David Eugene Worley v. Alabama State Bar
No. 89-1266
Supreme Court of Alabama
572 So. 2d 1239;
1990 Ala. LEXIS 1056
December 7, 1990
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
[**1] Released for Publication January 18, 1991.
PRIOR HISTORY:
Appeal from the Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar; No. ASB-89-02.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED.
COUNSEL: Bibb Allen and Max Hudson of Rives
& Peterson, Birmingham.
Robert W. Norris, General Counsel, Alabama State Bar.
JUDGES: Houston, Justice. Hornsby, C. J., and Maddox, Jones, Shores, Adams, and
Steagall, JJ., concur. Almon, J., concurs in the result.
OPINIONBY: HOUSTON
OPINION:
[*1240] David Eugene Worley appeals from a decision of the
Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar ("the Board") denying him
reinstatement to the
practice of law. We affirm.
In January 1981, the Board found Worley guilty of
disciplinary charges brought against him and entered an order disbarring Worley from the
practice of law in the State of Alabama for an indefinite period. Worley appealed and this
Court affirmed. See,
Worley v. Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar, 407 So.2d 822 (Ala. 1981).
On August 28, 1989, Worley petitioned for
reinstatement to the
practice of law. The Board denied
reinstatement and Worley again appeals.
Rule 19(c), Alabama Rules of
Disciplinary Enforcement ("the Rules"), reads as follows:
". . .
[**2] At the hearing the petitioner shall have the burden of demonstrating by
clear and convincing evidence that he has the moral
qualifications to
practice law in this State and that his
resumption of the
practice of law
within the State will not be
detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar or the administration of justice, or
subversive of the
public interest."
Although he acknowledges that the burden of proof in
reinstatement cases is an unusually
heavy burden, Worley contends that he met that burden by presenting
clear and convincing evidence that he has
"the moral
qualifications to
practice law in the state of Alabama and that his
resumption of the
practice of law within [the State] will not be
detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar, or the administration of justice, or
subversive of the
public interest." He also contends that the Board, in reaching its decision, did not consider
the evidence of his conduct and behavior subsequent to his
disbarment, which, he contends, was verified by letters and affidavits stating that he is
trustworthy and is of
good moral character and
recommending that he be
reinstated to the
practice of law. Rather, Worley contends that
[**3] the Board based its decision on the charges entered against him in the
original
disbarment proceedings and on the testimony offered in support of those charges.
Although the
Bar has no obligation to offer any evidence in
reinstatement proceedings, see
Bonner v. Disciplinary
[*1241] Board of the Alabama State Bar, 401 So.2d 734 (Ala. 1981), evidence of the
misconduct that led to Worley's
disbarment was clearly admissible, as was the evidence of any subsequent
misconduct with respect to Worley's lack of
moral character:
"'The judgment of
disbarment
"continues to be evidence against . . . [the petitioner] with respect to lack of
moral character at later times in accordance with the principle that 'a state of things once
proved to exist may generally be found to continue. '. . . . Whatever the
offense for which a judgment of
disbarment was entered, the person
disbarred has a
heavy burden on a subsequent petition for [reinstatement] to the bar to overcome by evidence the weight of the facts adjudicated by such
judgment and to establish affirmatively that since his
disbarment he has become 'a person proper to be held out by the court to the public as
trustworthy. . . .'"'"
Bonner
[**4] v. Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar, supra, at 737, quoting with approval
In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447 333 N.E.2d 429, 438 (1975). (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
At the hearing before the Board, besides Worley's own testimony, he presented
the testimony of numerous individuals who attested to his character, integrity,
and honesty -- a retired circuit judge from Madison County with whom Worley had
previously been employed as a law clerk, Worley's employer at the time of the
hearing,
practicing attorneys from Huntsville, and a Madison County district commissioner. He also
presented affidavits and letters from several former employers, from several
practicing attorneys in Huntsville, from the clerk of the Madison Circuit Court, and from
the pastor of the church Worley attends.
The Board had before it evidence of Worley's 1981
disbarment for sexual
misconduct with a prison inmate, for falsely
witnessing a signature in a fraudulent stock transfer, and for lying to the Bar
grievance committee. The Board also had before it evidence of Worley's
convictions for
public intoxication, for
driving under the influence, and for
driving with a suspended license (all of which
[**5] occurred subsequent to his
disbarment). n1 In addition, the Board had before it evidence of Worley's possession of
what the Board considered to be pornographic pictures (some of which depicted
him engaged in sexual acts with females); evidence of a number of civil suits
in which Worley had been a party prior to and subsequent to his
disbarment (including a $ 2,200 judgment entered against him in 1980 as a result of an
automobile accident; a $ 12,225 judgment entered against him in 1982, for
"false and material misrepresentations" relied on by the opposing parties to their detriment; a $ 350 judgment entered
against him for failure to pay apartment
rent; and a $ 28,311.44 judgment against him resulting from the lease of a
building used by Worley for a real estate office); and evidence of numerous
financial obligations (including approximately $ 10,000 due the Internal
Revenue Service for taxes for the years 1979 and 1987). Furthermore, the Board
had before it the testimony of certain Huntsville attorneys that Worley was not
of
good moral character; a letter from the Huntsville/Madison County Bar Grievance Committee
recommending that Worley's petition for
reinstatement be denied; and
[**6] evidence of the Huntsville Board of Realtors' denial of Worley's membership
request in 1987, because, according to it, Worley failed to show that he had a
"sound credit rating" and because he had
"failed to establish a favorable reputation in the community."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 We note that although the Board had before it evidence of Worley's multiple
arrests for
public intoxication, all but one of those
arrests were dismissed. We also note that the Board had before it evidence of Worley's
arrest on felony charges for possession of large amounts of drugs and drug-related
items, but that Worley was acquitted of those charges.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Although it did not state specific reasons for denying
reinstatement, in our review of the record we find reasonable bases. See
Elledge v. Alabama State Bar, 572 So.2d 424 (Ala. 1990). Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the Board erred in deciding that
Worley had failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he was of
good moral character and that he was
[*1242] worthy
[**7] of being
reinstated to the
practice of law in Alabama.
Worley also contends that the Board's action violated the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Worley specifically contends that he has been
deprived of his right to due process
"in that his future [was] placed in the hands of five members of the [Board] ...
[who] have unrestricted
authority to punish a lawyer as they see fit, with no restrictions placed upon
them," and that
"such a hearing should be before all of the Bar commissioners in view of the
fact that they are the governing body of the State Bar."
We
promulgated the Rules by which Worley was
disbarred and by which he was denied
reinstatement. In our Preamble to those rules, we stated:
"The Supreme Court of Alabama has inherent responsibility to supervise the
conduct of attorneys who are its officers, and in furtherance thereof, it
promulgates the following [Rules] superseding all other rules and statutes
pertaining to
disciplinary enforcement heretofore
promulgated or enacted."
See, also,
Board of Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar v. State ex rel. Baxley, 295 Ala. 100, 324 So.2d 256 (1975);
Simpson v. Alabama State Bar, 294 Ala. 52, 311 So.2d
[**8] 307 (1975); and
Ex parte Thompson, 228 Ala. 113, 152 So. 229 (1933). Thus, in exercising its inherent
responsibility this Court created the Board, but it retained the power to
inquire into the merits of any matters before the Board and retained the power
to take any action it sees fit to take in such matters.
Simpson v. Alabama State Bar, supra.
It is well settled that
"'the right to practice law is a valuable
property right, which can be denied only by due
process of law.'"
Ex parte Grubbs, 542 So.2d 927, 930 (Ala. 1989), quoting from
Reese v. Board of Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar, 379 So. 2d 564, 569 (Ala. 1980). See, also,
Elledge v. Alabama State Bar, supra. In original
disbarment proceedings, the Bar has the burden of proving sufficient facts to justify a decision by
the Board to disbar. See
Bonner v. Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar, supra. However, once an attorney has been properly
disbarred, he has been divested of that
property right by due
process of law. Elledge v. Alabama State Bar. Pursuant to Rule 19(c), the burden in
reinstatement cases is on the
disbarred attorney to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he is
[**9] entitled to be
reinstated.
"'One who has been guilty of the acts which he has committed should not be
reinstated in the ranks of the legal profession except upon the most clear and
convincing, nay, we will say upon overwhelming, proof of reform proof which we
could with confidence lay before the world in justification of a judgment again
installing him in the profession which he has so flagrantly disgraced.'"
Bonner v. Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar, supra, at 738, quoting
In re Stevens, 59 Cal.App. 251, 255, 210 P. 442 (1922) (emphasis added in Bonner); see, also,
Elledge v. Alabama State Bar, supra. Thus,
in
reinstatement cases, by affording the
disbarred attorney a hearing before the Board, created pursuant to the inherent
authority of this Court, where the
disbarred attorney has the opportunity to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he has
"the moral
qualifications to
practice law ... and that his
resumption of the
practice of law ... will not be
detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar or the administration of justice, or
subversive of the
public interest," the Board has afforded the
disbarred attorney all the process that
[**10] he was due. See
Elledge v. Alabama State Bar, supra; see, also,
Bonner v. Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar, supra.
Therefore, we affirm the Board's decision denying Worley
reinstatement to the
practice of law in the State of Alabama.
AFFIRMED.
Hornsby, C. J., and Maddox, Jones, Shores, Adams, and Steagall, JJ., concur.
Almon, J., concurs in the result.
