IN RE: SIDNEY J. CLARK, Petitioner
No. 80, 1992
SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE
607 A.2d 1230;
1992 Del. LEXIS 228
May 27, 1992, Submitted
June 5, 1992, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: No Mandate June 5, 1992.
PRIOR HISTORY:
[**1]
Disciplinary Proceeding Upon Final Report of the Board on Professional
Responsibility of the Supreme Court.
COUNSEL: Edmund N. Carpenter, II, Esquire, of Richards, Layton, and Finger (argued),
Wilmington, Delaware, and Charles S. Crompton, Jr., of Potter, Anderson
& Corroon, Wilmington, Delaware, for petitioner.
Charles Slanina, Esquire, Disciplinary Counsel for the Board on Professional
Responsibility, Wilmington, Delaware.
JUDGES: Before HORSEY, HOLLAND, Justices, and HARTNETT, Vice Chancellor. n1 n1 Sitting pursuant to Article IV,
§ 12 of the Delaware Constitution.
OPINIONBY: PER CURIAM:
OPINION:
[*1230] This proceeding is a Petition for
Reinstatement filed by Sidney J. Clark ("Clark"). In February, 1969, Clark was
disbarred because of his commingling and diversion to his own personal use of clients'
funds in the
approximate amount of $ 100,000. See
In Re Clark, Del. Supr., 250 A.2d 505 (1969). A panel of the Board on Professional Responsibility ("the Board") conducted a hearing on Clark's petition, as required by
Board Rule 23(f).
The Board filed a Final Report
[**2] with this Court. In that Final Report, the Board recommended that Clark's
Petition for
Reinstatement be denied. The Board's adverse recommendation was based upon its concerns
about Clark's present
competence to
practice law and the limited
restitution
[*1231] he has made to the victims of his professional misconduct.
This Court has concluded that Clark has presented
clear and convincing evidence that he is qualified for
reinstatement subject to
conditions not yet fulfilled. Bd. Prof. Resp. R. 23(h). This Court has also
determined that the concerns of the Board, while clearly valid, do not preclude
Clark's ultimate
reinstatement provided he meets those concerns, which must be a condition of his
reinstatement. Therefore, this Court has concluded that Clark's
reinstatement will be conditioned upon, inter alia, making
restitution as herein provided and his
successful completion of the Delaware Bar Examination in its
entirety.
I.
The Board made findings of fact, in connection with the present application for
reinstatement, which are set forth in its Final Report as follows:
1. Petitioner, Sidney J. Clark, is 63 years of age, and resides at 1003 E.
Matson Run Parkway, Wilmington, Delaware,
[**3] 19802. He has resided in Delaware continuously for almost 50 years.
2. After attending college and law school at Howard University in Washington,
D.C., Petitioner was admitted to the
practice of law before the Supreme Court of Delaware in January 1957.
3. Following his admission to the Delaware Bar, Petitioner Commenced his legal
career by serving as an Assistant City Solicitor for the City of Wilmington,
Delaware, prosecuting criminal cases in the Wilmington Municipal Court. He
served in that capacity from July 1957 to March 1961, In March 1961, he became
a Municipal Court Judge, and he continued in that position until he resigned on
June 1, 1966. When Petitioner resigned from the bench, he went into the
full-time private
practice of law.
4. In approximately 1966, Petitioner became involved in casino
gambling and developed an addiction for
gambling. Petitioner would frequently visit the casinos in Las Vegas and suffered huge
losses which were far beyond his means, and eventually he began to use clients'
money to cover his losses.
5. In April 1967, Petitioner's wife died of cancer after a prolonged illness.
At the time of his wife's death, Petitioner's sons were ages 3 and 5. Near
[**4] the same time, Petitioner went through a series of throat operations. Between
gambling losses and medical bills he found himself heavily in debt and continued to
gamble, hoping to win in order to pay his debts. Petitioner's conduct was
compulsive; once he started a
gambling session he was emotionally unable to stop and continued to lose far beyond his
means.
6. Petitioner's name was stricken from the rolls of practicing attorneys before
the courts of Delaware, by order of the Delaware Supreme Court in February
1969. The Court
disbarred Petitioner because of Petitioner's commingling and diversion to his own
personal use of clients' funds in the
approximate amount of $ 100,000.
In re Clark, Del. Supr., 250 A.2d 505 (1969).
7. Subsequently, Petitioner was indicted, tried and convicted in the Superior
Court of the State of Delaware on two charges of embezzlement, and was
sentenced to two concurrent five-year terms of imprisonment. On January 4, 1973
Petitioner was committed to the Delaware Correctional Center to serve those
sentences. Petitioner commenced habeas corpus proceedings in the federal court
system, and, ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals
[**5] for the Third Circuit ordered that a writ of habeas corpus issue, and
Petitioner was released in July 1974 after approximately eighteen months in
custody. See
Clark v. Anderson, 502 F.2d 1080 (3rd Cir. 1974). See also
Matter of Clark, Del. Supr., 406 A.2d 28, 29 (1979). Of the eighteen months he was in
custody, eight or nine months were spent in prison, and the rest in a work
release program in conjunction with Plummer House.
8. Following Petitioner's
disbarment, the Internal Revenue Service had asserted tax liens against Petitioner, in the
amount of approximately $ 72,000, for underpayment of federal income taxes on
income
[*1232] Petitioner earned in his last year of law practice, and also on the income he
was deemed to have received by converting his clients' funds to his own use.
The State of Delaware also filed liens in the amount of approximately $ 6,000.
9. Petitioner, through periodic payments and compromise, was able to settle
these tax claims and was released from them in 1978. Although Petitioner has no
record of exactly how much he paid to satisfy these tax liens, his estimate is
that he paid less than $ 20,000 or $ 25,000.
10. After
[**6] settlement of the tax liens, Petitioner filed a
petition for conditional
reinstatement June 1978, which was denied by the Delaware Supreme Court on July 6, 1979. See
Matter of Clark, Del. Supr., 406 A.2d 28 (1979).
11. In July, 1980, Petitioner filed a second petition for
reinstatement, which was denied by the Supreme Court in February 1981. See In re Clark, Del.
Supr., No. 184, 1980 (Feb. 6, 1981) (ORDER).
12. In September 1982, Petitioner filed a third petition for
reinstatement, which was denied by the Supreme Court in June 1983. See
In re Clark, Del. Supr., 464 A.2d 879 (June 22, 1983).
13. In June 1984, Petitioner filed a fourth petition for
reinstatement, which was denied by the Supreme
Court in September 1984. See In re Clark, Del. Supr., No. 170, 1984 (September
24, 1984) (ORDER).
14. Between 1969 and 1984, Petitioner made only one $ 25
restitution payment to any of those who had sustained financial losses as a result of his
conversion of his clients' funds. Those who had sustained such losses included:
Bayard Allmond, a Wilmington attorney (from whom Petitioner had diverted
approximately $ 13,000); Buford Manlove (from whom
[**7] Petitioner had diverted approximately $ 13,000); and the Clients' Security
Trust Fund of the Bar of Delaware, an organization funded by Delaware lawyers,
which had paid $ 62,046.24 in claims that arose out of Petitioner's other
conversions of his clients' funds. After the 1984 denial of his fourth petition
for
reinstatement, Petitioner began making relatively small payments to the Allmond and Manlove
families. Petitioner paid $ 1,500 to the Allmonds and $ 1,400 to the Manloves
in this manner,
but made no further payments after November 1988. Petitioner has made no
payments to the Clients' Security Trust Fund.
15. During the time since denial of his fourth petition for
reinstatement in 1984, Petitioner's employment and income have been sporadic. After being
unemployed and in ill health during 1982 and 1983, Petitioner commenced
employment in 1984 as an aide and companion for former Supreme Court Justice
James M. Tunnell, Jr., who was afflicted with Alzheimer's disease. In this
capacity, Petitioner earned $ 11,953 in 1984 and $ 14,987 in 1985. Petitioner
continued to be employed by the Tunnell family until the spring of 1986, when
Mr. Tunnell died. (No evidence was presented as to
[**8] precisely how much income Petitioner received from the Tunnell family in
1986). In the fall of 1986, Petitioner became employed
by Delaware Technical and Community College as a counselor for unemployed
workers. In this job, he earned $ 8,097 in 1986 and $ 17,400 in 1987. This job
was terminated, however, in June 1987, and Petitioner then received
unemployment compensation from August 1987 until April 1988. There was no
evidence of the amount of his unemployment compensation in 1987. In 1988, his
income totalled only $ 3,500. In May 1989, he began working as an AIDS
education coordinator for the Delaware Council of Crime and Justice, the
position which he
presently holds. His income for 1989 was $ 10,312 and it was approximately $ 19,500 in
each of 1990 and 1991. He has also held other short-term, low-paying jobs from
time to time, including an early-morning job (two hours per day) that he
presently holds to supplement his income. He has also received loans and gifts at
various times, which he has used for
living expenses. He remains indebted for some of these loans.
16. Petitioner estimates that the present value of his home is approximately $
175,000 and that the
mortgage liens
[*1233] against
[**9] it are in the amount of approximately $ 100,000.
17. In the twenty-three years since he was
disbarred, Petitioner's contact with law and legal matters has been limited. He was
prohibited, of course, from
engaging in the
practice of law, and he honored that prohibition. He worked to some extent on
legal issues while employed by Matlack between December 1969 and July 1974 (during part of
which time he was imprisoned), and also while employed by DuPont from December
1975 to May 1982. He described his involvement in legal matters while employed
at DuPont as
"marginal." However, he has had virtually no law-related employment work in the past ten
years. Since
disbarment, he has taken no law school courses, Continuing Legal Education courses or
other professional practice
courses. He is aware of the Delaware Supreme Court's Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education requirements and the availability of CLE courses, but he testified
that it would have been embarrassing and expensive for him to attend such
courses. He has attempted to stay current on
legal issues by reading
monthly publications of the National Bar Association, some publications of the
American Bar Association, and annotations of
[**10] the Delaware Code to which he has had access, and by
engaging in discussion of
legal issues with other lawyers.
18. At the hearing before the Board, Petitioner presented an impressive array
of credible and distinguished witnesses who testified in favor of his
reinstatement. They included: Quentin Primo, a
retired Episcopal bishop; Robert C. O'Hara, a lawyer and former Superior Court Judge;
James M. Baker, the President of the Wilmington City Council; Charles M.
Oberly, III, the Attorney General of Delaware; Charles H. Toliver, IV, a
current Superior
Court Judge; Irenee du Pont, Jr., a
retired DuPont company executive and financial benefactor of the Petitioner; Herman M.
Holloway, Sr., a Delaware State Senator; Norman N. Aerenson, a Wilmington
lawyer and another benefactor of Petitioner; Arnetta McRae, a DuPont Company
lawyer and neighbor of the Petitioner; and Kathryn Hazeur, a
retired school principal and neighbor of the Petitioner. These witnesses corroborated
Petitioner's testimony that he had conquered the
gambling habit that had led to his thefts of client funds and subsequent
disbarment. They also testified to Petitioner's success since
disbarment in raising and educating his
[**11] two sons and caring for his elderly mother, and his good standing in the
community generally. They testified that, although they were not familiar with
the details of Petitioner's income and expenses, they believed from outward
appearances that Petitioner's financial resources were quite meager and that he
was living a
"hand-to-mouth" lifestyle. These
witnesses also testified to Petitioner's sharp intellectual capacity, and his
continuing interest in the law and legal matters. Each of these witnesses
expressed the opinion that the Petitioner had been
punished long enough for his transgressions, and that the
reinstatement of Petitioner would not be adverse to the administration of justice or to
public confidence in the legal system.
Similar testimony and opinions were expressed in a letter submitted to the
Board by Delaware State Representative Terry Spence. Other witnesses were
prepared to give similar testimony, but, because of the cumulative nature of
the testimony, Disciplinary Counsel and counsel for the Petitioner stipulated
that such testimony would have been similar to that given by Petitioner's
witnesses named above. These additional witnesses included: Loraine Sitler,
Director
[**12] of the Delaware Council on Crime and Justice (Petitioner's present employer);
Reverend Maurice Mayer, a Wilmington minister; Dr. Woodrow Wilson, a Wilmington
dentist; Joshua W. Martin,
formerly a Superior Court Judge and
presently an executive with Diamond State Telephone Company; Gregory M. Sleet, a
Delaware Deputy Attorney General; Rosetta Henderson, a consultant for a joint
venture between the DuPont Company and Merck; and Lorin P. Hunt, a
retired magistrate and community center director.
19. In opposition to Petitioner's application of
reinstatement, Disciplinary Counsel
[*1234] presented the testimony of Joseph M. Kwiatkowski, a Delaware lawyer and
Treasurer of the Clients' Security Trust Fund. Mr. Kwiatkowski indicated that
the Trustees of the Fund had voted to oppose Petitioner's application because
Petitioner had not made any
restitution to the Fund. Mr. Kwiatkowski also presented the Trustees' written opposition
to Petitioner's application.
It was also stipulated that Disciplinary Counsel's witnesses, Linda Manlove and
Charles Allmond, would have testified that Petitioner had made
restitution to the Manlove and Allmond families in the total
amount of only $ 2,900 and that Petitioner
[**13] had made no
restitution payments to them
"in the past couple of years" (actually, slightly more than three years, according to Petitioner's
testimony).
II.
We begin our examination of Clark's present (fifth) Petition for
Reinstatement by noting, once again, the analogy between Clark's
disbarment and the
disbarment reported as
In re Hawkins, Del. Supr., 87 A. 243 (1913). Both matters involved disciplinary proceedings that originated with the theft
of clients' funds. When this Court denied Clark's Petition for
Reinstatement in 1979, it quoted the following language from Hawkins:
We do not think it should be easy for an attorney who has committed a crime to
retain or regain his membership in the profession. On the contrary, the
conditions imposed should be difficult and exacting.
* * * *
The facts that impress us as of most importance in such cases are these: That
the wrongdoer has been severely and adequately
punished; that he has sincerely repented of his crime; that he has
lived such a life for a considerable period of years since his
disbarment that lawyers and laymen alike are satisfied he is an honest and upright
citizen, of clean habits and
good character,
[**14] and likely to be in the future, if given a chance, a useful and honest member
of the bar and society.
In re Clark, Del. Supr., 406 A.2d 28, 31 (1979) (quoting
In re Hawkins, 87 A. at 247).
In this matter, the record reflects that a considerable
period of time has elapsed since Clark's
disbarment. Clark presented testimony in support of his Petition for
Reinstatement from an impressive array of prominent persons and distinguished citizens. That
testimony constituted clear and convincing record evidence establishing Clark's
present
good character, reformation and repentance, which is uncontradicted. See
In re Clark, 406 A.2d at 31. The Board
found that each of the witnesses testifying in support of Clark's Petition for
Reinstatement was of the opinion that Clark had been
punished long enough for his transgressions, and that his
reinstatement would not be adverse to the administration of justice or to public confidence
in the legal system.
III.
However, Clark had additional burdens to sustain. Rule 23(f) of the Board
provides that a petitioner for readmission to the Bar
. . . shall have the burden of demonstrating, by
[**15]
clear and convincing evidence, rehabilitation, compliance with all applicable discipline orders and rules,
fitness to practice and
competence, and that the resumption of the
practice of law within Delaware will not be detrimental to the administration of justice.
Bd. Prof. Resp. R. 23(f).
One of the Board's two concerns in the present matter was whether Clark had
"complied with all applicable discipline orders." See Bd. Prof. Resp. R. 23(f). When this Court denied Clark's Petitions for
Reinstatement in
1981 and 1983, it found
"insufficient compliance by petitioner with the factors outline in our Opinion
of 1979."
In re Clark, Del. Supr., 464 A.2d 879, 880 (1983). When this Court denied Clark's Petition for
Reinstatement in 1984, it stated
"further application for
reinstatement by petitioner will not be considered by this
[*1235] Court absent substantial payments to the innocent victims." In re Clark, Del. Supr., No. 170, 1984, McNeilly, J. (Sept. 24, 1984) (ORDER).
The Board concluded that Clark had not complied with this Court's 1984
directive.
The Board's Final Report quite properly observes that the issue of
restitution has been at the center of each of
[**16] Clark's four previous applications for readmission. In support of his present
petition, Clark relies upon the efforts he made at
restitution after his last Petition for
Reinstatement was denied in 1984, to wit: he actually reached an agreement with both
individual
claimants (then represented by Charles Allmond, after the death of Bayard Allmond, and
by Linda Manlove, the real owner of the Manlove claim, who had reached her
majority). Pursuant to those agreements, regular payments commenced in the
1986-1988 period and some $ 2,900 was remitted by Clark to these two
claimants ($ 1,500 to one and $ 1,400 to the other, the discrepancy arising because of a
one-month delay in the second agreement). When at least one of the
claimants pressed for a lump sum payment, Clark attempted to arrange bank and private
loans to do so.
When this Court denied Clark's Petition for
Reinstatement in 1979, it stated that
"restitution is a factor to be considered, but that is not to say that we would require
full restitution [prior to
reinstatement] in every case in which clients' funds have been misappropriated."
In re Clark, 406 A.2d at 33. This Court observed that
"a thoroughly bad
[**17] man may make
restitution . . . and a thoroughly good man may not be able to make
restitution at all." Id. (quoting
In re Hawkins, 87 A. at 247). Given Clark's limited financial resources, the record reflects that since
1984, Clark has made efforts to discharge his obligations to the individual
claimants.
When this Court denied Clark's application in 1979, it stated that
"an attorney
disbarred by reason of moral turpitude must bear the burden of forgiveness by those he
has injured. In this case the injured are those whose funds were
misappropriated and the entire Bar of this Court who have been forced to
partially pay his debts through the Clients' Security Trust Fund." Id. Clark has always maintained that it was his desire and his intention to
make
full restitution. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that
full restitution is not necessarily a
prerequisite to
reinstatement, the history of this case requires that Clark make
restitution to the individual
claimants as a condition of his
reinstatement. Bd. Prof. Resp. R. 23(h). In addition, Clark must make
restitution or execute an interest-bearing
confessed judgment
promissory note, n2 in favor of
[**18] the Clients' Security Trust Fund, for the
principal amount it expended on Clark's behalf ($ 62,046.24), as a condition of his
reinstatement. Id. See also
In re Bennethum, Del. Supr., 278 A.2d 831 (1971) (reinstatement with arrangements for
restitution).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 Said
promissory note must be secured by a
mortgage on Clark's residence and must also be entered as a
confessed judgment, pursuant to the Civil Rules of the Superior Court. However, said
mortgage and
confessed judgment note must provide for their subordination to any lien incurred to make
restitution to Manlove and Allmond
possible. Said
mortgage may be junior to any liens of record on the date of the Board's hearing.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
IV.
The second area of concern to the Board was Clark's present
competence to
practice law. That concern is justified. This Court has recently noted that
"lead[ing] a good life free of criminal conduct and ethical misdeeds is not
proof of . . . current professional
competence."
In re Reed, Del. Supr., 584 A.2d 1207, 1209 (1990).
[**19]
The Court recognizes that it is difficult to establish fitness and
competence to
practice law for an attorney who has been prohibited from demonstrating that fitness and
competence for some 23 years. Id. Clark has, of course, not been engaged in the
practice of law since his
disbarment. Some of the jobs Clark has held involved some contact with
legal issues. Clark has made attempts to stay current on
legal issues by reading
monthly publications of the National Bar Association, some
publications of the American Bar Association, and
[*1236] annotations of the Delaware Code to which he has had access, and by
engaging in discussion of
legal issues with other lawyers. However, Clark has had no opportunity to
"demonstrate" his
competence by actual practice.
Nevertheless, the unrebutted testimony in the
present record reflects Clark's intellectual acumen, his
"sharp intellectual capacity," and his aptitude for a
"continuing interest in the law and legal matters." This is not a case like the most recent Reed proceeding.
In re Reed, Del. Supr., 584 A.2d 1207 (1990). In that case, the attorney involved had a series of ethical violations over a
period of time. See
In re Reed, Del. Supr., 429 A.2d 987 (1981);
[**20]
In re Reed, Del. Supr., 394 A.2d 221 (1978);
In re Reed, Del. Supr., 369 A.2d 686 (1977). Consequently, in the 1990 Reed case, the issue was not only the attorney's
present
competence to
practice law but also an absence of
clear and convincing evidence of his professional rehabilitation.
In re Reed, 584 A.2d at 1209 (finding multiple failures to meet ethical standards directly related to the
practice of law).
The record reflects that Clark was once a successful practicing lawyer, and a
member of the Judiciary. His
disbarment was for a reason unrelated to his legal abilities. But see
In re Reed, Del. Supr., 584 A.2d 1207 (1990). The testimony presented in this proceeding established that Clark should be
able to competently resume the
practice of law when, and if, permitted to do so. But more importantly, the record also
reflects that Clark has agreed to demonstrate his present professional
competence to
practice law by
passing the Delaware Bar Examination as a condition of his
reinstatement. This Court has concluded that, based upon the
present record, Clark's
successful completion of the
regularly
[**21] scheduled Delaware Bar Examination, in its
entirety, must be a condition of his
reinstatement. Bd. Prof. Resp. R. 23(h).
V.
Rule 23(h) of the Rules of the Board on Professional Responsibility provides:
(h) Conditions of
Reinstatement. If the petitioner fails to establish that he is qualified for
reinstatement, the petition shall be dismissed by the Court. If the petitioner is found to be
qualified to again
practice law, the Court shall reinstate him, provided that the Court may condition
reinstatement upon the payment of all or part of the costs of the proceedings, upon
restitution and upon proof of competency, including
certification by the Bar Examiners of the
successful completion of an examination for admission to practice administered subsequent to the
suspension or
disbarment.
Bd. Prof. Resp. R. 23(h).
Having duly considered the findings of fact and conclusions of the Board,
together with the oral argument of counsel in this Court, and the record of all
proceedings before the Board, the Court has concluded that Clark has presented
clear and convincing evidence that he is qualified to be reinstated, subject to the conditions stated and
hereafter detailed. In accordance
[**22] with
Board Rule 23(h), Clark's
reinstatement is expressly conditioned upon his complete compliance with all of the
following terms:
(a) payment of all costs of these proceedings;
(b)
certification of payment of
restitution to the individual
claimants, Manlove and Allmond, of the entire
principal amount owed or
certification that those claims have otherwise been resolved to the satisfaction of Manlove
and Allmond;
(c)
certification of payment of
restitution of the
principal amount owed to the Clients' Security Trust Fund or
certification that Clark has executed a
confessed judgment
promissory note, n3 in favor of the Clients' Security Trust Fund, for the
principal amount it expended on Clark's
behalf ($ 62,046.24),
[*1237] providing for interest only to be paid
monthly at the rate of six percent per annum, from the date of the
promissory note, with the entire
principal amount plus interest payable on July 1, 1999;
(d)
certification by the Board of Bar Examiners that Clark has successfully passed, anonymously,
the
regularly scheduled Delaware Bar Examination in its
entirety; and
(e) the continuation of the good moral character reflected in the
present record.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n3 Said
promissory note must be secured by a
mortgage on Clark's residence and must also be entered as a
confessed judgment, pursuant to the Civil Rules of the Superior Court. However, said
mortgage and
confessed judgment note must provide for their subordination to any lien incurred to make
restitution to Manlove and Allmond possible. Said
mortgage may be junior to any liens of record on the date of the Board's hearing. 19
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**23]
In In
re Hawkins, prior to granting the Petition for
Reinstatement, this Court made the precedential significance of its decision clear:
In concluding these remarks we desire to say a few words about the effect of
our decision in this case, because we confess it is a feature which has given
us much concern. We have before observed, that as a protection and safeguard in
future cases, we imposed in this case certain conditions which it will be
impossible to meet except in a meritorious case. The court is not likely to be
embarrassed hereafter in any application for
reinstatement if it is understood that an attorney who has been
disbarred will not be reinstated unless his application is supported by proofs,
resolutions and recommendations as strong, full and convincing as those
presented in the present case; nor unless a considerable
period of time has elapsed since his
disbarment. The decision in every case must depend, of course, upon its own facts and
circumstances, and the present decision cannot be regarded as a precedent which
shall govern any other case unless the facts and circumstances are sustantially
[sic] similar.
In re Hawkins, 87 A. at 248.
[**24]
Those observations are equally applicable to this Court's present disposition.
Clark's
reinstatement shall become effective only upon his subsequent demonstration to this Court
that he satisfactorily completed all of the conditions imposed by this decision
and only upon the entry of a subsequent order by this Court to that effect.
