IN THE MATTER OF WILLIAM JAMES PERRONE; PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT
No. 959 Disciplinary Docket No. 2
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
2001 Pa. LEXIS 1522
January 30, 2001, Argued
July 17, 2001, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
[*1] Disciplinary Board No. 74 DB 93. Attorney Registration No. 19412.
DISPOSITION: Petition for reinstatement denied.
COUNSEL: For PETITIONER, Office Of Disciplinary Counsel: Harold E. Ciampoli, Esq.
For RESPONDENT, William J. Perrone: James C. Schwartzman, Esq.
JUDGES: COMPOSITION OF THE COURT: MR. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN P. FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY,
CASTILLE, NIGRO, SAYLOR, JJ. Madame Justice NEWMAN did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE NIGRO.
OPINIONBY: NIGRO
OPINION:
OPINION
MR. JUSTICE NIGRO
This case involves Petitioner William Perrone's petition to be
reinstated following his
disbarment from the
practice of law in Pennsylvania. On July 27, 1993, Perrone pleaded guilty to
theft by
deception, tampering with public records or information, securing execution of documents
by
deception and unsworn falsification to authorities. The criminal charges stemmed from
Perrone's filing of false and misleading fee petitions which requested payment
for
legal services purportedly provided to
indigent defendants in the City of Philadelphia ("City"). Perrone was sentenced to five years probation for the
theft by
deception and tampering with public records convictions, and two years probation on the
other charges, to run concurrently. Perrone was also ordered to pay $
130,000.00 in restitution, which was promptly paid in full. On November 30,
1995, this Court entered an order disbarring Perrone from the
practice
[*2] of law
retroactive to September 1, 1993. Perrone now petitions this Court for
reinstatement pursuant to Rule 218(c)(6) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary
Enforcement ("Pa.R.D.E."). n1 For the reasons that follow, we deny the petition for
reinstatement.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 1. Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(6) provides:
In the event the Board recommends
reinstatement and the Supreme Court, after consideration of that
recommendation, is of the view that a rule to show cause should be served upon the
respondent-attorney why an order denying
reinstatement should not be entered, the same shall be issued setting forth the areas of the
Court's concern.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Perrone filed the instant petition for
reinstatement on December 9, 1997. A hearing on the petition was held before a hearing
committee on October 15, 1998. Following the hearing, the committee filed a
report recommending that the petition
for
reinstatement be granted. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a brief on exceptions to
the
recommendation, and the matter was adjudicated by the
[*3] Disciplinary Board at a meeting on August 18, 1999. In a subsequent report,
the Disciplinary Board recommended that Perrone's petition for
reinstatement be granted. n2
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 Board Member, now Chair, Angelo Scaricamazza filed a dissenting opinion in
which then-Board Chair William Caroselli joined.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
On April 18, 2000, this Court issued a rule to show cause why an order denying
Perrone's petition for
reinstatement should not be entered based on his failure to meet the
threshold standard
articulated in
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Keller, 509 Pa. 573, 506 A.2d 872 (Pa. 1986), as well as his failure to demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that his present
resumption of the
practice of law would not have a
detrimental effect upon either the integrity and standing of the bar, the administration
of justice, or the
public interest, and that he has the moral
qualifications,
competency and learning in the
law required for
admission to practice law in the Commonwealth, as is required by Pa.R.D.
[*4] E. 218(c)(3)(i). Following our receipt of Perrone's response to the rule to
show cause, this Court issued an order granting oral argument in this matter,
which was heard on January 30, 2001.
The primary purpose of our lawyer disciplinary system is to protect the public
from unfit attorneys and to maintain the integrity of the
legal system. See
Keller, 506 A.2d at 875. Although a
disbarred attorney may petition for
reinstatement five years after
disbarment,
reinstatement is not automatic or guaranteed. See id. When a
disbarred attorney seeks
reinstatement, the threshhold
question must be whether the petitioner has shown that his breach of trust was
not so
egregious as to preclude this Court from even considering his petition for
reinstatement. n3 See In the
Matter of Greenburg, 749 A.2d 434, 435 (Pa. 2000); In the
Matter of Costigan, 541 Pa. 459, 664 A.2d 518, 520 (Pa. 1995);
Keller, 506 A.2d at 875.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n3 This
threshold inquiry is somewhat coextensive with this Court's duty to determine whether
Perrone has met his burden under Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3)(i) of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that his current
resumption of the
practice of law would not have a
detrimental impact on the integrity and standing of the bar, the administration of
justice, or the
public interest. The
threshold inquiry
articulated in Keller and later clarified in In the
Matter of Costigan, 541 Pa. 459, 664 A.2d 518, 520 (Pa. 1995), merely recognizes the fact that some forms of
misconduct are so
egregious that they will forever bar the
disbarred attorney from successfully seeking
reinstatement.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*5]
The
misconduct in this matter arose from Perrone's filing of false and misleading fee
petitions with the City. From 1990 to 1992, Perrone submitted 254 fee petitions
requesting payment for
legal services provided to
indigent defendants in Philadelphia. The fee petitions contained itemized statements of
time expended, services rendered and expenses allegedly incurred by Perrone in
performing
legal services. Each fee petition also contained Perrone's notarized affidavit that the facts
averred in the petition were true. After the Deputy Court Administrator and
trial court judge reviewed each fee petition, Perrone was issued checks by the
City. From 1990 to 1992, Perrone received checks
totaling $ 345,755.12 from the City.
Perrone's
misconduct continued for three years until it was discovered as a result of an
investigation conducted by a reporter for the Philadelphia Inquirer. A review
of Perrone's fee petitions, as a whole, revealed that he actually billed for
more than 40 hours a day for three separate days, 24 hours per day on 85
separate days, and more than 18 hours per day on 140 days. This billing meant
that Perrone would had to have worked 11.5 hours per day, seven days a week,
[*6] 365 days a year from 1990 through 1992. Perrone's methods of defrauding the
City included filing fee petitions and receiving compensation for representing
defendants in non-existent cases, representing defendants when official court
records showed that he was not present in
court on the dates and times listed in the fee petition, researching and
writing petitions for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court when he
submitted the identical brief submitted to the Superior Court, and drafting
petitions in such a way that it appeared that he represented a defendant on
more than one matter when, in fact, he provided legal representation for
handling a single matter.
Viewing Perrone's
misconduct in light of this Court's previous holdings concerning
reinstatement petitions, we cannot say that Perrone's
misconduct was so
deplorable that he can never be
reinstated to the bar. See In the
Matter of Verlin, 557 Pa. 47, 731 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1999) (attorney's
misconduct in assisting personal injury client in impersonating dead man at deposition
was not so
egregious that it precluded consideration of petition for
reinstatement);
Costigan, 664 A.2d at 518 (attorney's
[*7] participation in an unorthodox distribution of estate assets involving
concealment of assets from the rightful heir was not so
egregious that it precluded consideration of petition for
reinstatement). Having come to this conclusion, we must now determine whether Perrone has met
his burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that his current
resumption of the
practice of law would not have a
detrimental impact on the integrity and standing of the bar, the administration of
justice, or the
public interest, and that he has the moral
qualifications,
competency and learning in the
law required for
admission to practice law in this Commonwealth. See Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3)(i). In order to make this
determination, we must consider the amount of time that has passed since
Perrone was
disbarred, as well as his efforts at
rehabilitation. See
Verlin, 731 A.2d at 602.
In the instant case, Perrone has been removed from the
practice of law since September 1, 1993. Since his
disbarment, Perrone has completed his probationary period, paid his court ordered
restitution, volunteered for charitable organizations and spent time with his
family. Perrone also worked as a record
[*8] keeper for a restaurant supply company and as a paralegal, where he had the
opportunity to review advance sheets and other legal publications. In addition,
Perrone kept up with his legal education by attending CLE courses, completing
42 hours of course work in the year preceding his filing for
reinstatement. At his
reinstatement hearing, eight character witnesses, including Perrone's employers, community
members and attorneys, testified in support of Perrone's
reinstatement. Perrone also submitted twenty-four
"character reference" letters supporting his petition for
reinstatement. In addition, Perrone testified that he recognized his wrongdoing and admitted
that he is solely to blame for his
misconduct. Although this evidence suggests that Perrone is working
towards
rehabilitation, we do not believe that a sufficient amount of time has passed to dissipate the
detrimental impact of his
misconduct on the
public trust. Nor do we believe that he has performed an acceptable amount of community
service given the type of
misconduct involved here, i.e., the misappropriation of
public funds earmarked for
indigent representation.
Perrone's
misconduct was both deliberate and committed solely
[*9] for his own personal profit. Not only did Perrone knowingly and intentionally
engineer a systematic scheme to defraud the City, he did so in his capacity as
a court-appointed public defender. As noted by the dissent to the Disciplinary
Board's
recommendation, Perrone misappropriated
public funds that were specifically intended to be used to provide representation for
indigent individuals. The dissent explained that:
The major portion of the budget of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County is allocated to provide for
legal services to those that are unable to afford services of a private attorney. [Perrone],
by filing these fraudulent fee petitions, in essence, was taking funds from
those individuals that our system has a duty to protect. The individuals are
those that could least afford the services of a private attorney and must turn
to the Courts to appoint representation for them. The misappropriation and
theft was incurred by the fee petitions submitted by [Perrone] that potentially
deprived an
indigent person from representation.
Dissent, 959 D.D. 2 at 1-2, filed February 24, 2000.
Moreover, Perrone's
misconduct continued for three years until it was discovered
[*10] by the Philadelphia Inquirer reporter. In Perrone's initial disciplinary
proceeding, the Disciplinary Board found that Perrone
"has not shown appreciable contrition or sorrow for his conduct, and it is the
opinion of this Board that [Perrone] would not have come forward on his own to
report his conduct had he not been directly and indisputably confronted with it." 74 D.B. 93, at 13-14, filed October
18, 1995.
Our decision to deny the petition for
reinstatement also rests on the fact that Perrone's
misconduct involved false swearing. When Perrone submitted the false fee petitions, he
did so with notarized affidavits stating that the facts averred in the
petitions were true. This Court has consistently held that this type of
misconduct is a particularly
egregious species of dishonesty that goes to the heart of the
legal profession. See
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Grigsby, 493 Pa. 194, 425 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa. 1981). In Greenburg, we recently reiterated how
deplorable such conduct is when we stated:
Deliberate misrepresentations in court filings by an attorney are a greivously
serious matter. Attorneys, as officers of the court, who intentionally file
false
[*11] statements in court proceedings
implicate the very core of the
legal system. Ours is a profession that can only function effectively as long as attorneys
abide by their
ethical requirements. By repeatedly filing false information to a court of law,
petitioner has seriously damaged both the
legal profession and the
public trust. It is difficult to imagine a circumstance that more closely
implicates one's
fitness to practice law.
Greenberg, 749 A.2d at 436-437 (Citations omitted). Similarly, in the instant case, Perrone's
misconduct in misappropriating
public funds earmarked for
indigent representation for his own personal enrichment goes to the core of the
legal system and seriously
implicates his
fitness to practice law.
In light of these circumstances, it is clear that Perrone's dishonest actions
have gravely damaged both the
legal profession and the
public trust in the
legal system. Given the severity of Perrone's misdeeds, allowing him to be
reinstated after less than eight years of
disbarment would only reinforce the public's perception that lawyers are greedy and
deceitful. See
id. at 437. Therefore, as we believe that allowing Perrone to
[*12] resume the
practice of law at the present time would have a
detrimental effect upon the integrity and standing of the bar and on the administration of
justice and would subvert the
public interest, the petition for
reinstatement is denied. n4 See
id. at 436;
Costigan, 664 A.2d at 522-523.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n4 Pursuant to Rule 218(e), Pa.R.D.E., Perrone is directed to pay the expenses
incurred by the Board in the investigation and processing of the petition for
reinstatement.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Madame Justice Newman did not participate in the consideration or decision of
this case.
