FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS RE: LONNIE NEIL GROOT *
* Although bar admission petitions to the Court are ordinarily confidential, an
applicant may waive the confidentiality and anonymity of his or her admission
application. Lonnie Groot has waived the confidentiality of his application.
No. 52842
Supreme Court of Florida
365 So. 2d 164;
1978 Fla. LEXIS 5050
November 22, 1978
COUNSEL:
[**1]
Lonnie Neil Groot, in pro. per.
C. Graham Carothers, Tallahassee, for respondent.
OPINIONBY: PER CURIAM
OPINION:
[*165]
Lonnie Groot applied for admission to The Florida Bar and passed all required
portions of our
bar examination. The Florida Board of Bar
Examiners, acting as our agent for the admissions process, n1 undertook an investigation
into his character,
fitness and general
qualifications to practice law in the state. n2 In its investigation, the Board learned that
Groot had filed a voluntary petition for
bankruptcy in 1977 and had been
discharged from his financial obligations, including substantial student loans incurred
to finance his education. n3
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n1. Our authority to admit attorneys to practice in Florida derives from
Article V, Section 15 of the Florida Constitution. The Board's authority
derives from the Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar
(1975 Revision), Article I, Section 2, 32 Florida Statutes Annotated 273
(Supp.1978).
n2. Fla.Sup.Ct. Bar Admiss.Rule, art. II,
§ 12.
n3. Since these events, however,
federal law has been amended to provide that an adjudication of
bankruptcy does not always discharge federal student loans.
20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976).
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[**2]
The Board completed its findings and conclusions, and refused to recommend
Groot for admission to the bar. After Groot exhausted his administrative
remedies within the Board, n4 he petitioned the Court for admission, n5
challenging each of the Board's conclusions and raising the general issue of
the effect of a
bankruptcy petition on a bar applicant's
fitness to practice law. We heard
oral argument on February 6, 1978, to further crystallize the issues presented by Groot's
admission application.
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n4. See Fla.Sup.Ct. Bar Admiss.Rule, art. II,
§ 12; Fla.Bd. Bar Exam.Rule
VI,
§ 70, 32 Fla.Stat.Ann. 291 (Supp.1978).
n5. Fla.Sup.Ct. Bar Admiss.Rule, art. IV,
§ 20(a).
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Groot attended Florida State University as an undergraduate and law student,
graduating in 1973 and 1976, respectively. He finance his undergraduate and
law school education in part through student loans obtained from Florida banks and
guaranteed by the federal government. At the time of his
law school graduation in June 1976, these
[**3] obligations totalled approximately $ 8,530.
Repayment of these debts was to
commence not later than
one year after he ceased to carry at least one-half of a full-time academic workload
that is, in June 1977.
In July 1976, Groot successfully sat for the multi-state portion (Part II) of
the Florida
bar
examination. In November 1976, he terminated his part-time employment with the Office of
the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, where he was receiving a $
14,000 annual
salary, and moved to Helena, Montana. There he accepted
[*166] employment as a counselor with Tri-County DD (Developmentally Disabled), Inc.,
for compensation of approximately $ 4,800, plus living quarters, food and
utilities. In December 1976, he secured additional employment with the Montana
Legislative Council as a legislative legal aide, at a
salary of approximately $ 13,000 per year.
Around May 1, 1977, Groot abruptly left his jobs in Montana and moved to
Goldsboro, North Carolina. Although Groot had represented to the Council that
he would remain in its employ for at least one full year, and had represented
to Tri-County that he would remain on the job for not less than nine months,
neither
[**4] employer has indicated any dissatisfaction with his early
departure. En route to Goldsboro he incurred gasoline credit charges, and while in
Goldsboro (and unemployed) he incurred hospital debts for the birth of a child.
These several debts, all of which were later
discharged in
bankruptcy, totalled approximately $ 900.
Groot successfully sat for Part I of the May 1977
bar examination, and in July 1977 he passed Part III of the
bar examination. On June 30, 1977, he submitted an application for admission to The Florida Bar.
On or about August 18, 1977, Groot filed a voluntary petition for
bankruptcy in the United States District Court, Eastern District of North Carolina,
seeking to discharge his medical and travel debts and his
accumulated
student loan obligations. Approximately one week later he accepted a position as staff
director of the Florida House of Representatives' Committee on Standards and
Conduct, at a
salary of approximately $ 18,000 per year. He received a discharge in
bankruptcy on November 11, 1977.
After undertaking an investigation into Groot's background and character, the
Board invited Groot to appear for an
informal hearing. During that hearing, the Board
[**5] inquired into circumstances surrounding Groot's personal history which it felt
reflected adversely on his
fitness to practice law. The Board later advised Groot that he was entitled to a formal hearing on the
matters of its concern, but Groot responded in writing denying the charges
against him and stating that he did not want a further hearing before the Board.
The Board eventually recommended against Groot's admission to practice, basing
its decision principally on two grounds. First, it concluded that the
chronology of
events leading up to his filing of a petition for
bankruptcy created
serious doubt as to Groot's motives for seeking a discharge of his debts.
Specifically, the Board found from the record that Groot knowingly engaged in a
course of conduct which (i) contributed to his inability to satisfy his debts in a timely and
responsible manner, and (ii) caused them to be
discharged without any attempt on his part to pay or renegotiate them. Second, the Board
concluded that Groot had
testified falsely under
oath at his
informal hearing in response to questions regarding his obligation to
repay one of his student loans. In regard to the
repayment of loans made by the Combank
[**6] of Winter Park, Florida, Groot responded to one of the
examiner's questions:
"The loans to the Combank at Winter Park, I hadn't entered any contract yet, so
that was-whenever I entered an agreement to start repaying it, that's when I
would start repaying that one."
The Board found that Groot well knew this testimony was false in that his
obligation to begin
repayment had been set to
commence not later than
one year from the date on which he
ceased to carry at least one-half of a normal full-time academic work load.
Since
oral argument before the Court, Groot has filed a number of communications and petitions
with the Court, demanding his prompt admission to the bar and raising other
matters which, for the most part, are irrelevant to this proceeding. n6
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n6. For example, on June 14, 1978, Groot indicated that he had filed a
complaint against three members of the Florida Board of Bar
Examiners with the Florida Ethics Commission, based on their refusal to admit him to the
practice of law. After the complaint was dismissed because the bar
examiners were found by the Commission not to be subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction, Groot notified the Court of his disagreement with the
Commission's decision.
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[**7]
[*167] Groot basically asserts to the Court that there is nothing
unethical either in his filing for
bankruptcy
or in the overall course of his conduct. We have already
dealt with the first aspect of Groot's argument. The filing of a petition for
bankruptcy,
standing alone, does not constitute sufficient cause to deny admission to The
Florida Bar. Florida Board of Bar
Examiners Re:
G. W. L. (Fla. 1978), 364 So.2d 454. As regards Groot's assertion that his overall conduct reflects a
fitness for admission to the bar, we find from the record no support for the Board's
conclusion to the contrary, and we therefore direct his admission to the
practice of law.
The Board's first finding relates to Groot's prebankruptcy conduct. The record
reflects Groot's itinerancy from Florida to Montana to North Carolina, but it
offers no basis on which to conclude that the various
departures were motivated by
unethical or improper considerations. Groot's personal life was in disarray during this
period, in part from problems which culminated in a divorce. The Board's
concern for
Groot's abrupt
departure from
gainful employment on several occasions provides no
unethical gloss on his character,
[**8] however, for in each case he left behind employers who were wholly satisfied
with his prior performance and who later expressed to the Board a willingness
to rehire Groot if he were desirous of returning to their employ.
The expenses attendant to these moves similarly suggest nothing with respect to
Groot's character, as they were both reasonable and necessary for the travel
performed. It cannot be said from the record before us that these costs were
incurred with a reckless disregard for their payment. Groot charged gas
purchases on two credit cards which he validly owned. The fact that he later
discharged these debts in
bankruptcy,
instead of paying them according to their terms, is the only basis of support
for the Board's conclusion that he initially incurred the charges recklessly or
malevolently. Contradicting that view, however, is the record of Groot's
inability to secure employment in North Carolina. Similarly, he could not
avoid the medical bills necessitated by the birth of his child.
It appears to us that, in evaluating Groot's prebankruptcy conduct, the Board
unduly emphasized Groot's wandering and indecision during a period of his life
when his personal affairs
[**9] were at a low ebb. During that period Groot not only divorced his wife and
had a child, but he found himself unable to obtain reasonable employment.
Since the debts he later
discharged were validly and properly incurred, it is irrelevant to an evaluation of his
character that credit was extended by gasoline companies and a hospital at a
time when Groot lacked the current capacity to
repay the obligations. The mere fact that debts are incurred beyond a debtor's
present capacity to
repay them is not, without more, an indication of immorality.
The course of Groot's conduct up to August 1977, then, offers no basis to deny
Groot admission to The Florida Bar. In that month, however,
Groot secured the prospect of
gainful employment and simultaneously took the initial legal steps to discharge his
accumulated debts. The ultimate issue facing the Board, and now facing us, is whether it
was
morally
reprehensible for Groot to set in motion the mechanism to avoid
repayment of his debts at the very time he developed the capacity to begin
repayment. The record shows that at the time Groot filed for
bankruptcy,
he was reasonably sure of employment with the Florida House of
Representatives.
[**10] Obviously, he intended to unburden himself of
accumulated debts in order to retain, to the detriment of his creditors, the full
financial benefits of his new employment. His right to exercise that choice,
of course, is precisely the reason that the
bankruptcy laws exist. As we held in Florida Board of Bar
Examiners Re: G. W. L., a desire to
"wipe
[*168] the slate clean" cannot alone be a basis to prevent admission to the bar. The real issue here,
as in that case, is whether the Board could
reasonably conclude from the record that Groot's conduct under the
circumstances was
morally
reprehensible. We think it was not.
Unlike G. W. L., Groot was the father and legal custodian of two children born
of his recently-terminated marriage. His expenses included not only his own
living costs and those of his dependents, but to some degree those of his
former wife. When his personal resources became exhausted, he was forced to
prevail upon family members to loan him the money, to meet current living
expenses while he was without a job. Thus, unlike G. W. L., Groot had suffered
unusual misfortune at the time he finally secured employment, and he had a
valid present need to devote
[**11] his entire employment income to his current, not past, financial
responsibilities. His circumstances warranted his turning to the remedy
provided by
federal law for persons in just such situations, and we hold that Groot's conduct under
these circumstances is not
morally
reprehensible or indicative of a present unfitness for admission to the bar.
The Board's second basis for rejecting Groot's admission is reflected in its
finding that Groot gave false testimony concerning
repayment of his
student loan to Combank of Winter Park. The one statement made by Groot at the
informal hearing on which the Board relied, however, is misleading when considered in
isolation. The statement is, in fact, completely accurate when considered in
the context of Groot's total testimony on the subject and the legal mechanisms
which then existed for
student loan
repayments. It seems clear to us that Groot's statement to the Board was intended to
communicate only that he had not signed a
promissory note and confirmed a
repayment schedule for the Combank debt at the time he initiated
bankruptcy.
His student loans had been financed on the basis of a contract which called
for the post-graduate execution
[**12] of a formal legal instrument
setting for the first time the exact terms for
repayment. Although the debts had been incurred with an expectation that
repayment was to
commence not later than
one year after graduation, the precise due dates and amounts of periodic payments had
been left open for embodiment in a later
promissory note which, at the time of Groot's quoted response before the Board, simply had not
yet been executed. The Board's treatment of this one statement by Groot at his
informal hearing as a misrepresentation of the truth was not warranted. From the record as a
whole, his response was truthful.
For the reasons expressed above, we direct the admission of Lonnie Neil Groot
to the
practice of law.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C. J., and BOYD, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., concurs in result only.
ALDERMAN, J., dissents with an opinion.
OVERTON, J., did not participate having recused himself pursuant to the
provisions of Canon 3 C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
DISSENTBY: ALDERMAN
DISSENT: ALDERMAN, Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority decision which directs that Groot be
admitted to the
practice of law. In my
[**13] opinion, the Court has substituted its judgment on disputed factual issues for
that of the finder of fact, the Florida Board of Bar
Examiners.
After evaluating and weighing the testimony based upon its personal observation
of the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, the Florida Board of Bar
Examiners found that the chronology of
events leading up to the filing of Groot's petition for
bankruptcy creates
serious doubt as to his motives for seeking a discharge of his debts in
bankruptcy; that he knowingly engaged in a
course of conduct which contributed to his inability to satisfy his debts in a timely and
responsible manner; that during the period from June 1976 when he graduated
from
[*169]
law school to August 1977 when he filed his petition for
bankruptcy, he exhibited substantial disregard for his obligation to
repay debts
incurred by him when his income was sufficient to enable him to
repay such debts; and that his filing of his petition for
bankruptcy within one week of his acceptance of a position in Florida at a
salary of $ 18,000 per year creates an inference that he was solely motivated by his
own self gain. The Board also found that he
testified falsely under
[**14]
oath at the
informal hearing before it on November 11, 1977. The Board in conclusion found that the
evidence before it established clearly and unequivocally that Groot fails to
meet the standards of conduct and
fitness required by Article IV, Section 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of
Florida Relating to Admissions to the Bar.
There is evidence in the record that supports the
findings of fact of the Board of Bar
Examiners, and I believe these
findings of fact should be accorded the same presumption of correctness as are accorded
findings of other triers of fact such as the referee in disciplinary
proceedings. Cf. Rule
11.06(9)(a), Integration Rule of The Florida Bar. The Florida Board of Bar
Examiners is charged with the responsibility of determining the character and
fitness of applicants to The Florida Bar. Article II, Section 12, Rules of the
Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar provides in pertinent part:
"Prior to recommending an applicant for admission to practice the profession of
law in Florida, the Florida Board of Bar
Examiners shall conduct an investigation and otherwise inquire into and determine the
character,
fitness and general
qualifications
[**15] of every applicant. In every such investigation and inquiry the Board may
obtain such information as bears upon the character,
fitness, and general
qualifications of the applicant and take and hear testimony, administer
oaths and affirmations, and compel, by subpoena, the attendance of witnesses and the
production of books, papers and documents. . . ."
Article IV, Section 19, provides:
"No person shall be recommended by the Florida
Board of Bar
Examiners to the Supreme Court of Florida for admission to The Florida Bar unless he
first produces satisfactory evidence to the Board that he is of good
moral
character, that he has an adequate knowledge of the standards and ideals of
the profession and is otherwise a fit person to take the
oath and perform the obligations and responsibilities of an attorney."
The Board has been appointed the fact-finder to determine whether an applicant
to the Bar possesses the requisite educational, character, and
fitness requirements.
The evidence in this case is subject to two interpretations. One of these
interpretations clearly supports the findings of the Board. Although, had we
been the fact-finder in this case, we
[**16] may have reached a different result upon evaluation of the evidence, we should
not now, after reviewing the cold record, substitute our judgment for that of
the Board as long as there is evidence in the record to support the Board's
findings. Accordingly, I would deny Groot's petition for admission at this
time without prejudice to his seeking
admission at a later date as provided by Article IV, Section 20(c), Rules of
the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar.
