a bill of attainder in violation of Art. I,
§ 10, of the Constitution. The District Judge, in refusing to request the
convening of a three-judge court, ruled that these
constitutional claims were
"obviously insubstantial." The Court of Appeals agreed.
421 F.2d 619, 625 (CA9 1970). Because of our resolution of this case, we express no opinion as to the
substantiality of any of petitioners' other constitutional claims.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[***12]
I
[1]
[2]
Deciding whether a state statute is in conflict with a federal statute and
hence invalid under the Supremacy Clause is essentially a two-step process of
first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and then determining
the constitutional question whether they are in conflict. In the present case,
both statutes have been authoritatively construed. In
Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P. 2d 136 (1963), the Supreme Court of Arizona held that
"the
Financial Responsibility Act has for its principal purpose the protection of the public using the
highways from
financial hardship which may result from the use of automobiles by
financially
irresponsible persons."
93 Ariz., at 280, 380 P. 2d, at 140. The Arizona court has consistently adhered to this construction of its
legislation, see
Camacho v. Gardner, 104 Ariz. 555, 558, 456 P. 2d 925, 928 (1969);
New York
[***13]
Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court, 104 Ariz. 544, 456 P. 2d 914 (1969);
Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241, 243, 428 P. 2d 98, 100 (1967);
Farmer v. Killingsworth, 102 Ariz. 44, 47, 424 P. 2d 172, 175 (1967);
Hastings v. Thurston, 100 Ariz. 302, 306, 413 P. 2d 767, 770 (1966);
Jenkins v. Mayflower Ins. Exchange, 93 Ariz. 287, 290, 380 P. 2d 145, 147 (1963), and we are bound by its rulings. See,
e.
g., General Trading Co. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 337 (1944). Although
[**1709] the dissent seems unwilling to accept the Arizona Supreme Court's construction
of the statute as expressive of the Act's primary
purpose n11
[*645] and indeed characterizes
[**1710] that construction as unfortunate,
post, at 667, a reading of the provisions outlined above leaves the impression that
the Arizona Court's
[*646] description of the
statutory purpose is not only logical but persuasive. The sole emphasis in
the Act is one of providing leverage for the
collection of damages from
[*647]
drivers who either
[***14] admit that they are at fault or are adjudged negligent. The victim of another
driver's carelessness, if he so desires, can exclude the
superintendent entirely from the process of
"deterring" a repetition of that
driver's negligence. n12 Further, if an
[*648] accident is litigated and a special verdict that the defendant was negligent
and the plaintiff contributorily negligent is entered, the result in Arizona,
as in many
other States, is that there is no liability for damages arising from the
accident.
Heimke v. Munoz, 106 Ariz. 26, 470 P. 2d 107 (1970);
McDowell v. Davis, 104 Ariz. 69, 448 P. 2d 869 (1968). Under the Safety Responsibility Act, the apparent result of such a judgment is
that no consequences are visited upon either
driver although both have been found to have driven carelessly. See Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann.
§§ 28-1143 (A)(4), 28-1144 (3). Moreover, there are no provisions requiring
drivers proved to be
careless to stay off the roads for a period of time. Nor are there provisions
requiring
drivers who have caused accidents to attend some kind of
driver improvement course, a technique that is not unfamiliar in sentencing
[***15] for traffic offenses.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n11 As discussed below, the majorities
in
Kesler and
Reitz also seemed unwilling to be bound by, or even to look for, state court
constructions of the
financial responsibility laws before them. See
infra, at 652-654. It is clear, however, from even a cursory examination of
decisions in other States that the conclusion of the Arizona Supreme Court as
to the purpose of the
financial responsibility law is by no means unusual. See,
e. g.,
Sullivan v. Cheatham, 264 Ala. 71, 76, 84 So. 2d 374, 378 (1955) ("The purpose of the [Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility] Act is clearly to require and establish
financial responsibility for
every owner or operator of a
motor vehicle 'in any manner involved in an accident.' . . . The Act is designed to protect
all persons having claims arising out of
highway accidents.");
Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 876, 222 P. 2d 1, 5 (1950) ("The state chose to allow
financially
irresponsible licensed operators to drive until they became involved in an accident with the
consequences described in the [financial responsibility law] and their financial irresponsibility was thus brought to the attention of the
department, and then to require
suspension of their
licenses.");
People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 215-216, 363 P. 2d 180, 183 (1961) ("The requirement of C. R. S. '53, 13-7-7, that the director of revenue, '. . .
shall suspend the
license of each operator and all
registrations of each owner of a
motor vehicle in any manner involved in [an] accident . . .' unless such persons deposit a
sum 'sufficient in the judgment of the director . . .' to pay any damage which
may be awarded, or otherwise show ability to indemnify the other party to the
accident against financial loss, has nothing whatever to do with the protection
of the public
safety, health, morals or welfare. It is a device designated and intended to
bring about the posting of security for the payment of a private obligation
without the slightest indication that any legal obligation exists on the part
of any person. The public gets no protection whatever from the deposit of such
security. This is not the situation which we find in some states where the
statutes require public liability insurance as a condition to be met
before a
driver's
license will issue. Such statute protects the public. The statute before us is entirely
different. In the matters to which we have particularly directed attention, C.
R. S. '53, 13-7-7, is unconstitutional. On a matter so obviously basic and
fundamental no additional citation of authority is required. We reach this
conclusion notwithstanding the fact that other jurisdictions have seemingly
overlooked basic constitutional guarantees which must be ignored in reaching an
opposite conclusion.");
Dempsey v. Tynan, 143 Conn. 202, 208, 120 A. 2d 700, 703 (1956) ("The purpose of the legislature in enacting the
financial responsibility provisions . . . was to keep off our
highways the
financially
irresponsible owner or operator of an automobile who cannot respond in damages for the
injuries he may inflict, and to require him, as a condition for securing or
retaining a
registration or an operator's
license, to furnish adequate means of satisfying possible claims against him.");
City of St. Paul v. Hoffmann, 223 Minn. 76, 77-78, 25 N. W. 2d 661, 662-663 (1946) ("The apparent objective of the safety responsibility act is to provide
financial responsibility for injuries and damages suffered in
motor vehicle traffic. It seeks to achieve its objective solely by the
suspension of
licenses. While its announced purpose is to promote safety of travel, its provisions
take
effect after an accident happens and subject
drivers and owners of vehicles involved to
suspension of their 'licenses' unless liability insurance coverage equivalent to that required by the act is
carried by the owner or
driver of the vehicle. . . . The purpose of the act was to effect
financial responsibility to injured persons.");
Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N. H. 314, 318, 197 A. 701, 704 (1938) ("Two reasons were thought to avail for sustaining such a law. One was its
character as a regulation of the use of public
highways and the other was its capacity to secure public safety in dangerous agencies
and operations. This latter reason has slight if any evidence for its factual
support. Certainly, in the absence of known experience and statistics, it is
doubtful whether the insured owner's car, driven either by himself or another,
may be considered to be operated more carefully than one whose owner is
uninsured. But protection
in securing redress for injured
highway travelers is a proper subject of police regulation, as well as protection from
being injured. It is a reasonable incident of the general welfare that
financially
irresponsible persons be denied the use of the
highway with their cars, regardless of the competency of themselves or others as the
drivers."). For legislative statements to the effect that
financial responsibility laws are designed to secure compensation for injured victims, see,
e. g., Alaska Stat.
§ 28.20.010 (1970);
Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 463, 259 S. W. 2d 177, 180 (1953) (quoting emergency clause enacted by the Texas Legislature in connection with
its
financial responsibility law); S. Rep. No. 515, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1953) (Report of the Senate
Committee on the District of Columbia on the
financial responsibility law
proposed for the District).
[***16]
n12 See
Reitz, 314 U.S., at 40-43 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).
Under Art. 3 of the
Arizona Act, dealing with the posting of security for damages arising from a particular
accident, the victim may cut the
superintendent out by executing a release from liability or agreeing to some other written
settlement or confession of judgment providing for payment of some damages, in
installments or otherwise. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1143 (A)(4) discussed in n. 2,
supra. Assuming that such an agreement or confession of judgment providing for
installment payments is filed with the
superintendent, it prevents him from suspending
driving privileges for failure to post the amount of financial security the
superintendent determines to be necessary; however, if the
careless
driver later defaults on one
installment, the victim may give
notice to the
superintendent, who must then use his
power of
suspension to either coerce full payment or the posting of security. Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann.
§ 28-1144 (3), discussed in n. 3,
supra.
Under Art. 4, dealing with
suspension for nonpayment of a judgment, the victim who has chosen to reduce his claim to
judgment maintains substantial control over the
suspension of
driving privileges if the judgment remains unsatisfied 60 days after entry. He may
consent that the judgment debtor's
driving privileges not be
suspended, but the debtor still must furnish proof of
financial responsibility for the future. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1162 (B). For an argument that a similar provision delegating to judgment
creditors the right to choose which
careless
drivers who do not pay judgments shall escape
suspension conflicts with the
Bankruptcy Act see
Kesler, 369 U.S., at 179-182 (Warren, C. J., dissenting). If the
judgment debtor is able to secure a discretionary court order permitting him to pay a judgment
in
installments under
§ 28-1165 (A), the creditor may cause
suspension of
driving privileges until the judgment is fully satisfied by notifying the
superintendent of any default in payment of the
installments. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1165 (C). Again, however, the
judgment debtor must still give
proof of financial responsibility for the future. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1165 (B).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[***17]
[3]
Turning to the federal statute, the construction of the
Bankruptcy Act is similarly clear. This Court on numerous occasions has stated that
"one of the primary purposes of the
bankruptcy act" is to give debtors
"a new opportunity in life and a clear field for
[**1711]
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting
debt."
Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
Accord,
e. g.,
Harris v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447, 451 (1943);
Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918);
Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-555 (1915). There can be no doubt, given
Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467 (1925), that Congress intended this
"new opportunity" to include freedom from most kinds of pre-existing tort judgments.
[*649] II
[4]
[***18]
[5]
With the construction of both statutes clearly established, we proceed
immediately to the constitutional question whether a state statute that
protects judgment creditors from
"financially
irresponsible persons" is in conflict with a federal
statute that gives
discharged debtors a new start
"unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt." As early as
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall stated the governing principle -- that
"acts of the State Legislatures . . . [which]
interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the
constitution," are invalid under the Supremacy Clause.
Id., at 211 (emphasis added). Three decades ago MR. JUSTICE BLACK, after
reviewing the precedents, wrote in a similar vein that, while
"this Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties
or federal laws touching the same subject, ha[d] made use of the following
expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance;
[***19] difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and
interference[,] . . . in the final analysis," our function is to determine whether a challenged state
statute
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Since
Hines the Court has frequently adhered to this articulation of the meaning of the
Supremacy Clause. See,
e. g.,
Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 240 (1967);
Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964);
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963) (dictum);
Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962);
Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 542-543 (1945);
Sola Electric Co. v.
Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942). Indeed, in
Florida Lime
&
[*650] Avocado Growers,
Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), a recent case in which the Court was closely divided, all nine Justices
accepted the
[***20]
Hines test.
Id., at 141 (opinion of the Court), 165 (dissenting opinion).
Both
Kesler n13 and
Reitz, however,
ignored this controlling principle. The Court in
Kesler conceded that Utah's
financial responsibility law left
"the
bankrupt to some extent burdened by the
discharged debt,"
369 U.S., at 171, made
"it more probable that the debt will be paid despite the discharge,"
id., at 173, and thereby made
"some inroad . . . on the consequences of bankruptcy. . . ."
Id., at 171. Utah's statute, in short, frustrated Congress' policy of giving
discharged debtors a
[**1712] new start. But the
Kesler majority was not concerned by this frustration. In upholding the statute, the
majority opinion did not look to the effect of the legislation but simply
asserted that the statute was
"not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted Creditors,"
id., at 174, and was
"not designed to aid
collection of debts but to enforce a policy against
irresponsible
driving. . . ."
Id., at 169. The majority, that is, looked to the purpose of the
state legislation and upheld it because
[***21] the purpose was not to circumvent the
Bankruptcy Act but to promote
highway safety; those in dissent, however, were concerned that, whatever the purpose of the
Utah Act, its
"plain and inevitable effect . . . [was] to create a powerful weapon for
collection of a debt from which [the]
bankrupt [had] been released by
federal law."
Id., at 183. Such a result, they argued, left
"the States free . . . to impair . . . an important and historic policy
[*651] of this Nation . . . embodied in its bankruptcy laws."
Id., at 185.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n13
Kesler also decided a jurisdictional question, holding that a Supremacy Clause
challenge to a state statute was required to be heard by a three-judge
district court under
28 U. S. C. § 2281. See
369 U.S., at 155-158. This jurisdictional part of the decision was overruled almost four years later
in
Swift
& Co. v.
Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The opinion of the Court in
Reitz
[***22] was similarly concerned, not with the fact that New York's
financial responsibility law frustrated the operation of the
Bankruptcy Act, but with the purpose of the law, which was divined as the promotion of
highway safety. As the Court said:
"The penalty which
§ 94-b imposes for injury due to
careless
driving is not for the protection of the creditor merely, but to enforce a public
policy that
irresponsible
drivers shall not, with impunity, be allowed to injure their fellows. The scheme of
the legislation would be frustrated if the reckless
driver were permitted to escape its provisions by the simple expedient of voluntary
bankruptcy, and,
accordingly, the legislature declared that a
discharge in bankruptcy should not interfere with the operation of the statute. Such legislation is
not in derogation of the
Bankruptcy Act. Rather it is an enforcement of permissible state policy touching
highway safety."
314 U.S., at 37.
The dissenting opinion written by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS for himself and three
others noted that the New York legislation put
"the
bankrupt . . . at the creditor's mercy," with the results that
"in practical effect the
bankrupt may be in as bad,
[***23] or even worse, a position than if the state had made it possible for a
creditor to attach his future wages" and that
"bankruptcy . . . [was not] the sanctuary for hapless debtors which Congress
intended."
Id., at 41.
[6]
We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine of
Kesler and
Reitz that state law may frustrate the operation of
federal law as long as the state legislature in passing its law had some purpose
in mind other than
[*652] one of frustration. Apart from the fact that it is at odds with the approach
taken in nearly all our Supremacy Clause
cases, such a doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all
unwanted federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative committee
report articulating some state interest or policy -- other than frustration of
the federal objective -- that would be tangentially furthered by the proposed
state law. In view of the consequences, we certainly would not apply the
Kesler doctrine in all Supremacy Clause cases. Although it is possible to argue that
Kesler and
Reitz are somehow confined
[***24] to cases involving either bankruptcy or
highway safety, analysis discloses no reason why the States should have broader power to
nullify
federal law in these fields than in others. Thus, we conclude that
Kesler and
Reitz can have no authoritative effect to the extent they are inconsistent with the
controlling principle that any
state legislation which frustrates the full
effectiveness of
federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause. Section 28-1163 (B) thus may not
stand.
III
Even accepting the Supremacy Clause analysis of
Kesler and
Reitz -- that is,
[**1713] looking to the purpose rather than the effect of state laws -- those decisions
are not dispositive of this case. Just as
Kesler went a step beyond
Reitz and broadened the holding of the earlier case,
369 U.S., at 184 (dissenting opinion), so in the present case the respondents asked the courts
below and this Court to expand the holdings of the two previous cases. The
distinction between
Kesler and
Reitz and this case lies in the State's expressed legislative purpose.
[7]
Kesler and
[***25] Reitz were aberrational in their treatment of this question as well. The
majority opinions in both cases assumed, without citation of state court
authority or any indication that such precedent was unavailable,
[8A]
[*653] that the purpose of the state
financial responsibility laws there under
attack was not provision of relief to creditors but rather deterrence of
irresponsible
driving. The assumption was, in effect, that all state legislatures which had enacted
provisions such as
§ 28-1163 (B) had concluded that an uninsured motorist about to embark in his
car would be more careful on the road if he did not have available what the
majority in
Kesler cavalierly characterized as an
"easy refuge in bankruptcy."
369 U.S., at 173. n14 Passing the question
of whether the Court gave sufficient attention to binding state
interpretations of state legislative purpose and conceding that it employed
proper technique in divining as obvious from their face the aim of the state
enactments, the present case raises doubts about whether the Court was correct
even in its basic assumptions.
[***26] The Arizona Supreme Court has declared that Arizona's Safety Responsibility
Act
"has for its principal purpose the protection
[*654] of the public . . . from
financial hardship" resulting from involvement in traffic accidents with
uninsured motorists unable to respond to a judgment.
Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz., at 280, 380 P. 2d, at 140. The Court in
Kesler was able to declare, although the source of support is unclear, that the Utah
statute could be upheld because it was
"not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted Creditors" or a statute
"designed to aid
collection of debts."
369 U.S., at 174, 169. But here the respondents urge us to uphold precisely the sort of statute that
Kesler would have stricken down -- one with a declared purpose to protect judgment
creditors
"from
financial hardship" by giving them a powerful weapon with which to force
bankrupts to pay their debts despite their discharge. Whereas the Acts in
Kesler and
Reitz had the effect of frustrating
federal law but had, the Court said, no such purpose, the
Arizona Act has both that effect and that purpose. Believing as we do that
Kesler and
Reitz
[***27] are not in harmony with sound constitutional
principle, they certainly should not be extended to cover this new and
distinguishable case.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n14 It also seems clear that even under the logic of
Kesler and
Reitz Mrs. Perez should not have lost her
driving privileges. She was not present when the accident occurred, and no act or
omission on her part contributed to it. Because the automobile was
community property under Arizona law and because judgment was confessed as to her in the
Pinkerton negligence action, the Court of Appeals reasoned that loss of Mrs.
Perez'
license
"is the price an Arizona wife must pay for negligent
driving by her husband of the community vehicle" when the resulting judgment is not paid.
421 F.2d, at 624. The
Kesler and
Reitz assumption that depriving uninsured motorists of the full relief afforded by a
discharge in bankruptcy would prompt careful
driving is without foundation when applied to Mrs. Perez. As the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has stated in
a recent decision involving similar facts:
"Even accepting the fiction that, as applied to
drivers,
motor vehicle responsibility statutes are intended to promote safety, it is just too much
fiction to contend that, applied to a
judgment debtor held vicariously liable for the omission of a sub-agent, the statute is
anything but a means for the enforcement of judgments."
Miller v. Anckaitis, 436 F.2d 115, 118 (CA3 1970) (en banc).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[***28]
IV
[**1714] One final argument merits discussion. The dissent points out that the
District of Columbia Code contains an anti-discharge provision similar to that
included in the
Arizona Act.
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of the District of Columbia, D. C. Code Ann.
§ 40-464 (1967), 68 Stat. 132. In light of our decision today, the sum of the
argument is to draw into question the constitutional validity of the District's
anti-discharge section, for as noted in the dissent the Constitution confers
upon Congress the power
"to establish . . .
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. Const., Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 4 (emphasis
[*655] added). It is asserted that
"Congress must have regarded the two statutes as consistent and compatible,"
post, at 665, but such an argument assumes a modicum of legislative attention to
the question of consistency. The D. C. Code section does, of course, refer
specifically to discharges, but its passage may at most be viewed as evidencing
an opinion of Congress on the meaning of the general discharge provision
enacted by an earlier Congress and interpreted by this Court as early as 1925.
See
[***29]
Lewis v. Roberts, supra. In fact, in passing the initial and amended version of the District of
Columbia
financial responsibility
law, Congress gave no attention to the interaction of the anti-discharge section
with the
Bankruptcy Act. n15 Moreover,
the legislative history is
[*656] quite clear that when Congress dealt with the subject of
financial responsibility laws for the District, it based its work upon the efforts of the uniform
commissioners which had won enactment in other States. n16
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n15 See S. Rep. No. 10, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); H. R. Rep. No. 208, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (both presenting a summary of the provisions of the
proposed statute dealing with
"Financial Responsibility of
Motor Vehicle Operators in the District of Columbia," but failing to mention the fact that a
discharge in bankruptcy of an accident judgment would have no effect on
suspension of
driving privileges for failure to satisfy such judgment); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 799,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (Conference Report making no mention of
anti-discharge provision); 79 Cong. Rec. 272-273 (Senate); 79 Cong. Rec.
3416-3417, 4621-4629, 4631-4641, 6556-6564 (House). Some members of the House,
which debated some aspects of the
financial responsibility law concept rather extensively in 1935, demonstrated in debate that they were
totally unaware of any of the provisions designed to enforce payment of a
judgment for injuries caused by the first accident of a
financially
irresponsible
driver. See 79 Cong. Rec. 4624 (remarks of Reps. Fitzpatrick and Sisson);
id., at 4625 (remarks of Rep. Hull).
When the present District of Columbia
financial responsibility law was enacted in 1954, debate was much more limited and the reports of the House
and Senate District Committees were quite brief. Except for the
reading of the bill, no mention was made of the anti-discharge provision. See
S. Rep. No. 515, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); H. R. Rep. No. 1448, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1954); 99 Cong. Rec. 8950-8951; 100 Cong. Rec. 6281-6287, 6347-6348.
[***30]
n16 S. Rep. No. 10, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1935); H. R. Rep. No. 208, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1935); 79 Cong. Rec. 4626-4627 (remarks of Rep. Norton,
chairman of the House District Committee). In reference to the present version
of the
financial responsibility act, see S. Rep. No. 515, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1953); H. R. Rep. No. 1448,
83d Cong., 2d
Sess., 2 (1954); 100 Cong. Rec. 6287 (remarks of Rep. Talle);
id., at 6347 (remarks of Sen. Beall).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[9]
Had Congress focused on the interaction between this minor subsection of the
rather lengthy
financial responsibility act and the discharge provision of the
Bankruptcy Act, it would have been immediately apparent to the legislators that the only
constitutional method for so defining the scope and effect of a
discharge in bankruptcy was by amendment of the
Bankruptcy Act, which by its terms is a uniform statute applicable in the States, Territories,
and the District of Columbia.
11 U. S. C. § 1 (29). To follow any other course would obviously
[***31]
[**1715] be to legislate in such a way that a
discharge in bankruptcy means one thing in the District of Columbia and something else in the States
-- depending on state law -- a result explicitly prohibited by the uniformity
requirement
in the constitutional authorization to Congress to enact bankruptcy legislation.
V
[8B]
From the foregoing, we think it clear that
§ 28-1163 (B) of the Arizona Safety Responsibility Act is constitutionally
invalid. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
CONCURBY: BLACKMUN (In Part)
DISSENTBY: BLACKMUN (In Part)
DISSENT:
[*657] MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, and MR.
JUSTICE STEWART.
I concur in the result as to petitioner Emma Perez and dissent as to petitioner
Adolfo Perez.
I
The slaughter on the
highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars. n1 The country is
fragmented about the current conflict in Southeast Asia, but I detect little
genuine public concern about what takes place in our very midst
[***32]
and on our daily travel routes. See
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401 (1971) (concurring opinion).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 See Appendix to this opinion,
post, p. 672.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
This being so, it is a matter of deep concern to me that today the Court
lightly brushes aside and overrules two cases where it had upheld a
representative attempt by the States to regulate traffic and where the Court
had considered and
rejected the very Supremacy Clause argument that it now discovers to be so
persuasive. n2
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 The petitioners urge upon us only the Supremacy Clause.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
II
I think it is desirable to stress certain factual details. The facts, of
course, are only alleged, but for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are to
accept them as true.
Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
Arizona is a
community property state.
[***33] Adolfo and Emma Perez are husband and wife. They were resident citizens of
Arizona at the time of the accident in Tucson in July 1965. Mr. Perez was
driving an automobile registered in his name. He was alone. Mrs. Perez was not with
him and had nothing to do with her husband's
[*658] operation of the car on that day. The automobile, however, was the property
of the marital community.
Accompanying, and supposedly supportive of, the Perez complaint in the present
suit, were affidavits of Mr. and Mrs. Perez. These affidavits asserted that
the Perezes had four
minor children ages 6 to 17; that Emma is a housewife and not otherwise
gainfully employed; that Emma's inability to drive has required their two older
children, aged 17 and 14, to walk one and a half miles to high school and the
third child, aged 9, one mile to elementary school, with consequent
nosebleeding; that Emma's inability to drive has caused inconvenience and
financial injury; and that Adolfo's inability to drive has caused inconvenience
because he must rely on others for transportation or use public facilities or
walk.
III
The Statutory Plan
Arizona has a comprehensive statutory plan for the regulation
[***34] of vehicles upon its
highways. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 28. Among the State's efforts to assure
responsibility in this area of increasing national concern are its Uniform
Motor Vehicle Operators' and Chauffeurs'
License Act (c. 4), its Uniform Act
Regulating
[**1716] Traffic on
Highways (c. 6), and its Uniform
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (c. 7). n3
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n3 In 1943 some of the
motor vehicle uniform laws were
"withdrawn from active promulgation pending further study" by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 9B U. L.
A. Table III, xix, xxii, xxiii. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's detailed review
of the development of
state legislation and of the uniform laws in this field in
Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 158-168 (1962).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The challenged
§ 28-1163 (B) is a part of the
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. The Act's provisions are not unfamiliar. There is
imposed upon the
Motor
[*659] Vehicle Division
Superintendent the
[***35] duty to suspend the
license of each operator, and the
registration of each
owner, of a
motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury or death or property damage
to any one person in excess of $ 100, except, among other situations, where
proof of financial responsibility, as by the deposit of appropriate security or by the presence of a liability
policy of stated minimum coverage, is afforded.
§§ 28-1142 (Supp. 1970-1971), 28-1143, and 28-1167. The
suspension, once imposed, remains until the required security is deposited or until one
year has elapsed and no action for damages has been instituted.
§ 28-1144. If the registrant or operator fails, within 60 days, to satisfy an
adverse
motor vehicle final judgment, as defined in
§ 28-1102 (2) (Supp. 1970-1971), the court clerk has the duty to notify the
Superintendent and the latter to suspend the
license and
registration of the
judgment
debtor.
§§ 28-1161 (A) and 28-1162 (A). But if the judgment creditor consents in writing
that the debtor be allowed to retain his
license and
registration, the
Superintendent in his discretion may grant that privilege.
§ 28-1162 (B). Otherwise the
suspension remains
[***36] in effect until the judgment is satisfied.
§ 28-1163 (A). Payments of stated amounts are deemed to satisfy the judgment,
§ 28-1164 (Supp. 1970-1971), and court-approved
installment payment of the judgment will preserve the
license and
registration,
§ 28-1165.
IV
Adolfo Perez
Inasmuch as the case is before us on the motion of defendants below to dismiss
the Perez complaint that alleged Adolfo's
driving alone, the collision, and the judgment in favor of the Pinkertons, it is
established, for present purposes, that the Pinkerton judgment was
[*660] based on Adolfo's negligence in
driving the Perez vehicle.
Adolfo
emphasizes, and I recognize, that under Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution, Congress has possessed the power to establish
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States"; that, of course, this power, when exercised, as it has been since 1800, is
"exclusive,"
New Lamp Chimney Co. v.
Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91 U.S. 656, 661 (1876), and
"unrestricted and paramount,"
International Shoe Co. v.
Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929); that one of the purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act is to
"relieve
[***37] the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to
start afresh . . . ,"
Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-555 (1915); and that a
bankrupt by his discharge receives
"a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by
the pressure and discouragement of
preexisting debt,"
Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
From these general and accepted principles it is argued that
§ 28-1163 (B), with its insistence upon post-discharge payment as a condition
for
license and
registration restoration, is violative of the
Bankruptcy Act and, thus, of the Supremacy Clause.
[**1717] As Mr. Perez acknowledges in his brief here, the argument is not new. It was
raised with respect to a New York statute in
Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941), and was rejected there by a five-to-four vote:
"The use of the public
highways by motor vehicles, with its
consequent dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of regulation
apparent. The universal practice is to register ownership of automobiles and
to
license their
drivers.
[***38] Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and care on
the part of its licensees
[*661] and to protect others using the
highway is consonant with due
process. . . .
. . . .
"The penalty which
§ 94-b imposes for injury due to
careless
driving is not for the protection of the creditor merely, but to enforce a public
policy that
irresponsible
drivers shall not, with impunity, be allowed to injure their fellows. The scheme of
the legislation would be frustrated if the reckless
driver were permitted to escape its provisions by the simple expedient of voluntary
bankruptcy, and, accordingly, the legislature declared that a
discharge in bankruptcy should not interfere with the operation of the statute. Such legislation is
not in derogation of the
Bankruptcy Act. Rather it is an enforcement of permissible state policy touching
highway safety."
314 U.S., at 36-37.
Left specifically unanswered in that case, but acknowledged as a
"serious question,"
314 U.S., at 38, was the claim that interim amendments of the statutes gave the creditor
control over the initiation and duration of the
suspension and thus violated the
Bankruptcy Act.
[***39] The dissenters, speaking
through MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concluded that the constitutional issue
"cannot be escaped . . . unless we are to overlook the realities of
collection methods."
314 U.S., at 43.
Nine years ago, the same argument again was advanced, this time with respect to
Utah's
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, and again was rejected.
Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 158-174 (1962). There, Utah's provisions relating to duration of
suspension and restoration, more stringent than those of New York, were challenged. It
was claimed that the statutes made the State a
"collecting agent for the creditor rather than furthering an interest in
highway safety,"
[*662] and that
suspension that could be perpetual
"only renders the
collection pressure more effective."
369 U.S., at 169. There was a troublesome jurisdictional issue in the case, the decision as to
which was later overruled,
Swift
& Co. v.
Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 124-129 (1965), but on the merits the Court, by a five-to-three vote, sustained all the Utah
statutes then under attack: n4
"But the lesson
Zavelo [v.
[***40]
Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 (1913)] and
Spalding [v.
New York ex rel. Backus, 4 How. 21 (1845)] teach is that the
Bankruptcy Act does not forbid a State to attach any consequence whatsoever to a debt which
has been
discharged.
"The Utah Safety Responsibility Act leaves the
bankrupt to some extent burdened by the
discharged debt. Certainly some inroad is made on the consequences of bankruptcy
if the creditor can exert pressure to recoup a
discharged debt, or part of it, through the leverage of the State's licensing
[**1718] and
registration power. But the exercise of this power is deemed vital to the State's
well-being, and, from the point of view of its interests, is wholly unrelated
to the considerations which propelled Congress to enact a national bankruptcy
law. There are here
overlapping interests which cannot be uncritically resolved by exclusive regard
to the money consequences of enforcing a widely adopted measure for
safeguarding life and safety.
". . . At the heart of the matter are the complicated demands of our federalism.
"Are the differences between the Utah statute and
[*663] that of New York so significant
[***41] as to make a constitutionally decisive difference? A State may properly
decide, as forty-five have done, that the prospect of a judgment that must be
paid in order to regain
driving privileges serves as a substantial deterrent to unsafe
driving. We held in
Reitz that it might impose this requirement despite a discharge, in order not to
exempt some
drivers from appropriate protection of public safety by easy refuge in bankruptcy. . .
. To whatever extent these provisions make it more probable that the debt will
be paid despite the discharge, each no less reflects the State's important
deterrent interest. Congress had no thought of amending the
Bankruptcy Act when it adopted this law for the District of Columbia; we do not believe
Utah's identical statute conflicts with it either.
"Utah is not using its police power as a devious collecting agency under the
pressure of organized creditors. Victims of
careless car
drivers are a wholly diffused group of shifting and uncertain composition, not even
remotely united by a common financial interest. The Safety Responsibility Act
is not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted Creditors. It is not directed to
bankrupts as such. Though in
[***42] a particular case a
discharged
bankrupt who wants to have his rightfully
suspended
license and
registration restored may have to pay the amount of a
discharged debt, or part of it, the bearing of the statute on the purposes served by
bankruptcy legislation is essentially tangential."
369 U.S., at 170-174 (footnotes
omitted).
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, joined by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissented on the ground that
Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-12-15 (1953), essentially identical to Arizona's
§ 28-1163 (B),
[*664] operated to deny the
judgment debtor the federal immunity given him by
§ 17 of the
Bankruptcy Act and, hence, violated the Supremacy Clause.
369 U.S., at 182-185.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n4 Mr. Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in part, would have upheld the Utah
statutes other than that
"which gives to a creditor the discretion of determining if and when
driving privileges may be restored by the State. . . ."
369 U.S., at 179-182.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Perezes in their brief, p. 7, acknowledge that the Arizona
[***43] statutes challenged here
"are not unlike the Utah ones discussed in
Kesler." Accordingly, Adolfo Perez is forced to urge that
Reitz and the remaining portion of
Kesler that
bears upon the subject be overruled. The Court bows to that argument.
I am not prepared to overrule those two cases and to undermine their control
over Adolfo Perez' posture here. I would adhere to the rulings and I would
hold that the States have an appropriate and legitimate concern with
highway safety; that the means Arizona has adopted with respect to one in Adolfo's position
(that is, the
driver
whose negligence has caused harm to others and whose judgment debt based on
that negligence remains unsatisfied) in its attempt to assure
driving competence and care on the part of its licensees, as well as to protect
others, is appropriate
state legislation; and that the Arizona statute, like its Utah counterpart, despite the
tangential effect upon bankruptcy, does not operate in derogation of the
Bankruptcy Act or conflict with it to the extent it may rightly be said to violate the
Supremacy Clause.
Other factors of significance are also to be noted:
1. The Court struggles to explain away
[***44] the parallel District of Columbia situation installed
by Congress itself.
[**1719] Section 40-464 of the D. C. Code Ann. (1967) in all pertinent parts is
identical with Arizona's
§ 28-1163 (B). The only difference is in the final word, namely,
"article" in the Arizona statute and
"chapter" in the District's. The District of Columbia statute was enacted as
§ 48 of Pub. Law 365 of May 25, 1954, effective one year later, 68 Stat. 132.
This is long after the
Bankruptcy Act
[*665] was placed on the books and, indeed, long after this Court's decision in
Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467 (1925), that a personal injury judgment is a provable claim in bankruptcy. Surely, as
the Court noted in
Kesler, 369 U.S., at 173-174,
"Congress had no thought of amending the
Bankruptcy Act when it adopted this law for the District of Columbia."
See
Lee v. England, 206 F.Supp. 957 (DC 1962). Congress must have regarded the two statutes as consistent and compatible, and
cannot have thought otherwise for the last 35 years. n5 If the statutes truly
are in tension, then I would suppose that the later one, that is,
§ 40-464, would be
[***45] the one to prevail.
Gibson v. United States, 194 U.S. 182, 192 (1904). But, if so, we then have something less than the
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States" that Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution commands, for the law would be one way in
Arizona (and, by the present overruling of
Reitz and
Kesler, in New York and in Utah) and the other way in the District of Columbia.
Unfortunately, such is the dilemma in which the Court's decision today leaves
us.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n5 Public Law 365 replaced the Act of
May 3, 1935, 49 Stat. 166, known as the Owners'
Financial Responsibility Act of the District of Columbia. Section 3 of the earlier Act provided, 49
Stat. 167, that a judgment's
discharge in bankruptcy, as distinguished from other discharge, would not relieve the
judgment debtor from
suspension.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. Arizona's
§ 28-1163 (B) also has its counterparts in the statutes of no less than 44 other
States. n6 It
is, after
[*666] all, or purports
[***46] to be, a
uniform Act. I suspect the Court's decision today will astonish those members of the
Congress who were responsible for the District of Columbia Code provision, and
will
[**1720] equally astonish the legislatures of those 44 States that absorbed assurance
from
Reitz and
Kesler that the provision withstands constitutional attack.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n6 Ala. Code, Tit. 36,
§ 74 (55) (Supp. 1969); Alaska Stat.
§ 28.20.350 (1962); Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 75-1457 (1957); Cal. Vehicle Code
§ 16372 (1960); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-7-25 (2) (Supp. 1965); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev.
§ 14-131 (1966); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 21,
§ 2943 (1953); Hawaii Rev. Stat.
§ 287-17 (1968); Idaho Code
§ 49-1514 (1967); Ill. Ann. Stat., c. 95 1/2,
§ 7-310 (1971); Iowa Code
§ 321A.14 (2) (1971); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 8-744 (b) (1964); Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 187.420 (1962); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 32:893 (1963); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 29,
§ 783 (6) (1964) (10 years); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 66 1/2,
§ 7-315 (1970); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 257.513 (b) (Supp. 1956); Minn. Stat.
§ 170.33, subd. 5 (1967); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 8285-14 (b) (1942); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 303.110 (1959); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§ 53-431 (1961); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 60-519 (1968); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 485.303 (1968); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 268:9 (1966); N. J. Stat. Ann.
§ 39:6-35 (Supp. 1971); N. M. Stat. Ann.
§ 64-24-78 (1960); N. Y. Veh.
& Traf. Law
§ 337 (c) (1970);
N. C. Gen. Stat.
§ 20-279.14 (Supp. 1969); N. D. Cent. Code
§ 39-16.1-04 (5) (Supp. 1969); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 4509.43 (Supp. 1970); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 47,
§ 7-315 (1962); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 75,
§ 1414 (1960); R. I. Gen. Laws Ann.
§ 31-32-15 (1969); S. C. Code Ann.
§ 46-748 (Supp. 1960); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 32-35-58 (1967); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 59-1236 (1968); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 6701h,
§ 14 (b) (1969); Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-12-15 (1953);
Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 23,
§ 802 (b) (1967); Va. Code Ann.
§ 46.1-444 (a)(4) (Supp. 1970) (15 years); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 46.29.380 (1967); W. Va. Code Ann.
§ 17D-4-6 (1966); Wis. Stat.
§ 344.26 (2) (1967) [cf.
Zywicke v. Brogli, 24 Wis. 2d 685, 130 N. W. 2d 180 (1964)]; Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 31-299 (1967).
See also Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 324.131 (1968) and Op. Atty. Gen. 059-200 (1959); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 92A-605 (e)(3) (Supp. 1970); Ind. Ann. Stat.
§ 47-1049 (1965) and Op. Atty. Gen. 1936, p. 272;
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 90,
§ 22A (Supp. 1971); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 486.211 (5) (1967).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[***47]
3. The Court rationalizes today's decision by saying that
Kesler went beyond
Reitz and that the present case goes beyond
Kesler, and that that is too much. It would justify this by noting the Arizona
Supreme Court's characterization of the Arizona statute as one for the
protection of the public from
financial hardship and by concluding,
[*667] from this description, that the statute is not a public
highway safety measure, but rather a financial one protective, I assume the
implication is, of insurance companies. The Arizona court's characterization
of its statute, I must concede, is not a fortunate one. However, I doubt that
that court, in evolving that description, had any idea of the consequences to
be wrought by this Court's decision today. I am not willing to say that the
description in
Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P. 2d 136 (1963), embraced the only purpose of the State's legislation. Section 28-1163 (B) is
a part of the State's
Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act and does not constitute an isolated subchapter of that Act
concerned only with financial well-being of the victims of
drivers' negligence. In any
[***48] event, as the Court's opinion makes clear, the decision today would be the
same however the Arizona court had described its statute.
4. While
stare decisis
"is no immutable principle," n7 as a glance at the Court's decisions over the last 35 years, or over almost
any period for that matter, will disclose, it seems to me that the principle
does have particular validity and application in a situation such as the one
confronting the Court in this case. Here is a statute concerning
motor vehicle responsibility, a substantive
matter peculiarly within the competence of the State rather than the National
Government. Here is a serious and conscientious attempt by a State to
legislate and do something about the problem that, in terms of death and bodily
injury and adverse civilian effect, is so alarming. Here is a statute widely
adopted by the several States and legitimately assumed by the lawmakers of
those States to be consistent with the
Bankruptcy Act, an assumption rooted in positive, albeit divided, decision
[*668] by this Court, not once, but
twice. And here is a statute the Congress itself, the very author of the
Bankruptcy Act, obviously considered consistent
[***49] therewith. I fear that the Court today makes
stare decisis meaningless and downgrades it to the level of a tool to be used or cast aside
as convenience dictates. I doubt if Justices Roberts, Stone, Reed,
Frankfurter, Murphy, Warren, Clark, HARLAN, BRENNAN, and STEWART, who
constituted the respective majorities on the merits
in
Reitz and
Kesler, were all that wrong.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n7 MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting, in
Swift
& Co. v.
Wickham, 382 U.S., at 133.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5. Adolfo's affidavit protestation of hardship goes no further than to assert a
resulting reliance upon friends and neighbors or upon public transportation or
upon walking to cover the seven miles from his home to his place of work; this
is inconvenience, perhaps, even in this modern day when we are inclined to
equate convenience with necessity and to eschew what prior generations
routinely accepted as part of the day's labor, but it falls far short of the
"great harm" and
"irreparable injury" that he otherwise asserts only in general
[***50] and conclusory terms. Perez' professed inconvenience stands vividly and
starkly in contrast with his victims' injuries. But as is so often the case,
the victim, once damaged, is seemingly beyond concern. What seems to become
important is the perpetrator's inconvenience.
6. It is conceded that Arizona constitutionally could prescribe liability
insurance as a condition precedent to the issuance of a
license and
registration.
[**1721] V
Emma Perez
Emma Perez' posture is entirely different. Except for possible emotional
strain resulting from her husband's predicament, she was in no way involved in
the Pinkerton accident. She was not present when it occurred and no negligence
or nonfeasance on her part contributed to it.
[*669] Emma thus finds herself in a position where, having done no wrong, she
nevertheless is deprived of her operator's
license. This comes about because the Perez vehicle concededly was
community property under
§ 25-211 (A), and because, for some reason, the judgment was confessed as to her
as well as against her husband. As one
amicus brief describes it, Emma, a fault-free
driver,
"is without her
license solely because she is the impecunious
[***51] wife of an impecunious, negligent
driver in a
community
property state."
At this point a glance at the Arizona
community property system perhaps is indicated. Emma Perez was a proper nominal defendant in the
Pinkerton lawsuit, see
Donato v. Fishburn, 90 Ariz. 210, 367 P. 2d 245 (1961), but she was not a necessary party there.
First National Bank v. Reeves, 27 Ariz. 508, 517, 234 P. 556, 560 (1925);
Bristol v. Moser, 55 Ariz. 185, 190-191, 99 P. 2d 706, 709 (1940). However, a judgment against a marital community based upon the husband's tort
committed without the wife's knowledge or consent does not bind her separate
property.
Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 138, 185 P. 2d 304, 310 (1947). The judgment would, of course, bind the
community property vehicle to the extent permitted by Arizona law. See
§ 33-1124.
In Arizona during coverture personal property may be disposed of only by the
husband.
§ 25-211 (B). The community personality is subject to the husband's dominance
in management and control.
Mortensen v. Knight, 81 Ariz. 325, 334, 305 P. 2d 463, 469 (1956).
[***52] The wife has no power to make contracts binding the common property.
§ 25-214 (A). Her power to contract is limited to necessaries for herself and
the children.
§ 25-215. Thus, as the parties appear to agree, she could neither enter into a
contract for the purchase of an automobile nor acquire insurance upon it except
by use of her separate property.
[*670] The Court of Appeals ruled that Mrs. Perez' posture, as the innocent wife who
had no connection with the negligent conduct that
led to the confession and entry of judgment, was, under the logic of
Kesler and
Reitz,
"a distinction without a significant difference" even though
"she had no alternative."
421 F.2d 619, 622-623. The court opined that the spouse can acquire an automobile with her separate
funds and that negligent operation of it on separate business would then not
call into question the liability of the other spouse. It described Emma's
legal status as
"closely analogous" to that of the automobile owner who permits another person to drive, and it
regarded as authority cases upholding a State's right to revoke the owner's
license and
registration after judgment had been entered against
[***53] him and remains unsatisfied. The husband was described, under Arizona law, as
the managing agent of the wife in the control of the community automobile, and
"the
driver's
licenses of both husband and wife are an integral part of the ball of wax, which is the
basis of the Arizona
community property laws." The loss of her
license
"is the price an
Arizona wife must pay for negligent
driving by her husband of the community vehicle" when the resulting judgment is not paid.
421 F.2d, at 624.
For what it is worth, Emma's affidavit is far more persuasive of hardship than
Adolfo's. She relates the family automobile to the children and their medical
needs and to family purchasing at distant discount stores. But I need not, and
would not, decide her case on the representations in her affidavit.
I conclude that the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, in its application to
Emma Perez and her operator's
license,
[**1722] does not comport with the purpose and policy of the
Bankruptcy Act and that it effects a result at odds with the Supremacy Clause. Emma's
subordinate
[*671] position with respect to the community's personal property, and her complete
lack of connection
[***54] with the Pinkerton accident and with the negligence that occasioned it, are
strange accompaniments for the deprival of her operator's
license. The nexus to the state police power, claimed to exist because of her marriage
to the negligent
Adolfo and the
community property character of the accident vehicle, is, for me, elusive and unconvincing. The
argument based on Arizona's appropriate concern with
highway safety, that prompts me to adhere to the
Reitz-Kesler rationale for Adolfo, is drained of all force and persuasion when applied to
the innocent Emma. Despite the underlying
community property legal theory, Emma had an incident of ownership in the family automobile only
because it was acquired during coverture. She had no
"control" over Adolfo's use of the vehicle and she could not forbid his use as she might
have been able to do were it her separate property. Thus, the state purpose in
deterring the reckless
driver and his unsafe
driving has only undeserved punitive application to Emma. She is personally penalized
not only with respect to the
operation of the Perez car but also with respect to any automobile.
I therefore would hold that under these circumstances
[***55] the State's action, under
§ 28-1163 (B), in withholding from Emma her operator's
license is not, within the
language of
Reitz, an appropriate means for Arizona
"to insure competence and care on the part of [Emma] and to protect others" using the
highways,
314 U.S., at 36, and that it interferes with the paramount federal interest in her bankruptcy
discharge and violates the Supremacy Clause.
[For Appendix to opinion of BLACKMUN, J., see
post, p. 672.]
[*672] APPENDIX TO OPINION OF BLACKMUN, J.
MOTOR-VEHICLE DEATHS AND WAR DEATHS
From 1900 through 1969, motor-vehicle deaths in the U.S. totalled nearly
1,800,000. Deaths of U.S. military personnel in all wars are shown below. In
making comparisons, it must be kept in mind that nearly everyone is exposed to
motor-vehicle accidents but relatively few are exposed to war deaths.
|
| U.S. MILITARY CASUALTIES IN PRINCIPAL WARS |
|---|
| War | Deaths | Nonfatal |
|---|
| Total | Battle | Others * | Wounds |
|---|
|
| Total | +1,146,000 | 643,052 | +503,200 |
§ 1,540,000 |
| Revolutionary War (1775-83) | 4,435 | 4,435 | N.A. | 6,188 |
| War of 1812 (1812-15) | 2,260 | 2,260 | N.A. | 4,505 |
| Mexican War (1846-48) | 13,283 | 1,733 | 11,550 | 4,152 |
| Civil War (1861-65) |
| Union Forces | 364,511 | 140,414 | 224,097 | 281,881 |
| Confederate Forces | 133,821 | 74,524 | 59,297 | N.A. |
| Spanish-American War (1898) | 2,446 | 385 | 2,061 | 1,662 |
| World War I (1917-18) | 116,708 | 53,513 | 63,195 | 204,002 |
| World War II (1941-45) | 407,316 | 292,131 | 115,185 | 670,846 |
| Korean War (1950-53) | 54,246 | 33,629 | 20,617 | 103,284 |
| Viet Nam War (1961-69) | 47,251 | 40,028 | 7,223 | 262,799 |
[***56]
Source: Office of Secretary of Defense.
+ Rounded.
* Includes deaths from disease, accidents, etc.
§ Incomplete and rounded.
N. A. Not available.
Accident Facts 63, published by the National Safety Council (1970 ed.).
The same publication, page 59, discloses that the annual death toll for
motor vehicle accidents in the United States has exceded 52,000 in each of the last five
calendar years. Thus, the
annual
motor vehicle carnage approximates the
total number of lives lost during the entire Vietnam conflict beginning in 1961.
