In the Matter of the Reinstatement of Richard C. MURRAY
Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV), No. 14, September Term, 1987
Court of Appeals of Maryland
316 Md. 303;
558 A.2d 710;
1989 Md. LEXIS 89
June 7, 1989
DISPOSITION:
[***1] ORDERED that Richard C. Murray be and he is hereby reinstated as a member of
the Bar of Maryland upon paying the costs of these proceedings and upon taking
in open court and subscribing to the oath of attorneys required by Md. Code
(1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Art. 10,
§ 10.
COUNSEL: Robert E. Cahill, Sr., Baltimore, Maryland, for petitioner.
No argument on behalf of respondent.
JUDGES: Murphy, C.J., and Eldridge, Cole, Rodowsky, McAuliffe, Adkins and Blackwell,
JJ.
OPINIONBY: ADKINS
OPINION:
[*304]
[**710] On 22 April 1977, Richard C. Murray was
disbarred by consent. Md. Rule BV12 d. He now seeks
reinstatement to the Bar. Md. Rule BV14. Pursuant to Rule BV14 d 2, Bar Counsel conducted
an investigation. Thereafter, Murray's petition was
"heard and determined by the Inquiry Panel" and
"reviewed by the Review Board . . . ."@
Id.@ Both of those bodies unanimously
recommended
reinstatement.
We first enunciated criteria for
reinstatement after
disbarment in
In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (1948), reaffirmed them in
Maryland St. Bar Ass'n v. Boone, 255 Md. 420, 258 A.2d 438 (1969), crystallized them in
In re Braverman, 271 Md. 196, 199-200, 316 A.2d 246, 247 (1974),
[***2] and restated them most
recently in
Matter of Cory, 300 Md. 177, 180, 477 A.2d 273, 274 (1984). The criteria are not difficult to state.
Disbarment
"does not in all circumstances forever prevent
reinstatement . . . ."@
Meyerson, 190 Md. at 676, 59 A.2d at 491.
"There may be a point in time when it is
[*305] proper to reinstate to the practice of law even one who has committed a most
heinous crime."@
In re Raimondi and Dippel, 285 Md. 607, 617, 403 A.2d 1234, 1239 (1979),
cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1033, 100 S.Ct. 705, 62 L.Ed.2d 669 (1980). The fundamental inquiry is
"'whether, in the interval following the rendering of the judgment
[**711] of removal, the petitioner has become a proper person to hold such office.'"@
Meyerson, 190 Md. at 677, 59 A.2d at 491 (quoting
In re Keenan, 310 Mass. 166, 170, 37 N.E.2d 516, 519 (1941).
"We . . . look probingly at any reapplication alleging reform,
rehabilitation and
competence" because, although
"[w]e continue to believe that a fallen lawyer may rise again,"
[***3] we permit
reinstatement
"only after a clear and demonstrated change from what he was before."@
In re Barton, 291 Md. 61, 64, 432 A.2d 1335, 1336 (1981) (Barton II). In other words,
"while
disbarment does not necessarily operate as a permanent disability, it may only be
overcome by a clear and convincing showing of
rehabilitation and of
legal competence, borne out by an applicant's conduct over a long
period of time."@
Id. at 67, 432 A.2d at 1338.
See
Cory, supra, 300 Md. at 180, 477 A.2d at 274.
More specifically, the essential factors to be evaluated include:
1. The nature and circumstances of petitioner's original
misconduct.
2. Petitioner's
subsequent conduct and
reformation.
3. His or her present character.
4. His or her present qualifications and
competence to
practice law.
See
Braverman, 271 Md. 196, 199-200, 316 A.2d 246, 247 (1974). We examine these factors to determine
"whether this Court can be assured that the public can rely on the
competence and integrity of the previously
disbarred attorney."@
In re Barton, 273 Md. 377, 381, 329 A.2d 102, 105 (1974)
[***4] (Barton I).
See
In re Loker, 285 Md. 645, 649-651, 403 A.2d 1269, 1271-1272 (1979);
Dippel, supra, 285 Md. at 617, 403 A.2d at 1239. And in doing so, we
keep in mind
[*306] that
"the more serious the original
misconduct was, the heavier is the burden to prove present fitness for
readmission to the bar."@
Barton I, 273 Md. at 380, 329 A.2d at 104. We now proceed to apply these standards to the facts before us. n1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 Our discussion will focus on the first three factors. There is little room
for debate as to Murray's
competence to
practice law. He was admitted to the Bar in 1952 and before his 1977
disbarment was a highly regarded lawyer. The events that produced the
disbarment raised no question about his technical
competence. Since the
disbarment, Murray has worked as a
paralegal for the Westminster firm of Walsh and Fisher (and more recently as
office manager as well). His
paralegal work has involved extensive legal research and drafting of pleadings,
memoranda of law, and other documents related to the firm's general practice.
He has co-authored a book on Maryland negligence law. The excellence of his legal work
during this period is attested by many members of the Carroll County bench and
bar. There is ample evidence to support the Review Board's conclusion that
Murray
"has demonstrated that he is presently
well-qualified and competent to
practice law in the State of Maryland."@ Murray's professional
competence appears at least to equal that which we found adequate in
In re Barton, 291 Md. 61, 66-67, 432 A.2d 1335, 1337-1338 (1981).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[***5] I. Nature and Circumstances of Original
Misconduct
Murray was admitted to the Bar of this Court on 13 November 1952. By 1971, he
had become (in the Review Board's words)
"a well-respected, competent attorney" and a
partner in the Baltimore County firm then known as Cook, Murray, Howard, Downes
& Tracy. In the year
last-mentioned, Murray was representing Elizabeth Jessop, widow of Holmes C.
Jessop, and
personal representative of her late husband's estate. On or about 27 October 1971, Mrs. Jessop
delivered to Murray a check in the amount of $ 10,000, drawn on the estate,
signed by her as
personal representative, and payable to Murray. It seems that this check represented money payable to
the Mayor and City council of Baltimore. As the Review Board found, Murray
"appropriated the $ 10,000 check to his own use by depositing the check in his
personal account in the First National
[*307] Bank of Maryland . . . ."@ He used the funds for personal purposes, mostly to pay overdue income taxes.
He never disclosed the
misappropriation to Mrs. Jessop, or to the person who became successor
personal representative after Mrs. Jessop died on 24 December 1971.
In 1976, Murray was still a
partner
[***6] in the Cook
firm. He was co-personal representative of the estate of Louis J. Appel. On
or about 27 October of that year, Murray forged the other personal
representative's
[**712] name to two estate checks, one for $ 1,000 and one for $ 9,000, and deposited
them in his (Murray's) personal account. Murray used this money to pay overdue
income taxes.
A
partner in the Cook firm inadvertently discovered the
misappropriations in 1977. When Murray was confronted with the facts, he immediately admitted
his
guilt in both transactions and, as we have recounted, forthwith consented to
disbarment.
Thereafter, he pled guilty to counts of forgery and
misappropriation of funds. He was sentenced to incarceration for three years, suspended in
favor of
probation for a like period, subject to a condition that he pay $ 2,000 in court costs.
Later, on 20 October 1977, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County struck
out the guilty finding and imposed
probation before judgment. The court terminated
probation on 3 May 1979.
These are the bare facts of the transgressions that resulted in Murray's
disbarment. We next examine the
circumstances surrounding those misdeeds.
Murray's own account is that he let family
[***7] finances get out of hand. Unwilling to admit to his wife that his respectable
but modest earnings could not finance such things as private schooling for
their two children, he failed to pay estimated taxes, allowing tax liabilities
to accumulate
[*308] until they became so pressing that on the two occasions mentioned, he resorted
to stealing to satisfy the tax collector. As Dr. Jonas Rappeport n2 put it,
Murray
"was unable to admit to his wife that he could not earn the reasonable income
they required and that he could not face his
partners with his problems." n3@ During this period of stress, Murray indulged in increasingly heavy
drinking. He has never claimed, however, any causal connection
between the drinking and his
misconduct.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 Dr. Rappeport is a psychiatrist who saw Murray for psychotherapy during 15
sessions in 1977. Dr. Rappeport also examined Murray in 1986.
n3 This is the account Murray gave a
probation officer in May 1977; it also is the account he gave the Inquiry Panel in 1988.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Review
[***8] Board found that Murray,
"in order to maintain an established
lifestyle, which was not extravagant, permitted false pride to overwhelm better judgment
and rather than approach his wife or . . . friends with his personal problems,
resorted to . . .
misappropriation."@ Nevertheless, it also found that Murray's
"misconduct and the
circumstances surrounding [it] were egregious . . . ."@ We agree.
"[M]isappropriation by an attorney of funds of others entrusted to his care, be
the amount small or large, is of great concern and represents the gravest form
of professional
misconduct."@
In re Loker, 285 Md. 645, 651, 403 A.2d 1269, 1272 (1979).
See
Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Ezrin, 312 Md. 603, 608-609, 541 A.2d 966, 969 (1988);
Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Bloom, 306 Md. 609, 611, 510 A.2d 589, 590 (1986);
Barton I, supra, 273 Md. at 380, 329 A.2d at 104.
Loker involved a lawyer who was
disbarred in 1970. He had been convicted of
embezzlement and larceny from Leonardtown, of which municipality he had been an official.
The defalcations apparently occurred over a period
[***9] of 12 years or more and involved almost $ 98,000.
285 Md. at 646, 403
[*309] A.2d at 1269. In 1979, we declined to reinstate Loker, pointing out, among other things, that
[t]his was no isolated incident . . . . [I]t was spread over a number of
years and included a substantial sum of money.
Id. at 651-652, 403 A.2d at 1272. In fact, Loker controlled the books and accounts of Leonardtown; he was the
town's treasurer, clerk, and attorney, and managed the town's affairs from his
law office.
Loker v. State, 2 Md.App. 1, 16-19, 233 A.2d 342, 352-354 (1967),
aff'd,
250 Md. 677, 245 A.2d 814 (1968),
cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1082, 89 S.Ct. 862, 21 L.Ed.2d 774 (1969). Taking advantage of these positions of trust, he schemed to take the town's
money over a long period of years.
Another case involving
deliberate scheming is that of Francis X. Dippel, reported as
[**713]
In re Raimondi and Dippel, supra. n4@ Dippel was
disbarred in
1963 and sought
reinstatement in 1979. He had been convicted, on
[***10] guilty pleas, of six counts of
embezzlement and served about 21 months in the Maryland Penitentiary.
Dippel, 285 Md. at 611, 403 A.2d at 1236.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n4 Raimondi and Dippel were not involved in the same
misconduct. We consolidated the two cases because
"the same principles of law and policy [were] applicable in each . . . ."@
In re Raimondi and Dippel, 285 Md. 607, 608, 403 A.2d 1234, 1235 (1979). In this opinion, we usually cite the case as
"Dippel."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[***11] Dippel's convictions and
disbarment were
precipitated by investigations . . . concerning a scheme devised by [Dippel]
and an
accomplice . . . who was also a member of the Maryland Bar, whereby they would file
documents with the Orphans' Court of Baltimore City to gain control of estates
of deceased resident aliens, then divest the estates of all capital assets to
their
own use . . . . The scheme included in some cases the preparation of forged
Wills leaving substantial parts of the estate to fictitious heirs, the payment
of fictitious claims, and the filing of spurious and false documents.
[*310]
Id. at 610-611, 403 A.2d at 1236 (quoting findings of the Inquiry Panel) [brackets in opinion]. Dippel's
activities affected six estates and transferred over $ 71,000 from those
estates to him and his
accomplice.
Id. at 611, 403 A.2d at 1236.
We characterized Dippel's conduct thus:
. . . Dippel made use of his legal training and knowledge to steal from certain
estates. Without any apparent reason other than sheer greed, Dippel engaged in
a calculated campaign of
theft. [He was earning over $ 80,000 a year in terms of 1979 dollars.]@ Thus, greed
alone would seem to have been the only reason behind his crime, a point
illustrated by his statement that it was easy to steal
by these forgeries and other manipulations.
Id. at 619, 403 A.2d at 1240.
Like Loker and Dippel, Murray
stole -- and
stole from clients. We note that Murray's two
thefts were conducted over a lesser
period of time than those involved in the two earlier cases, produced a smaller amount of
money, and do not appear to have been part of an elaborate and ongoing
clandestine scheme. Even a former thief may be
reinstated if he or she makes
"a clear and convincing showing of
rehabilitation and of
legal competence, borne out by . . . applicant's conduct over a long
period of time . . . ."@
Barton II, 291 Md. at 67, 432 A.2d at 1337. n5@
Barton II teaches that
rehabilitation may occur, even
[***12] after the grave offense of
[*311] stealing from clients. We turn now to the question of whether Murray's proof
is sufficient in this respect.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n5
Barton
misappropriated small amounts of money from four different clients over a period of years. No
scheme seems to have been involved. He also failed to represent some clients
effectively, and made
deliberate misrepresentations to a court. It appears that alcohol abuse played a
substantial part in causing his
misconduct. He was
disbarred in 1966 and denied
reinstatement in 1974, because
"at this stage, sufficient time has not passed to be assured of petitioner's
reformation and sufficient evidence has not been submitted of his present competency to
practice law."@
In re Barton, 273 Md. 377, 382, 329 A.2d 102, 105 (1974). A second application
"was filed too soon and we summarily dismissed it in 1977."@
In re Barton, 291 Md. 61, 63, 432 A.2d 1335, 1336 (1981). Barton was eventually
reinstated in 1981.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
II.
[***13]
Subsequent Conduct and
Reformation; Present Character
Murray's consent
disbarment occurred just over 12 years ago. Since that time, as we have noted, Murray
has worked as a
paralegal and
office manager at a Westminster law firm.
See note 1,
supra. He has sold his Baltimore County home and acquired a more modest one in
Carroll County. This home is unencumbered, and the record indicates that
Murray's debts are no more than the normal day-to-day obligations one generally
incurs. There are no tax arrearages, as the Attorney Grievance Commission
investigation substantiates. Murray has made full restitution of the sums he
stole. n6@ He has entered
[**714] into the community life of Carroll County; for example, he serves on the
board, and (at the time of the Inquiry Panel hearing in July 1988) was
president of Carroll Haven, a charitable organization assisting the mentally
retarded. His drinking is
no longer a problem.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n6 In point of fact, Murray testified that he paid some $ 56,000, covering the
two
misappropriations with interest to date of payment, a fee to an accountant to identify all of
his tax and other major obligations, and full payment of those taxes and other
obligations. The tax bill was particularly high because Murray had to treat as
income the money he had
misappropriated and pay taxes and penalties on that.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[***14] Murray's new
lifestyle has been achieved, the record indicates, by strong family efforts. Murray
himself explained to the Inquiry Panel:
[My wife] and I are able to work together, have worked together, talked to each
other, thrashed over any difference . . . . We have changed our complete
lifestyle, we are happy and content with what we're doing, we have no secrets between
each other and I feel like a person that, although its been difficult to work
through, a person who sort of is an open
book. I don't know how to put this, but . . . once you've been arrested and
booked and indicted
[*312] and sentenced and investigated, there's not much else left and you feel that
something died in your life.
Because
"false pride" or some other factor made it difficult for Murray to discuss financial
problems with his wife at the time of his
thefts, the present relationship between the Murrays is of special significance. In
this regard, the Review Board, like the Inquiry Panel, found that Murray
"has . . . developed an open relationship with his wife and revised his
lifestyle, resulting in a complete
reformation from his former misdeeds."
These are the relatively objective facts about
[***15] Richard Murray's life since
disbarment. We, of course, must make a much more subjective judgment about his present
character and the completeness of his
rehabilitation. We must do so in order to protect the public against any likelihood of future
ethical lapses on Murray's part should he be
reinstated.
Dippel, 285 Md. at 617-618, 403 A.2d at 1239;
Barton I, 273 Md. at 381, 329 A.2d at 105. Those who testified before the Inquiry Panel and the even larger numbers of
individuals who submitted letters on Murray's behalf had no reservations in
this regard. Judges, lawyers, and other citizens -- those who had known Murray
before
disbarment and those who had met him since, but who were acquainted with the facts of the
disbarment -- were unanimous in their conclusions of complete
rehabilitation and present good character. There was no testimony, there were no letters,
there was nothing in the Attorney Grievance Commission investigation that even
suggested a contrary view. Compare
Dippel, in which there was very substantial evidence supporting
reinstatement, but also opposing testimony.
285 Md. at 612, 403 A.2d at 1237.
[***16] Dr. Rappeport's letter of 10 November 1986 foreshadows what others said in
1988.
. . . I have
examined many attorneys who have been in difficulties with the bar because of
their behavior, as well
[*313] as many who have requested
readmission after
disbarment. I do not recall having evaluated anyone who has been as straightforward and
honest as Richard Murray, nor anyone who has appeared to resurrect himself as
devotedly as this man. I can find nothing in my evaluation which would lead me
to believe that there is any likelihood of a recurrence of the
misappropriation of clients' funds or any other illegal act should Mr. Murray be readmitted to
the bar. I feel that he has an emotional stability now which he never enjoyed
[before,] as well as the constant nagging knowledge of what he did. This,
however, is a
guilt which has been used as should all
guilt -- in a constructive fashion. His behavior subsequent to his
disbarment has apparently been without blemish and can only be described as that of a
responsible, competent citizen.
We are aware, of course, of the ease with which a
disbarred lawyer may sometimes obtain general endorsements of his present moral
character.
Dippel, 285 Md. at 618, 403 A.2d at 1240.
[***17] Nevertheless,
[**715] we may give weight to those letters,
Cory, supra, 300 Md. at 184, 477 A.2d at 276, as may the Inquiry Panel and the Review Board. We, like the Inquiry Panel and
the Review Board, also give weight to the sworn testimony before the former
body. As we have noted, both the Inquiry Panel and the Review Board, looking
at the entire record, unanimously
recommended Murray's
reinstatement. The latter concluded:
Based upon the evidence presented . . . [Murray's] present character is above
reproach and is of such a nature that he will be an asset to the Bar of
Maryland. [Murray's]
subsequent conduct, following
disbarment, has been exemplary, revealing that he has made a total and complete
reformation. While the initial
misconduct and
circumstances surrounding [it] were egregious, it appears highly unlikely that such conduct would ever
again be repeated. [Murray] has demonstrated that he is
[*314] presently
well-qualified and competent to
practice law in the State of
Maryland.
We recognize, too, that we are not bound by findings of the Inquiry Panel or
the Review Board.
Barton II, 291 Md. at 65, 432 A.2d at 1337.
[***18] Indeed, in
Dippel, we denied Raimondi's
reinstatement although both the Inquiry Panel and the Review Board
recommended it.
285 Md. at 616-620, 403 A.2d at 1239-1241. Nevertheless,
"we find their work to be of invaluable assistance."@
Barton II, 291 Md. at 65, 432 A.2d at 1337. Giving due weight to the findings and to the testimony on which they are
based, our task is to determine whether Murray's
"proof of
rehabilitation over the time he has been prohibited from practicing law overcomes the proof
of bad character evidenced by his criminal conviction."@
Cory, 300 Md. at 185, 477 A.2d at 273.
See also
Dippel, 285 Md. at 618, 403 A.2d at 1239-1240. The record reveals that the past
12 years of Murray's life have been industrious, without discernible blemish
that might give cause to question his integrity.
Compare,
Loker, supra, 285 Md. at 648, 403 A.2d at 1270 (efforts subsequent to
disbarment to shield family home and wages from creditors indicative of insufficient
reformation).
On balance, we conclude that Murray's conduct during
[***19] the 12 years since his
disbarment demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that he is remorseful, fully
rehabilitated, and competent to
practice law in Maryland. The factors that helped to produce his
misconduct no longer exist. We hold that Murray should be
reinstated. Accordingly, it is this 7th day of June, 1989, by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland
ORDERED that Richard C. Murray be and he is hereby
reinstated as a member of the Bar of Maryland upon paying the costs of these proceedings
and upon taking in open court and subscribing to the oath of attorneys required
by Md.Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Art. 10,
§ 10.
