As disbarment is not punishment, likewise we think due regard for the administration  [***6]  of justice does not permit disbarment and reinstatement to be made mere adjuncts to reform schools and the parole system. The authorities that seem to us the best considered take a different view, which is consistent with the principles recognized in Maryland. [Id. 190 Md. at 678.]

 
[It] was precipitated by investigations and subsequent criminal indictments concerning a scheme devised by [Dippel] and an accomplice,  [*611]  Henry Edward Wisowaty, who also was a member of the Maryland Bar, whereby they would file documents with the Orphans' Court of Baltimore City to gain control of estates of deceased resident aliens, then divest the estates of all capital assets to their own use, the assets being apportioned between them. The scheme included in some cases the preparation of forged Wills  [***7]  leaving substantial parts of the estate to fictitious heirs, the payment of fictitious claims, and the filing of spurious and false documents. As a result of these activities, six indictments were brought against [Dippel] for embezzlement, larceny and conspiracy, the total amounts embezzled for the six estates being $ 71,083.46. Eventually, total restitution was made of that sum, [Dippel] having made restitution in the amount of $ 45,083.46, and Wisowaty having made restitution in the amount of $ 26,000. In the meantime, however, as a result of those indictments, [Dippel] pleaded guilty to the six indictments charging embezzlement, and the State's Attorney stetted the companion charges of larceny and conspiracy. Judge Charles Harris in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City sentenced [Dippel] to terms totalling 15 years in the Maryland Penitentiary, which was later reduced to 5 years after partial restitution had been made, and after serving approximately 21 months of his sentence, [Dippel] was paroled after one previous parole application had been denied.

The misconduct of [Dippel] which led to the various investigations, both civil and criminal, resulting in indictments and court proceedings, disbarment, conviction, and sentencing, was of the most severe nature that an attorney can be guilty and was not a single, isolated aberration or youthful prank, but a deliberate plan to scheme and defraud innocent people out of funds belonging to them.

 
[Dippel] has been away from the active practice of law since at least June of 1963, a period of over 15  [*613]  years, and his efforts to keep current with Maryland law have been very limited.

* * *

With respect to his competence to practice law, there is, of course, always some question in the case of a lawyer who has been unable to practice for 15 years. The criteria set, however, in grave crimes require a substantial period for rehabilitation and reformation and it is unlikely, in a case of such gravity of misconduct leading to disbarment as this, that a shorter time than 15 years would ever be acceptable. Hence, to consider competence, we must measure this applicant against others forbidden to practice for such a period.

Dippel has proven his competence in a specialized field of law -- labor relations, and has participated as an advocate in many matters where a licensed lawyer was not required. He admits he has made only casual efforts to keep abreast of the changes in Maryland case and statute law. He asserts that he would know when he was incompetent and would  [***11]  associate with him a competent lawyer when the occasion arose. If this competence criterion were the only one standing in the way of reinstatement, it would point up the need for a rule permitting conditional reinstatement at the end of a period of refresher legal education.

The primary consideration deals with the gravity of the original misconduct and the extent that Petitioner has shown his reformation and the improbability of a repetition of such conduct if reinstated. The burden of proof is Petitioner's and the graver the misconduct the greater the burden.

The crimes that he committed are peculiarly available to unscrupulous lawyers and the fraudulent devices used -- false wills, false claims pursued in Court, and false affidavits to support them -- fall within the areas of the legal training he  [*614]  received at the outset. It is possible, but not probable, that these fraudulent schemes could have been carried out by one who was not a member of the Bar.

A lawyer who uses his legal skills to defraud has been put in the position to victimize the public through the sanction of the bar in its prior approval of his integrity and morality.

 [**1238]  [Dippel] committed  [***12]  crimes not only against the dignity of the State, but also against his profession and the Courts of which he was an officer. It is difficult enough to envision reinstatement of a lawyer who embezzles funds entrusted to him without the mitigating circumstances of an irresistible motive. Petitioner did not commit one embezzlement under the pressure of dire need or duress. He committed a series of carefully schemed embezzlements because, in his words, he was "stupid -- it appeared so easy." He was apparently an able lawyer at the time of the original misconduct and some of his schemes were ingenious, so the explanation of stupidity is unacceptable. That the money was easy to take seems the most reasonable explanation of his fraudulent acts. He should not have the sanction of the bar to invite the public to entrust to him more funds that are easy to take. The Panel has not been persuaded that [Dippel] has met the heavy burden of proof entitling him to reinstatement.

 
In the instant case approximately 4 1/2 years elapsed between the acceptance by the Court of Appeals of [Raimondi's] resignation from the Bar and the filing of his Petition for Reinstatement, and a further 1 1/2 years has elapsed since then. During that period, [he] obtained  [***16]  a Master's degree in Public Administration and has served for 2 1/2 years as a Hearing Officer in the Insurance Division for the State of Maryland. According to the testimony of Insurance Commissioner Birrane, his executive assistant, Ted Hickman, and several attorneys who have tried numerous cases before him, he has performed his duties with extreme competence. We believe that [Raimondi's] accomplishments, as well as his own testimony, evidence a sound and responsible attitude toward refreshing his professional skills. We are satisfied that if readmitted to the practice of law, [he] would abide by the requirements of EC 6-1.

The relation of the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispensed by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. [Id. at 383.]

 
[A court] should endeavor to make certain that it does not again put into the hands of an unworthy petitioner that almost unlimited opportunity to inflict wrongs upon society possessed by a practicing lawyer. [Id. at 126.]

 
The ultimate and decisive question is always whether the applicant is now of good moral character and is a fit and proper person to be reintrusted with the confidences and privileges of an attorney at law. This question has a broader significance than its purely personal aspect. From time immemorial lawyers have in a peculiar sense been regarded as officers of the court. It is a lawyer's obligation to participate in upholding the integrity, dignity, and purity of the courts. He owes a definite responsibility to the public in the proper administration  [***21]  of justice. It is of utmost importance that the honor and integrity of the legal profession should be preserved and that the lives of its members be without reproach. The malpractice of one reflects dishonor not only upon his brethren, but upon the courts themselves, and creates among the people a distrust of the courts and the bar. [Id. at 598.]