In the Matter of JEROME J. VERLIN
No. 886 Disciplinary Docket No. 2
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
557 Pa. 47;
731 A.2d 600;
1999 Pa. LEXIS 1783
February 2, 1999, Argued
June 23, 1999, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
[***1] No. 86 DB 92 Disciplinary Board. Attorney Registration No. 03706.
COUNSEL: For Petitioner: Harold E. Ciampoli, Esquire, For Disciplinary Board.
For Respondent: James C. Schwartzman, Esquire, For Jerome J. Verlin.
JUDGES: COMPOSITION OF THE COURT: MR. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN P. FLAHERTY ZAPPALA, CAPPY,
NIGRO, SAYLOR, JJ. MR. JUSTICE NIGRO. Mr. Justice Castille and Madame Justice
Newman did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr.
Chief Justice Flaherty and Mr. Justice Saylor dissent.
OPINIONBY: NIGRO
OPINION:
[*49]
[**600] PETITION FOR
REINSTATEMENT
OPINION
MR. JUSTICE NIGRO
DECIDED:JUNE 23, 1999
This case involves Petitioner Verlin's petition to be
reinstated to the bar following his
disbarment. On July 5, 1991, Verlin was convicted of criminal conspiracy, perjury, false
swearing, and theft by deception. The criminal charges leveled against Verlin
stemmed from his improper handling of two related
personal injury actions. Following Verlin's conviction, on November 30, 1995, this Court
entered an
[**601] order disbarring Verlin
retroactive to September 4, 1992. Verlin now petitions this Court for
reinstatement pursuant to Rule 218(c)(6) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary
Enforcement (Pa.R.D.E.). For the reasons that follow, we grant the petition for
reinstatement.
Verlin filed his instant petition for
reinstatement on December 18, 1996. A hearing on the petition was held before a
hearing committee on October
[***2] 20, 1997. Following the hearing, the committee filed a report
recommending that the petition for
reinstatement be granted. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a brief on exceptions,
and the matter was adjudicated by the Disciplinary Board at a meeting on June
10, 1998. The Disciplinary Board thereafter issued a report
recommending that Verlin's petition for
reinstatement be granted.
On October 15, 1998, the Court issued a rule to show cause why an order denying
Verlin's petition for
reinstatement should not be entered based on his failure to meet the
threshold standard
articulated in
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Keller, 509 Pa. 573, 506 A.2d 872 (1986), as well as his failure to demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence, as is
[*50] required by Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3)(i), that his present
resumption of the
practice of
law would not have a
detrimental effect upon either the integrity and standing of the bar, the administration
of justice, or the
public interest, and that he has the moral
qualifications,
competency and
learning in the
law required for
admission to practice law in the Commonwealth. n1 Following our receipt of Verlin's response to the rule
to show cause, the Court
[***3] issued an order granting oral argument in the matter. Oral argument was heard
on February 2, 1999.
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n1 Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(6) provides:
In the event the Board recommends
reinstatement and the Supreme Court, after consideration of that recommendation, is of the
view that a rule to show cause should be served upon the respondent-attorney
why an order denying
reinstatement should not be entered, the same shall be issued setting forth the areas of the
Court's concern.
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Initially, we must determine whether Verlin has shown that his
breach of trust was not so
egregious as to
preclude us from even considering his petition for
reinstatement. n2 See In the
Matter of Costigan, 541 Pa. 459, 464-65, 664 A.2d 518, 520 (1995);
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Keller, 509 Pa. 573, 506 A.2d 872 (1986)).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 This
threshold inquiry is somewhat coextensive with this Court's duty to determine whether
Verlin has met his burden under Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3)(i) of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that his current
resumption of the
practice of law would not have a
detrimental impact on the integrity and standing of the bar, the administration of
justice, or the
public interest. The
threshold inquiry
articulated in Keller and later clarified in Costigan merely recognizes the fact that some
forms of
misconduct are so
egregious that they will forever bar the
disbarred attorney from successfully seeking
reinstatement.
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[***4]
The
breach of
trust in this case arose from Verlin's handling of two related
personal injury matters. In 1984, Verlin agreed to represent half-brothers Robert Wilson and
Anthony Williams in two cases involving claims made on a single automobile
insurance policy issued to James Dodson by Aetna Insurance Company. James
Dodson died in 1978. Verlin filed complaints on behalf of Wilson and Williams,
and scheduled
depositions. Verlin became aware that Wilson had been impersonating Dodson in his
communications with Aetna, and therefore at least suspected that Wilson would
attempt to
[*51]
impersonate Dodson at a
deposition scheduled for December 7, 1984. Accordingly, Verlin arranged for an associate
at his firm who was unfamiliar with Wilson to conduct the
deposition, so that Wilson's confidentiality would be preserved and any perjury on
Wilson's part would remain undiscovered. Wilson proceeded to
impersonate Dodson at the
deposition, but after the
associate took the
deposition he
confronted Verlin and demanded to know whether the man he had
[**602] just deposed was actually James Dodson. At that point, Verlin acknowledged
that Dodson was dead, and assured the associate who deposed Wilson that the firm
[***5] would rid itself of the case. Despite his promise to the contrary, Verlin
continued to litigate the Wilson and Williams cases, and even attempted to use
the fraudulent Dodson
deposition as leverage in settlement negotiations. Only in 1988, when his fellow partners
discovered the fraud and
confronted him, did Verlin withdraw from the Wilson and Williams cases.
As the Disciplinary Board noted in its October 30, 1995 report
recommending that Verlin be
disbarred, Verlin's involvement in Wilson's and Williams' fraudulent conduct was not
merely
"passing" or
"accidental" but rather, was knowing and voluntary. By assisting Wilson to
impersonate Dodson at the
deposition, and by continuing to litigate Wilson's and Williams' cases following the
impersonation at the
deposition, Verlin
damaged the public's confidence in both the legal profession and the
administration of justice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, we
agree with the Disciplinary Board that Verlin's
misconduct is not so
egregious as to act as an outright bar to our consideration of his petition for
reinstatement.
Having concluded that Verlin's
misconduct is not so
egregious as to preclude this Court from considering
[***6] his petition for
reinstatement, we must now determine whether Verlin has met his burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that his current
resumption of the
practice of law would not have a
detrimental impact on the integrity and standing of the bar, the administration of
justice, or the
public interest, and that he has the moral
qualifications,
competency and
learning
[*52] in the
law required for
admission to practice law in this Commonwealth. Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3)(i). In order to make this
determination, we must consider the amount of time that has passed since Verlin
was
disbarred, as well as his efforts at rehabilitation.
Almost eight
years have passed since Verlin's
retroactive
disbarment on September 4, 1992. While this is not an extremely lengthy period of time,
we believe that it is sufficient to dissipate the
detrimental impact of Verlin's
misconduct on the integrity and standing of the bar, the administration of justice, and
the
public interest. In addition, Verlin's period of
disbarment has provided this Court with an opportunity to evaluate Verlin's ongoing
efforts to rehabilitate himself. As the following discussion indicates, Verlin
has demonstrated a steadfast commitment
[***7] to rehabilitating himself during his
disbarment
Following his criminal conviction in 1991, Verlin was sentenced to 11 to 23
months incarceration. However, Verlin's sentence was subsequently reduced to
four months of
work release and six weeks of home
monitoring, which he completed without incident. Following the conclusion of his
work release and home
monitoring, Verlin was placed on probation, which, owing to his exemplary behavior, was
terminated nearly two years early. Following the termination of his
probation, Verlin paid his court-ordered restitution and fines, and almost
immediately began working as a paralegal in his son's law office.
During his
disbarment, Verlin has kept up with his
learning in the law by working for his son as a paralegal, reading the legal
periodicals, and attending numerous legal courses sponsored by the Pennsylvania
Bar Institute and the Bar Association. In addition, Verlin has served the
community by volunteering his time at the Support Center for Child Advocates.
At his
reinstatement hearing, Verlin presented the testimony of seven character witnesses,
including a former Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, a
past President
[***8] of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, attorneys, and
[*53] a physician. The character witnesses testified that Verlin's
resumption of the
practice of law would not be subversive of the
public
[**603] interest or prejudicial to the administration of justice. In addition,
Verlin submitted one hundred sixteen letters attesting to his good character.
n3 Perhaps most importantly, the Disciplinary Board found that Verlin testified
credibly as to his remorse for his actions, which he described as a
breach of trust to himself, his profession and his family. In addition, Verlin assured the
Hearing Committee that if he is
reinstated, he will conduct himself with the
highest degree of integrity.
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n3 The extensive character testimony provided on Verlin's behalf demonstrates
the high regard and reputation that he enjoyed during the thirty-five years
that he practiced law in the Philadelphia area. That Verlin had such a
distinguished career and was held in such high esteem by his colleagues and the
community at large suggests that the serious
misconduct which resulted in his
disbarment was an aberration.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[***9]
Considering all of the foregoing facts, we believe that Verlin has proven, by
clear and convincing evidence, that his
resumption of the
practice of law would not have a
detrimental impact on the integrity and standing of the bar, the administration of
justice, or the
public interest, and that he has the moral
qualifications,
competency, and
learning in the
law required for
admission to practice law in this Commonwealth. Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3)(i). We are satisfied that Verlin
will conduct himself with the
highest degree of integrity, as he has observed and experienced firsthand the devastating
damage that the unethical
practice of law often reaps on the offending lawyer, his family, friends and colleagues. In
addition, we believe that Verlin has shown that he is prepared to accept his
responsibility as a lawyer to conduct himself in such a manner as to protect
and cultivate the integrity and standing of the bar in the eyes of the public,
and to facilitate the proper administration of justice.
As this Court aptly stated in In the
Matter of Robert W. Costigan, 541 Pa. 459, 465, 664 A.2d 518, 520 (1995):
Inevitably, meeting the requirements of
rule 218(c)(3)(I) will involve the
[***10] petitioner's coming to terms with the conduct that caused his
disbarment. In other words, the petitioner
[*54] must demonstrate not only that he understands the nature of his
wrongdoing, but also he must convince this court that he is not
predisposed to commit future ethical
wrongdoings.
Based on the record before us, we believe that Verlin has come to terms with
his
misconduct, and has further shown by his words and actions that he is not
predisposed to commit future ethical
wrongdoings. Accordingly, we hereby grant his petition for
reinstatement.
Pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 218(e), Verlin is directed to pay the expenses incurred
by the Board in the investigation and processing of his petition for
reinstatement.
Mr. Justice Castille and Madame Justice Newman did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Chief Justice Flaherty and Mr. Justice Saylor dissent.
