JIMMY D. McGUIRE v. THE MISSISSIPPI BAR
NO. 2000-BR-01097-SCT
SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
2001 Miss. LEXIS 163
June 21, 2001, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
[*1] COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: COMPLAINT TRIBUNAL.
DISPOSITION:
REINSTATEMENT DENIED.
COUNSEL: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: PRO SE.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: MICHAEL B. MARTZ.
JUDGES: MILLS, JUSTICE, PITTMAN, C.J., BANKS AND McRAE, P.JJ., SMITH, WALLER, COBB AND
DIAZ, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
OPINIONBY: MILLS
OPINION:
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL BAR MATTERS
EN BANC.
MILLS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
P1. On May 15, 1997, this Court entered an order disbarring Jimmy D. McGuire
from
membership in The Mississippi Bar and revoking his
license to practice law in the State of Mississippi.
Mississippi Bar v. McGuire, 694 So. 2d 674 (Miss. 1997);
see also
Mississippi Bar v. McGuire, 647 So. 2d 706 (Miss. 1994). Our decision was based upon McGuire's
felony conviction in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
for filing a false
currency reporting form as required by the IRS.
See
United States v. McGuire, 99 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc),
cert. denied,
520 U.S. 1251, 117 S. Ct. 2407, 138 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1997). McGuire was taped conspiring
[*2] with
purported
drug trafficking clients (who were actually
undercover agents) to accept cash payments in a manner shielding the source and purpose
of the cash in violation of federal law. In the process he advised these
purported drug
dealers of routes of travel that they could use to
avoid detection in their
drug trafficking. Though McGuire was
acquitted on other counts, he received the maximum sentence because he was involved in
other
money laundering schemes and he attempted to obstruct justice in his trial.
P2. McGuire now petitions this Court, seeking
reinstatement to the
practice of law. The Bar does not take a position concerning McGuire's Petition for
Reinstatement to
membership in the Bar and the reissuance of his
license to practice law in this State except as is required by Rule 12,
Mississippi Rules of Discipline.
DISCUSSION
P3.
Reinstatement to the
practice of law is governed by Rule 12 of the
Mississippi Rules of Discipline.
In re Robb, 702 So. 2d 423, 424 (Miss. 1997). Rule 12.7 specifically describes the
jurisdictional requirements of
reinstatement petitions as follows:
All
reinstatement petitions shall be addressed to
[*3] the Court, shall state the cause or causes for
suspension or
disbarment, give the names and current addresses of all persons, parties, firms, or legal
entities who suffered pecuniary loss due to the
improper conduct, the making of full amends and restitution, the reasons justifying
reinstatement, and requisite moral character and legal learning to be reinstated to the
privilege of practicing law. Upon filing, the petition shall be served on, and
an investigatory fee of $ 500.00 shall be paid to the Bar, same to be in
addition to any other sum due the Bar, or persons injured by the petitioner's
improper conduct. The matters set out in this
paragraph shall be
jurisdictional.
P4.
"The Court's fundamental inquiry is whether [the attorney] has
rehabilitated himself in conduct and character since the
suspension was imposed."
In re Mathes, 653 So. 2d 928, 929 (Miss. 1995).
"A
firm resolve to live a correct life evidenced by outward manifestation sufficient to
convince a reasonable mind clearly that the person has reformed is only required."
Williams v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 492 So. 2d 578, 580 (Miss. 1986).
P5. McGuire fails
[*4] to satisfy this Court that he has effectively
rehabilitated himself
"to the point that he should enjoy a
license to practice law."
In re Massey, 722 So. 2d 452, 453 (Miss. 1998) (hereinafter
Massey III). For this reason, his petition for
reinstatement is denied.
P6. The Bar deposed McGuire on July 25, 2000, as part of its investigation of
McGuire's
Petition for
Reinstatement. McGuire voluntarily submitted to the deposition. He provided the Bar with only
one letter of recommendation in support of his petition for
reinstatement at the time he was deposed. Since that time, however, McGuire has provided
this Court with thirty personal letters of recommendation.
P7. Since his release from prison, McGuire has not been engaged in any type of
community service activities, but he does attend United Methodist Church on a regular basis.
Rule 11(c) of the
Mississippi Rules of Discipline provides that a suspended attorney shall perform certain acts including:
(1)
notify all clients of his
disbarment,
suspension or
resignation and his
consequent
inability to act as an attorney after the
effective date of his
disbarment,
suspension or
resignation; (2)
[*5]
notify each client involved in pending litigation or administrative proceedings and
the attorney or attorneys for each adverse party in such proceedings, of his
disbarment,
suspension or
resignation and
consequent
inability to act as an attorney after the
effective date of his
disbarment,
suspension, or
resignation; (3) advise each client promptly to substitute another attorney or attorneys in
his place or to seek legal advice elsewhere; and (4)
notify all elected courts and agencies of his
disbarment,
suspension, and
consequent
inability to act as an attorney after the
effective date thereof; and (5) give such other notice as the disciplinary agency last having
jurisdiction may direct in the public interest.
Upon being questioned by the Bar, McGuire indicated that he was not aware of
the requirement of notifying all courts, agencies, and clients of his
disbarment, and notifying his clients to retain alternate counsel. However, McGuire
asserts in his response that at the time of his
disbarment he had no clients to
notify as he had been in the federal prison camp in Talledega, Alabama, for nearly
six months. McGuire also testified that although he did not
notify opposing counsel
[*6] and
courts of his
disbarment and
felony conviction, it was well known throughout the community.
P8. Some of the letters in support of McGuire's
reinstatement express chagrin over his
"harsh" treatment for failing to properly fill out an
"IRS Form." The tenor of the letters indicates that the writers are not aware of the
serious nature of McGuire's offenses. He violated far more serious laws than
failing to properly fill out an IRS form. In a letter to the Mississippi Bar,
Assistant U.S. Attorney Ruth Morgan provided the following information:
In his petition for
reinstatement, Mr. McGuire mis-characterizes the basis for his conviction as a simple mistake
on a form. In reality, the facts proved at trial showed that he devised an
intricate
money laundering scheme with people he thought were cocaine
dealers (who were actually
undercover agents). . . . The 5th Circuit panel observed
"[the information generating the [undercover] investigation was well-documented at trial. Several ex-clients testified that
McGuire routinely required large cash payments in the tens of thousands of
dollars and refused to give receipts. Other individuals offered testimony about
large amounts of cash
[*7] observed in McGuire's home and about large purchases made with cash."
* * *
In devising the
money laundering scheme, Mr. McGuire advised the
undercover agents, who were posing as his clients, to lie about where the money came
from, and he even suggested ideas for the lies they could tell the police and
the government about where they got the money. He also told them which highways
to avoid traveling on to avoid being stopped by the police while they were
hauling drugs or drug money.
P9. United States District Judge David Bramlette stated the following to
McGuire at the sentencing hearing:
The responses that you made, Mr. McGuire, that I have just read, show
clearly to me that you understood the agent's comments, to me, that the
currency came from
drug trafficking activity. And the
undercover agents' language was unambiguous in relating to you that the $ 20,000 was
illicit. And your responses were equally unambiguous in indicating that you
understood the true ownership of the money had to be concealed from the IRS,
and you devised a scheme, a thinly veiled scheme I might say, to accomplish
that purpose, in bringing in another man whose name would appear and in fact
did appear
[*8] on the form.
The district court further found that McGuire used his position as an attorney
to facilitate his crime. The judge stated:
Now, in this case, Mr. McGuire in my opinion used his special skills in several
ways. First, he used the attorney-client privilege to talk confidentially with
the
undercover agents about how to hide the information from the government. He advised them
on how to
avoid detection by the police on the highways, having gained that
information from your work as a defense counsel having represented many people
involved in
drug trafficking before, according to the record. You told them that you would keep all
information on Mr. Flores and Mr. Martinez completely separate from the cash
fees you received from them. And in fact, it's my recollection that you set up
two separate files involving [sic] one on Flores and one on Bolivar who was the
man that was brought in under the ruse, that is, under the pretense of being a
person who was going to be paying the fee or the money. And you did that so
that there would be no connection between these two in your office files, and
that Martinez and Flores would not be connected to the $ 20,000. Mr. McGuire
assured
[*9] the agents that everything they told him was confidential, and then you used
the attorney-client privilege to advise them to come up with false reasons for
why they were carrying a large sum of cash.
P10. The court found that McGuire's conduct in connection with the
acquitted
counts justified an upward departure in the sentencing guidelines. The court
imposed the statutory maximum of 36 months imprisonment and a $ 50,000 fine.
P11. It is our view that this case falls somewhere between
Parsons, who was
convicted after a plea bargain of attempting to launder drug money and
Massey, who was
convicted of trafficking in drugs.
Compare
In re Parsons, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 179, 2000 WL 1032463 (Miss. 2000),
with
Massey III, 722 So. 2d 452 (Miss. 1998),
and
Massey II, 670 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 1996). In
Parsons we allowed
reinstatement; in
Massey we did not.
P12. We find that McGuire has not demonstrated the requisite rehabilitation in
conduct and moral character since his
disbarment to allow his
reinstatement. Therefore, we deny his petition.
P13. This Court stated the following in
[*10]
Massey III:
The
legal profession has come a
long way from the days when attorneys were automatically presumed honorable.
The quality and reputation of the Mississippi Bar and the public interest which
it serves warrant stringent standards for
reinstatement following
disbarment. This Court remains firm in its resolve that one who has acted in a manner
sufficiently
egregious to warrant
disbarment must clearly show a rehabilitation of character before
reinstatement to the privilege of practicing law. Compromise of the standards to which
attorneys are held will surely cripple the profession, with concomitant harm to
the public.
Massey III, 722 So. 2d at 453 (quoting
In re Tucker, 656 So. 2d 799, 804 (Miss. 1995)).
P14. While McGuire's crime does not quite rise to the level of Massey's, it
certainly comes close. We cannot forgive such
egregious behavior so lightly and ignore public trust and confidence in the
legal profession by granting pro forma
reinstatement. McGuire has performed no acts of
community service, has not fully admitted the consequences of his failings as an attorney, and
has done little if anything to
convince
[*11] us that he has a
"firm resolve to live a correct life."
Williams, 492 So. 2d at 580.
CONCLUSION
P15. McGuire carries the ultimate burden of proving his worthiness for
reinstatement to the
practice of law. Having reviewed McGuire's petition, the Bar's answer, and McGuire's response,
it is the opinion of this Court that McGuire has not met his burden and has
failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 12 and the requirements for
reinstatement as set forth by this Court. Therefore, his petition is denied.
P16.
PETITION FOR
REINSTATEMENT DENIED.
PITTMAN, C.J., BANKS AND McRAE, P.JJ., SMITH, WALLER, COBB AND DIAZ, JJ.,
CONCUR. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
